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The study of lay theories focuses on understanding people’s fundamental beliefs, the 
interpretations of the world that they shape, and their regulatory consequences. Central to this 
scientific endeavor is the subject of stability and changeability—a cornerstone concept of human 
motivation (Weiner, 1985). Theories of attribute stability motivate self-validation through 
performance and dispositional judgments of others, whereas theories of attribute malleability 
facilitate change-directed efforts and expectations of improvement (Kammrath & Peetz, 2012; 
Molden & Dweck, 2006). Thus far, research has primarily focused on people’s beliefs about 
their personal attributes (“self theories”); comparatively less has elucidated the implications of 
people’s beliefs about the external world (“situation theories”). The goal of this dissertation is to 
expand our understanding of how self theories and situation theories work and to introduce a 
new theoretical framework that integrates them.  
In Chapter 1, I introduce the lay theories of change literature and provide a general 
overview of the following chapters. In Chapter 2, I test an important boundary condition of 
previous self theory research: choice context. Four studies show that offering people the choice 
between persisting or quitting on an intellectual task replicates conventional lay theory 
differences in persistence, but these differences are eliminated when people’s choices are 
expanded to include switching problems. In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of people’s situation 
theories on behavior. Four studies show that construing situations as malleable rather than fixed 
galvanizes action to change unfavorable circumstances. In Chapter 4, I assess the implications of 
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lay theories about how people should interact with their environments to achieve their goals. 
When it comes to achieving passion for work, some people believe that they should find work 
compatible with their interests whereas others believe that it comes through cultivating 
competence. These two mindsets lead to different affective forecasts and choices, but both are 
similarly effective at attaining passion. Assimilating these and past findings in Chapter 5, I 
propose the “Self by Situation Change” (SSC) model as a heuristic framework that integrates self 
and situation theories. Finally, I wrap up the dissertation with future directions and concluding 







 When highly complex and confounding events like 2014’s airplane tragedies occur, many 
people often jump in with explanations that betray their underlying assumptions, such as  
“terrorists are responsible for today’s violence,” and “accidents are bound to happen.” We 
similarly observe this phenomenon with everyday, mundane events that contain their own 
perplexities, such as why some people are richer than others or why some students do better than 
others on exams. After all, it is instinctive in human nature to make meaning of the events that 
occur in their lives (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985). As Weiner (1992) argued, lay people and 
scientists alike “search for meaning in their environment, formulate hypotheses, and act on the 
basis of these belief systems” (p. 224).  
The explanations that people conjure up to explain events often betray their fundamental 
assumptions about how the world works—or what psychologists term “lay theories” (Furnham, 
1988). Lay theories are often referred to synonymously as “mindsets, ” “naïve theories,” or 
“implicit theories.” For example, many people believe that everyone gets their just desserts, that 
people are born with a certain level of IQ, or that people remain in poverty because they do not 
help themselves. Others believe that the world is not always fair, that people can develop their 
intelligence, and that we should blame disadvantageous social systems for perpetuating poverty.  
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Regardless of which theories people endorse, these “lay theories” form the mental 
context that they use to interpret their circumstances (Crum, 2012; Molden & Dweck, 2006). 
From a psychological perspective, these interpretive frames can powerfully influence how people 
react to events. Interpreting the world through the lens of different lay theories means that people 
can draw drastically different conclusions about the same targets and react in considerably 
different ways to the same circumstances (Ross & Nisbett, 2011).  
For instance, marketing a type of wine as “highly popular” could either promote sales for 
the wine company or backfire, depending on the lay theory that consumers apply: High product 
popularity could be construed as desirable if consumers think that social consensus is indicative 
of a favored, good quality product; but it could be construed as undesirable if they rely on the lay 
theory that popularity reflects a lack of exclusivity, especially for high-end goods (Deval, Mantel, 
Kardes, & Posavac, 2013). Similarly, the value of an artwork can be swayed by the salience of 
different lay theories at the time of judgment. Only when a lay theory emphasizing artistic effort 
is applied does information about longer artistic investment boosts its perceived value. When a 
lay theory emphasizing artistic talent is salient, knowing that the artist invested a long time to 
craft the art piece has no impact on perceivers’ valuation of the artwork (Cho & Schwarz, 
2008)—and might even backfire if people judge the artist as untalented.  
Lay Theories of Change 
Although there are many different types of lay theories, the lay theory literature has 
greatly emphasized people’s beliefs about the stability or changeability of characteristics. The 
importance of this dimension dates back to writings by early developmental psychologists, 
Piaget & Garcia. These psychologists identified two primary conceptions of the world—static 
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versus constantly changing—as fundamental worldviews that shape children’s interpretations 
and reactions (as cited in Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Understanding which things are 
“amenable to personal control and which are likely to remain invariant in the face of attempted 
change” (p. 327) is crucial in human cognitive development (Dweck et al., 1995). This enables 
us to discern what we can or cannot expect to influence, and therefore how to interact effectively 
with our social worlds (Dweck et al., 1995).  
In his seminal review article, Michael Ross (1989) emphasized this stability-change 
dimension by defining lay theories as “schemalike knowledge structures that include specific 
beliefs regarding the inherent stability of an attribute, as well as a set of general principles 
concerning the conditions likely to promote personal change or stability.” And understandably 
so—lay theories of change can be powerfully motivating, as abundant empirical research has 
found.  
In the domain of education, for instance, students’ construals of their intelligence as fixed 
or malleable influence the way they deal with academic trials—and even predict their long-term 
achievement. When faced with difficulty, students with a theory that intelligence is malleable 
tend to show more emotional resilience and behavioral persistence, compared to those with a 
theory that intelligence is fixed and innate (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988). Over time, these behavioral and cognitive-affective differences add up to 
produce substantial disparities in academic achievement (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 
2007). We observe similar self-regulatory differences among those who hold fixed versus 
malleable theories of many other attributes, including: body weight, shyness, emotions, 
negotiation skills, leadership ability, relationships, and overall personality (e.g., Beer, 2002; 
Burnette, 2010; Erdley, Cain, Loomis, & Dweck, 1997; Hoyt, Burnette, & Innella, 2010; Knee, 
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1998; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). Across multiple 
domains, a malleably theory of attributes facilitates an orientation towards learning that seems to 
offer both short and long-term advantages over the achievement focus that a fixed theory 
promotes. 
The Present Literature and its Emerging Future 
At present, a great deal of research has focused on lay theories about personal attributes 
(“self theories”). A basic pattern of results has consistently emerged across multiple domains: 
when people believe that a particular aspect of themselves can be changed, they are more likely 
to work on cultivating and improving it. Recent research on lay theories, however, is attempting 
to go beyond further demonstrations that self theory effects extend to other personal attributes.  
This research is testing the boundary conditions of lay theory effects and their relations to other 
motivational constructs (e.g., Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013; Leith, Ward, 
Giacomin, Landau, Ehrlinger, & Wilson, 2014). The goal of this dissertation is to build our 
understanding of how lay theories of change work and to offer new perspectives that enrich 
current theorizing. Each Chapter approaches the study of lay theories literature in an incremental 
manner, building up to a new theoretical framework in Chapter 5 that aims to contribute to 
scholarly advancement on lay theories of change. The next four Chapters progress according to 
the following logic: 
(1) understanding the context that self theories have been studied in (Chapter 2), 
(2) extending scholarship to people’s lay theories of situations (Chapter 3), 
(3) examining lay theories about how people should interact with their environments 
(Chapter 4), and 
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(4) integrating self and situation theories into a unified framework (Chapter 5). 
Chapter 2: Putting Self Theories into Context 
Malleable self theories powerfully motivate persistence among people who believe that 
their abilities are malleable, but hinder task perseverance among those who believe their abilities 
are fixed (Molden & Dweck, 2006). In Chapter 2, I argue that this pattern of results generally 
emerges in contexts where people are only given two ways of responding to setback: persisting 
at the same task or quitting it. However, differences in persistence are eliminated when people’s 
responses to difficulty are expanded beyond this restricted dichotomy. Four studies demonstrate 
this boundary condition in action, illustrating that problem solvers’ choice options under 
difficulty moderate conventional self theory effects. 
Chapter 3: Empirical Evidence for the Motivational Implications of Situation Theories 
Do people have lay theories about situational malleability like they do about personal 
attributes? Can we change the way people respond to events by altering their beliefs about 
situational malleability? In Chapter 3, I introduce the concept of “situation theories” and describe 
four studies which show that construing situations as generally malleable rather than fixed 
increases how likely people are to take action to improve their circumstances. 
Chapter 4: Lay Theories about Person-Environment Interactions: Finding a Fit or 
Developing It 
 If people have lay theories about personal attributes and lay theories about their external 
circumstances, do they also hold beliefs about person-environment interactions? Using the 
domain of work to illustrate this possibility, I highlight in Chapter 4 that a majority of American 
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working adults believe in finding compatibility with their vocations, whereas a minority believe 
in developing themselves to meet the vocational demands. Four studies assessed the expectations, 
choices, and outcomes that are associated with each of these lay theories. 
Chapter 5: Integrating Lay Theories of Personal and Situational Changeability: The Self 
by Situation Change Model of Lay Theories 
 In Chapter 5, I present a brief review of the self and situation theories literatures 
(including the studies in the previous Chapters), discuss their separate motivational implications, 
and propose a new theoretical framework to integrate these disjoint areas. This Chapter attempts 
to extend previous theorizing on lay theories of change by offering a theoretical perspective that 
I hope will prove heuristic and generative. 
Chapter 6: Future Directions and Concluding Thoughts 
 In Chapter 6, I briefly discuss some future directions and end with concluding thoughts.
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Putting Self Theories into Context 
 
Abstract 
In four studies, we examined how the choice alternatives available to problem solvers interact 
with their implicit theories of intelligence to produce differences in persistence. Past laboratory 
studies that restrict problem solvers’ choices to continuing or quitting an activity find that, when 
faced with difficulty, entity theorists persist less and quit more than their incremental 
counterparts. We replicate these well-established differences with the standard dichotomous 
choice options in ongoing problem-solving tasks. Importantly, we show that these differences 
can be eliminated when problem solvers’ options are expanded beyond this persist-quit 
dichotomy. Our findings converge on the conclusion that the “entity-quitters” and “incremental-
persisters” dichotomy is conditional on a specific problem-solving context, and does not hold 
when problem solvers have other alternatives. These studies enrich our understanding of how our 
beliefs interact with the salient choice options to affect persistence, and suggest implications for 




When Quitters Don’t Quite Quit: Additional Choice Options Attenuate the Disadvantages of a 
Fixed Mindset 
When confronted with a homework problem that we are stuck on, faced with an 
assignment that we cannot figure out, or told that we scored at the bottom of our class on an 
exam, many of us tend to consider two options at our immediate disposal: putting in more effort 
or giving up. In threatening situations such as these, whether we are predisposed towards one or 
the other response depends to a large extent on our beliefs about intelligence (Dweck, 2000; 
Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Do these beliefs, however, produce the same 
motivational outcomes in achievement contexts where we have more than these two responses at 
our disposal? This research identifies and tests a previously unarticulated boundary condition of 
implicit theory effects: people’s choices under difficulty. 
Beliefs about Intelligence 
Consider two students: one whose schedule is full of rigorous, demanding courses, who 
values personal development over grades, and who considers each challenge an opportunity to 
learn; another who favors easy classes that are gentle on one’s grades, who maintains a stellar 
academic record with straight As, and who considers high effort indicative of low ability.  
The first kind of mentality is that of a growth mindset. These people hold an “incremental 
theory of intelligence”—a theory that intelligence is malleable and can be developed through 
practice over time. This mindset inclines people towards learning and mastery, so that they tend 
to embrace challenge, persist in the face of obstacles, and relish the experience of accomplishing 
effortful tasks (Dweck, 1986, 2000; Hong, et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Incremental 
theorists “tend to seek challenging learning opportunities and show resilience in the face of 
setbacks” (Dweck, 2012, p. 615).  
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In contrast, the second type of student exhibits a fixed mindset, which is associated with 
the belief that intelligence is a fixed, internal entity that does not significantly change over time.  
People with this  “entity theory of intelligence” generally prioritize performing well over 
development. They tend to prefer easy tasks on which successes are attainable, “tend to avoid 
challenges for fear of showing themselves to be unintelligent… (and) show less resilience in the 
face of setbacks” (Dweck, 2012, p. 615). Entity theorists are more likely to perceive failure as a 
sign of their own inadequacy and withdraw from a task after negative performance feedback 
(Molden & Dweck, 2006).  
In a nutshell, much past research has equated an incremental theory of intelligence with 
an adaptive response pattern associated with a learning orientation and behavioral persistence, 
but an entity theory of intelligence with a performance-orientation and a helpless response to 
failure (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Dweck, 2000; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong et al., 1999; Molden & Dweck, 2006). To date, few boundary 
conditions of these effects have been identified, which include ego threat and approach-
avoidance forms of motivation (Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 2013; Dweck, 
2000; Hong et al., 1999). For example, Hong and colleagues (1999) argue that motivational 
differences between entity and incremental theorists “may matter most when individuals are 
faced with clear poor performance or the threat of it” (p. 597). Our research expands on these 
known moderators by identifying another important boundary condition of implicit theory of 
intelligence effects: choice responses under difficulty. 
We propose that the motivational differences among incremental and entity theorists are 
likely to be more salient in achievement contexts where people have to choose between 
persisting at the same problem or leaving the task altogether. When people encounter difficulties 
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in these restricted choice contexts, beliefs that incline them towards learning would promote 
persistence and beliefs that incline them towards self-validation would make quitting more likely. 
However, in contexts where people’s choices of dealing with difficulty are expanded beyond this 
persist-or-quit dichotomy—like when they additionally have the option to switch problems—
these motivational differences would be attenuated. 
Achievement Choice Contexts 
 Implicit theory of intelligence research has primarily been studied in academic 
achievement contexts and laboratory experiments that simulate intellectual activities. To a large 
extent, these contexts are often structurally fixed and restrictive, offering little in the way of 
choice repertoire to students who navigate them. Surveys of students in college classes reveal 
that, on average, they perceive their class systems as such: When we asked more than 500 
students in psychology and statistics classes to rate how fixed or flexible their classes were (see 
Appendix 2.A for scales), students’ average ratings fell significantly below the midpoint of the 6-
point scales (psychology: M = 2.41, SD = .90, t(434) = -24.96, p < .001, [-1.17, -1.00]; statistics: 
M = 2.72, SD = .93, t(137) = -9.93, p < .001, [-.94, -.63]). These findings suggest that students 
perceive their class achievement contexts as generally unchangeable.  
In these restrictive contexts, when faced with difficulties that question one’s sense of 
competency, two ways of responding become apparent: putting in more effort or throwing in the 
towel. Mirroring the restricted choices that students have to respond to difficulty, a number of 
laboratory studies have dichotomized the choice between persistence and quitting on a task when 
people encounter setback. For example, Kamins and Dweck (1999, Study 1) asked children if 
they wanted to do the same puzzle again or something else; Hong and colleagues (1999, Study 3) 
gave participants the choice between taking a remedial tutorial on the same intellectual task or an 
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unrelated one; Mueller and Dweck (1998, Study 6) measured how likely or unlikely participants 
were to take home the same problems that they had tried earlier in the experiment. Given this 
choice, incremental theorists, who construe setbacks as learning opportunities, are more inclined 
to choose to continue trying; entity theorists, who view effort as negatively associated with 
ability, are more inclined to leave the task at hand (Molden & Dweck, 2006).  
The empirical evidence supports these motivational differences between entity and 
incremental theorists when their choices are restricted to quitting or persisting: Given the choice 
between persisting on the same problem or quitting the task altogether, children with an 
incremental theory of intelligence reported greater intentions to try the same puzzle they had 
earlier role-played making a mistake on. In contrast, children with an entity theory were much 
less inclined to try the same puzzle again (Kamins & Dweck, 1999, Study 1). In another study on 
college students, 73.3% of incremental theorists chose to do a remedial tutorial on the same 
ability task after receiving poor performance feedback, compared to only 13.3% of entity 
theorists—most of whom preferred an unrelated task instead (Hong et al., 1999, Study 3). These 
findings support the observation that different implicit theories motivate persistence to different 
extents when people are asked to choose between persevering or quitting under difficulty. 
But do these motivational differences between implicit theorists hold when people are no 
longer just comparing between the two options of persisting or quitting? What happens when 
people consider other ways of responding to difficulty? Greene and colleagues (2010) found that 
students who showed high levels of self-regulated learning did not show the usual relation 
between implicit theories of intelligence and learning outcomes. Self-regulation in students 
involves greater strategic awareness and flexibility in navigating their learning environments 
(Zimmerman & Pons, 1986). For those low in self-regulation, a more incremental theory was 
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associated with greater learning outcomes; but this effect was reduced to “almost zero” in those 
who were high in self-regulation (Greene, Costa, Robertson, Pan, & Deekens, 2010, p. 1036). 
Their findings suggest that people who actively strategize alternative ways of dealing with 
situational demands are buffered against the negative consequences of a fixed intelligence belief. 
Following this reasoning, the choice options that people perceive under difficulty should 
moderate differences in persistence between entity and incremental theorists. Expanding 
people’s choice options beyond the persist-or-quit dichotomy should, therefore, attenuate 
differences in persistence between theory groups.  
We tested a simple manipulation of this by offering people the option to switch problem 
under difficulty in addition to the conventional persist and quit responses. Problem switching— 
moving from a problem that one cannot immediately solve to a different problem of the same 
type, or moving from one approach to another within the same complex problem—is a strategy 
that people commonly and often adaptively adopt to deal with difficulty. Think of a crossword 
puzzle. Upon encountering a very difficult word, we can keep trying to figure out that particular 
word, quit doing the crossword puzzle altogether, or switch to a different word in the same 
puzzle. These choices are also evident in other situations where the stakes are higher, such as 
when we take examinations. During an examination, we may persist on a difficult problem that 
we do not immediately have an answer to or move on to another problem on the exam. Thus 
persisting and quitting are not the only ways that people can respond to difficulty. In fact, a 
strategy like switching allows the problem solver to persist on the same general task even though 
not on the same specific problem. We predicted that, when given this greater flexibility in 
responding to setback, the classic differences in persistence between incremental and entity 
theorists would not emerge.
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Overview 
 Four studies examined how the choice alternatives offered to problem solvers interact 
with their implicit theories of intelligence to affect persistence under difficulty. We hypothesized 
that the well-established “entity-quitters” and “incremental-persisters” dichotomy would 
replicate when problem solvers are offered only the options to persist or quit under difficulty, but 
these differences would not occur when the option to switch to a different problem is added. In 
our studies, we focused on ongoing problem-solving tasks, which recent research shows can 
similarly evoke intellectual threat like explicit negative feedback at the end of a task (O'Rourke, 
Haimovitz, Ballweber, Dweck, & Popović, 2014). Thus, the present research extends traditional 
implicit theory findings beyond achievement contexts with explicit performance feedback to 
ongoing problem-solving tasks.  
Studies 1 and 2 tested how the choice options available to problem solvers interact with 
their implicit theories to affect task persistence. Study 1 examined participants’ choices when 
encountering a highly challenging problem. Study 2 gave participants multiple problems of 
varying difficulty levels to try and measured their choices under difficulty, the total time they 
spent attempting problems, and the number of problems they attempted after experiencing 
setback. Studies 3 and 4 then studied the motivations behind participants’ behaviors: Studies 3a 
and 3b clarified the difficulty levels and types of problems that participants chose to switch to. 
Study 4 examined whether the choice options given influenced participants’ behavior directly or 
acted through their goals. 
Study 1: Quit, Persist, or Switch? 
 Study 1 tested how the choice context interacts with implicit theories to affect persistence 
in the face of difficulty. In the standard paradigm, participants were asked to choose between 
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persisting and quitting (e.g. Hong et al., 1999; Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 
1998). In these restricted choice contexts, entity theorists have been shown to persist less and to 
forgo learning opportunities in favor of quitting the activity, compared to their incremental 
counterparts. Do these behavioral differences also hold in an expanded choice context, where 
quitting, persisting, and switching problems are available options? We hypothesized that, when 
limited to the persist-or-quit choice options, entity theorists would be less likely to persist than 
incremental theorists; but when given expanded choice options, these behavioral differences 
would be attenuated.  
We measured adults’ implicit theories of intelligence and gave them two practice word 
problems before an unsolvable one. This unsolvable anagram, which was pretested to be 
experienced as a highly challenging problem, provided an intellectually challenging situation for 
everyone regardless of prior ability. Additionally, the experience of being unable to solve a 
problem simulates many real life ongoing problem-solving tasks, such as encountering a very 
difficult problem on an exam or homework assignment. In these situations, people have their 
own sense of self-efficacy and confidence in their ability to give a correct answer, and are aware 
when they are unable to do so (e.g., Hart, 1965; Miner & Reder, 1994). Thus this experience of 
intellectual difficulty served as an internal source of performance feedback on the ongoing 
problem-solving task, reproducing the intellectual threat often elicited more explicitly through 
post-task performance feedback (e.g., Hong et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). Here, we 
focused on participants’ choices among quitting, persisting, and switching problems as an 





Two hundred and four adults (53.4% male, Mage = 30.8 years, age range = 18 to 66, 
Amazon Mechanical Turk; geographic location: USA) were given up to 1 hour to solve word 
problems1. They were compensated US$1.00 regardless of study completion and accuracy of 
answers. They were not told how many anagrams the experiment included, but were instructed 
that they could do as many or as few as they wanted.  
 Participants rated their agreement with four implicit theory of intelligence measures (e.g. 
“You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence;” 1 = strongly 
agree to 6 = strongly disagree; α = .96; taken from Dweck, 2000) and how good they were at 
solving anagrams (1 = Not sure what they are; 8 = Very good). They were then instructed to 
attempt each of our anagrams by rearranging the letters provided to form a single new and valid 
word. Each letter was to be used only once. Participants were not told how many anagrams they 
would be given. 
The experiment included 3 anagrams—two easy (“RETE” and “MODR”) and one 
impossible to solve (“DUITBALNBIEE”), presented in that order2. The first two anagrams 
modeled easier practice questions or “success” problem sets in previous studies that generally 
preceded more difficult questions, and helped orient participants to the experimental task (e.g. 
Licht & Dweck, 1984; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). The impossible anagram had no solution, but 
was designed to mimic an extremely challenging, solvable anagram. A pretest showed that most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Pretesting showed that most people tended to take between 15 to 20 minutes to complete the 
experiment, with a maximum duration of 40 min. Hence, 1 hour provided an ample amount of 
time for participants to complete the experiment.  2	  Possible correct solutions to “RETE” include “TREE”, “RETE”, and “REET” – 83.3% of 
answers were correct; the correct solution to  “MODR” is “DORM” – 96.6% of answers were 
correct; there are no correct solutions to “DUITBALNBIEE” (created by scrambling letters in 
“INDUBITABLE” with an additional “E”). 	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people did not recognize that it was unsolvable, but rather, experienced it as highly challenging. 
This approach leveled any possible differences in answer accuracy and prior ability, and allowed 
us to directly measure people’s intentions to persist or quit.	  
All participants received the same choice options on the first two practice anagrams, and 
were then randomly assigned to different choice context conditions for the third anagram. On 
each of the first two, they were presented with the anagram, and asked to pick one of the 
following responses: “Here’s my answer! Continue on to the next question. [space for answer 
text]” or “Stop here, leave questionnaire.” If participants chose the latter, they were directed to 
the end of the experiment to fill out demographic information before exiting the experiment.  
All participants who attempted an answer on the first two were presented with the third 
anagram. On this anagram, participants were randomly assigned to either the restricted choice 
Quit-Persist (Q-P) condition or the expanded choice Quit-Persist-Switch (Q-P-S) condition. In 
the Q-P condition, the same choice options presented in the first two anagrams were shown, 
namely to answer the anagram or to stop. In the Q-P-S condition, participants were provided 
with an additional switch problems option, “Please switch me to a different anagram!” 
Participants’ choice response on the impossible anagram constituted our main dependent variable. 
After responding to the impossible anagram, participants who gave an answer to it were 
told that their answer was incorrect and those who chose the switch option received a message 
apologizing that there were currently no more anagrams available to try. After each anagram, 
participants rated its difficulty on a 1 (Very Difficult) – 7 (Very Easy) scale. Finally, all 
participants provided demographic information, and indicated whether they had tackled the 




We excluded 2 participants who reported getting help from others, 1 who did not respond 
to attempting the anagrams alone, and 1 who suspected that the third anagram was unsolvable. 
Our results and significance levels remained the same as when all participants’ data were 
included. On average, participants reported being “neither good nor bad” at anagrams (M = 4.90, 
SD = 1.90). There were no significant differences in pre-existing skill level between entity and 
incremental theorists, Me = 4.78, SDe = 1.88; Mi = 4.93, SDi = 1.90, p = .626, [-.73, .44], or 
choice option conditions, Me = 4.86, SDe = 1.96; Mi = 4.90, SDi = 1.84, p = .881, [-.57, .49]. On 
average, participants reported little experience with similar tasks (M = 2.27, SD = .64). The 
results validated the difficulty levels of our anagrams: A repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) showed that participants ranked the easy anagrams as significantly easier (MTree = 
5.47, SDTree = 1.76; MDorm = 5.82, SDDorm = 1.38) than the impossible anagram (MImpossible = 1.23, 
SDImpossible = .78), Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F(1.91, 375.34) = 882.12, p < .001,. There were 
no significant differences on the perceived difficulties of each of the anagrams between 
conditions (all ps > .27). 
The four implicit theory of intelligence measures formed a reliable measure (α = .96). In 
line with previous studies (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck et al., 1995; Hong et al., 1999), 
we divided participants into those with clear entity and incremental theories. Entity theories 
included all those who averaged 3 and below on the 6-point measure; incremental theorists 
included all those who averaged 4 and above. Hence, 23 (11.5%) who scored between 3 and 4 
were excluded from the theory groups. We obtained the same pattern of results when we used the 
continuous scales, but present them as dichotomous groups because we were primarily interested 
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in comparing people with clear entity and incremental theories, rather than including those who 
were undecided between the two. 
We tested participants’ responses to the difficulty experienced on the impossible anagram. 
Throughout our analyses, we report chi-square tests where appropriate and Fisher’s exact tests 
when the chi-square assumptions of expected call frequency of 5 or more were violated (as 
prescribed by Agresti & Finlay, 1997). Replicating past literature, entity theorists in the Q-P 
condition were more likely than not to quit in the face of difficulty, and more likely to do so than 
incremental theorists (78.8% entity versus 54.4% incremental), χ2(1, N = 90) = 5.36, p = .021. 
However, these differences were eliminated in the Q-P-S condition, p = .835. As shown in Table 
2.1, entity and incremental theorists overwhelmingly chose the switch option (93.5% entity, 
90.7% incremental), almost none chose to quit (0% entity, 3.7% incremental), and few chose to 
answer (6.5% entity, 5.6% incremental). 
 To directly compare quitting versus non-quitting, we collapsed answering and switching 
choices into a single “do not quit” measure on the impossible anagram for comparison. In the Q-
P condition, entity theorists quit in significantly higher rates than incremental theorists, as 
described above (78.8% entity versus 54.4% incremental). In the Q-P-S condition, entity 
theorists no longer behaved like quitters. Rather, 100% of them chose not to quit, no different 
from the 96.3% of incremental theorists, p = .531. Hence, offering a switching option drastically 
decreased entity theorists’ rates of quitting from 78.8% to 0%. There were no significant 
differences between implicit theory groups on the (logged) duration of persistence on the 
impossible anagram, perhaps because of a floor effect of persistence on a single short problem, p 
= .414. Thus, people’s choices to persist, quit, or switch problem were more diagnostic of their 
motivational intentions in this study. 
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Discussion 
Our results showed that conventional differences in persistence between entity and 
incremental theorists emerged when the problem afforded a choice between trying and quitting— 
but not otherwise. In the standard restricted choice context, those with an entity theory were 
more likely to give up than their incremental theory counterparts. However, in the expanded 
choice context, the “entity-quitters, incremental-persisters” dichotomy did not hold. In these 
cases, the majority of both types of theorists chose to switch to another problem of the same type, 
eliminating behavioral differences between the two groups. The pattern of results and 
significance levels replicated when the implicit theory measure was analyzed as a continuous 
scale. Our findings therefore suggest that the traditional finding is contingent upon a choice 
context restricted to persistence versus quitting in the face of difficulty. 
Contrary to the possible argument that this anagram task is not comparable in intellectual 
importance or threat to intelligence tasks given to students, we replicated the conventional 
difference in persistence among entity and incremental theorists in the Q-P condition. This 
suggests that the way people respond to our challenging word problems is not necessarily very 
different from the way students are motivated under more explicit reminders of intellectual 
challenge when given the same choice options. 
A limitation of Study 1 is that the small number of anagrams was not an ideal problem-
solving context to study persistence from multiple angles. We did not find any differences 
between theory groups on duration of persistence on the impossible anagram, probably due a 
floor effect on this single problem. To address the limited ways that persistence had been 
measured, we included multiple problems of varying difficulty and additional behavioral 
measures of persistence in Study 2. We measured persistence through participants’ choices 
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(answer, quit, or switch) on a challenging problem, the total duration they spent on the task, and 
the total number of problems they attempted on their own initiative.  
Study 2 
We presented participants with multiple anagrams of varying difficulty to test whether 
the results of Study 1 would replicate under iterative problem conditions. We offered participants 
the same three anagrams as in Study 1, followed by up to 8 more of varying difficulty. Study 2’s 
design enabled us to directly measure persistence with various behavioral measures, including 
participants’ choices on the impossible anagram, how long they spent working on anagrams in 
total, and how many anagrams they attempted. We hypothesized that persistence is a function of 
an individual’s implicit theory of intelligence and the choices that are available when attempting 
a problem. In the standard restricted choice between quitting or persisting, we predicted that 
entity theorists would be more likely to quit on a highly challenging problem, persist for a 
shorter duration on the task, and attempt fewer problems than incremental theorists. However, in 
the expanded choice condition with the option to switch, these differences in persistence and 
quitting would be eliminated.  
Method 
Three hundred and twenty-nine adults (56.8% male, Mage = 30.4 years, age range = 18 to 
67, Amazon Turk, geographic location: USA) participated in our online experiment. We paid 
them a fixed rate of USD$1.00 regardless of how many anagrams they tried and answered 
accurately. Participants were given a maximum of 3 hours to do as many or as few anagrams as 
they wanted, and were not told at any point that the experiment contained 11 anagrams in total so 
that we could measure how many problems they took the initiative to try. 
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As in Study 1, two easy practice anagrams were followed by an impossible one, which 
constituted the challenge situation of interest. On this impossible anagram, participants were 
randomly assigned to condition (Q-P or Q-P-S), which determined the choice options they saw 
for this and all subsequent anagrams attempted. Following this impossible anagram, there were 8 
more of varying levels of pretested difficulty for participants to attempt if they wished. These 
anagrams are described in Table 2.2 in the order they were presented.  
Those in the Q-P condition were given only the quit and persist choice options, whereas 
those in the Q-P-S condition were given the quit, persist, and switch choice options. Participants 
in the Q-P condition proceeded on to the next anagram when they gave an answer or were 
directed to the demographic survey at the end of the experiment when they chose to quit. In the 
Q-P-S condition, when participants gave an answer or chose to switch, they were directed to the 
next anagram available. Similarly, they were directed to the demographic survey at the end of the 
experiment when they chose to quit. After each anagram, participants rated its difficulty level on 
a 1 (Very Difficult) – 7 (Very Easy) scale, regardless of their response. The same demographic 
survey from Study 1 was included at the end of the experiment, including the questions about 
whether they had done the experiment alone and their level of previous experience with similar 
questions. 
The participants were never told the actual difficulty of any anagram to mimic the 
unexpected difficulty of the next problem on a realistic test. They were not told the total number 
of anagrams available, so that we could measure how long they would spend and how many 
problems they were willing to attempt on their own initiative (our measures of persistence). The 
varying anagram difficulty levels tested how they responded to different degrees of challenge. 
This paradigm allowed us to measure persistent behavior in different ways. 
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Results 
We excluded 8 people who reported getting help from others and 2 who suspected that 
the third anagram was unsolvable. We retained 319 participants’ data for analysis. The pattern of 
results remained the same when all participants’ data were included but we report results with 
these exclusion criteria because it is important that participants attempted the anagrams on their 
own during the experiment and did not suspect that the impossible anagram was unsolvable 
when trying it.  
On average, participants reported being, “neither good nor bad” at anagrams (M = 5.25, 
SD = 1.68). This was neither significantly different between implicit theory groups, p = .858, [-
.37, .44], nor condition, p = .48, [-.24, .51]. In general, they reported little previous experience 
with similar questions (M = 2.31, SD = .62). Our manipulation checks validated the difficulty 
ratings of the anagrams used in this study, which we had previously established in pretests. As in 
Study 1 and previous research, we divided the participants into clear entity and incremental 
theory groups. Our pattern of results replicated when we repeated the analyses with the 
continuous measure of implicit theories of intelligence. 
Responses to difficulty. As in Study 1, we first analyzed participants’ choices on the 
impossible anagram immediately after the two practice ones. In the Q-P condition, entity 
theorists were likely to quit when faced with restricted choice options under challenge, and they 
were more likely to do so than incremental theorists (72.9% versus 55.3%), χ2(1, N = 133) = 
4.03, p = .045. These results are consistent with well-established findings (e.g., Hong et al., 
1999). However, in the Q-P-S condition, choice responses for entity and incremental theorists 
did not significantly differ, p = .897. The majority of both theory groups chose to switch (91.4% 
entity, 88.1% incremental), almost none chose to quit (1.7% entity, 2.4% incremental), and few 
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chose to answer (6.9% entity, 9.5% incremental). Hence, when given the additional choice of 
switching, entity and incremental theorists showed similar behavioral responses to difficulty, and 
were no more quitters than the latter. This replicates the key finding of Study 1. 
 Comparing the rates of quitting to non-quitting choices on the impossible anagram, we 
again found that entity theorists were significantly more likely than incremental theorists to quit 
in the Q-P condition (72.9% entity versus 55.3% incremental), but not in the Q-P-S condition 
(1.7% entity, 2.4% incremental), p = 1.00. Hence, differences in quitting rates found in the 
standard paradigm were eliminated when people’s choice options were expanded beyond the 
quit-persist choice dichotomy.  
Total duration of persistence. We summed up how long participants spent solving all 
anagrams they attempted after the first two practice ones to create a measure of total persistence. 
We normalized this duration measure by taking its log to the base 10. A univariate ANOVA 
showed an interaction effect of condition and implicit theory on (logged) total persistence, F(1, 
270) = 3.83, p = .051, ηp2 = .014 (see Figure 2.1). In the Q-P condition, simple effects analyses 
showed that incremental theorists (Mi = 105.20 s, SD = 4.60 s) persisted longer on anagrams 
overall than entity theorists (Me = 67.92 s, SD = 3.42 s). This difference was marginally 
significant, F(1, 270) = 3.76, p = .054, [-.38, .00]. However, in the Q-P-S condition, differences 
in persistence were eliminated (Me =  137.40 s, SD = 2.80 s; Mi = 115.61 s, SD = 2.97 s), p 
= .424, [-.11, .26]. Importantly, entity theorists’ duration of persistence was significantly greater 
in the Q-P-S condition than in the Q-P condition, F(1, 270) = 8.26, p = .004, [-.52, -.10]; 
incremental theorists’ duration of persistence was similarly high in both conditions, p = .624, [-
.21, .12]. These persistence results support the pattern of choice responses, and suggest that 
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entity theorists are as persistent as their incremental counterparts when given the option to switch 
in the face of difficulty.  
Number of problems attempted after difficulty. Past literature suggests that 
challenging experiences and negative performance feedback have significant implications for 
subsequent performance (e.g., Mueller & Dweck, 1998; O’Rourke et al., 2014). On this ongoing 
problem-solving task, we examined participants’ problem-solving behaviors after they 
encountered their first impossible anagram.  
After encountering difficulty, how many anagrams did entity and incremental theorists 
attempt, on average? In the Q-P condition, entity theorists attempted significantly fewer 
anagrams (Me = 3.23, SD = 1.64) than incremental theorists (Mi = 4.95, SD = 2.65), F(1, 270) = 
4.44, p = .036, [-3.32, -.11]. However, in the Q-P-S condition, entity theorists attempted as many 
anagrams (Me = 6.39, SD = 2.62) as their incremental counterparts (Mi = 6.59, SD = 2.53), p 
= .649, [-1.06, .66]. Hence, even on the number of anagrams attempted, differences in 
persistence among entity and incremental theorists in the Q-P condition were eliminated when an 
additional switching option was offered. Both the main effects of condition, F(1, 186) = 26.88, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .126, and implicit theory, F(1, 186) = 4.30, p = .040, ηp2 = .023, were significant, 
but the interaction was not, p = .1023 (see Figure 2.2). This is because the additional switching 
option significantly increased the number of problems that both entity theorists, F(1, 186) = 
16.39, p < .001, [1.62, 4.69], and incremental theorists tried, F(1, 186) = 10.84, p < .01, [.66, 
2.62], attenuating behavioral differences in persistence.  
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  We report analyses with participants who did not continue after the first impossible anagram 
coded as system missing values for this analyses. Repeating the analyses with these coded as 
“0”s yielded the same pattern of results. 
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Was the number of anagrams that participants attempted affected by the self-selection of 
participants who chose to continue past the impossible anagram? To account for the non-random 
subset (70.4%) of participants who chose to continue past the first impossible anagram, we 
conducted Heckman sample selection modeling using full maximum likelihood with Stata 
version 13.1. This method allowed us to simultaneously model what factors predicted whether 
participants continued past the impossible anagram or not (selection step), and if they did, how 
many anagrams they chose to attempt (outcome step).   
Our results are summarized in Table 2.3. In the selection step, which measured 
participants’ likelihood of continuing after the impossible anagram (rather than stopping at this 
anagram), only choice condition was significant, z = 8.68, p < .001, [.94, 1.49]. There was 
neither a significant Implicit Theory X Condition interaction (p = .237, [-.44, .11]) nor a main 
effect of implicit theory (p = .566, [-.19, .35]). Thus, having an additional switching problems 
option significantly increased the likelihood that participants chose to continue past the 
impossible anagram, regardless of their implicit theory. Controlling for the self-selection of 
participants who did continue after the impossible anagram, we found that implicit theory, z = 
2.20, p = .028, [.06, 1.00], and condition, z = 2.81, p = .005, [.46, 2.57], significantly predicted 
the number of anagrams people chose to attempt in the outcome step. The interaction term was 
not significant (p = .074, [-.91, .04]). These Heckman outcome step results replicated our earlier 
analyses, in which we found significant main effects of implicit theory and condition, but no 
significant interaction. 
Additionally, we broke down these persistence results by anagram and present the 
proportions of entity and incremental theorists who attempted each anagram after the impossible 
one (Table 2.4). As shown in the top panel of Table 2.4, there were higher percentages of 
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incremental theorists than entity theorists attempting every anagram following the impossible 
one in the Q-P condition. However, as shown in the bottom panel, there were no significant 
differences in the Q-P-S condition. Furthermore, this pattern of results held when we compared 
the proportions of entity and incremental theorists who persisted to the last anagram. In the Q-P 
condition, a significantly higher percentage of incremental theorists persisted to the last anagram 
(7.6% incremental theorists versus 0% entity theorists). These differences were eliminated in the 
Q-P-S condition, where equal percentages of entity and incremental theorists persisted to the last 
anagram (35.1% incremental theorists versus 36.1% entity theorists).  
Overall, relative to the Q-P condition, higher percentages of entity and incremental 
theorists tried more anagrams in the Q-P-S condition. Remember that both also persisted for a 
longer duration on average in the Q-P-S condition. These results suggest two things: First, 
switching problems may be an adaptive strategy that enhances task persistence, rather than 
providing an easy “out;” second, entity theorists are as willing to persist doing the same kind of 
problems as their incremental counterparts if given the chance to switch problems. 
Accuracy. Table 2.5 shows that there were no significant differences in accuracy. For all 
those who attempted any solvable anagrams, the proportion of entity and incremental theorists 
who answered them correctly were the same across both conditions. These results are valuable 
for two reasons: First, they suggest that for this particular anagram task, it is the presence or 
absence of an attempt that is more indicative of persistence. Second, they rule out an alternative 
explanation of our effects that entity theorists are less willing to write down an answer they think 
is incorrect (whereas incremental theorists are more willing to try an answer they are not sure of). 
If that were the case, we would expect entity theorists’ accuracy rates to be significantly higher 
across the board. 
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Discussion 
Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1’s results: when given the standard restricted 
choice between persisting or quitting, entity theorists were more likely to quit, and to quit in 
higher proportions than incremental theorists. Merely offering the additional option to switch, 
however, equalized persistence and quitting behavioral responses to difficulty. This was 
consistently found across multiple measures of persistence, including the choice to continue, the 
amount of time spent solving problems, and the total number of problems attempted. Hence, both 
studies suggest that the standard differences in persistence are contingent upon restricted choice 
conditions. 
Since past literature have shown that people’s implicit theories give meaning to their 
experiences (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Molden & Dweck, 2006), some readers may wonder if 
entity and incremental theorists construe switching in different ways. Do entity theorists see 
switching as a means to leave the field in a more socially desirable manner than quitting, 
whereas incremental theorists see switching as an opportunity to get more practice? Study 2’s 
results suggest otherwise. In fact, when given the option to switch, both entity and incremental 
theorists persisted to the same extent over multiple problems and achieved similar accuracies on 
the solvable problems. Hence, entity theorists are as inclined towards persistence on the same 
types of problems as incremental theorists under the right contextual conditions. 
Nonetheless, two questions about their intentions behind switching remain: First, do 
entity and incremental theorists intend to persist on the same task when switching problems, or 
are they using switching as an opportunity to leave the current task? If they are motivated to 
persist on the same task, they would choose to switch to another problem of the same type. 
However, if they perceive switching as a more socially desirable way to leave the current task, 
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they might be motivated to switch to a different ability task instead. To address this, Study 3a 
offered participants a choice between problems of the same type and problems of a different type 
to switch to. The second question is whether entity and incremental theorists hope to switch to 
problems of different difficulty levels, reflecting possibly different expectations when switching. 
Study 3b assessed the difficulty levels of the problems that participants chose to switch to.  
Study 3a: Switching Within or Between Problem Types 
This study examined whether entity and incremental theorists intended to switch within 
the same problem type or between problem types by opting for the switch option. Switching 
within problem type (i.e. to another anagram) reflects the motive to gain another practice 
opportunity. Switching between problem types, however, could be construed as an alternative 
means of quitting the task. This latter option would remove the source of difficulty through a 
more socially acceptable choice than quitting outright, and at the same time, give the chooser 
another achievement opportunity in a different intellectual domain. This design thus allowed us 
to examine participants’ motivations behind their switching behavior. 
Method 
One hundred and one adults (50.5% male, Mage = 30.9 years, age range = 18 to 70, 
Amazon Turk, geographic location: USA) participated in our online experiment. They were 
given up to an hour to complete the experiment. The procedure was the same as in Study 1, 
except on the third impossible anagram where all participants were presented with the following 
4 choice options: (1) answer, (2) quit, (3) switch within problem type (“Please switch me to a 
different anagram to try.”), or (4) switch between problem types (“Please switch me to another 
type of verbal reasoning question instead of anagrams to try.”). At the end of the experiment, 
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participants provided demographic information and indicated whether they had attempted the 
anagrams alone or not.  
Results 
 We excluded 2 participants who had not attempted the anagrams on their own and 1 
participant who expressed suspicion about the solvability of the impossible anagram. Results and 
significances remained the same. Difficulty ratings replicated those of Study 1, such that the first 
easy anagram (MTree = 5.35, SDTree = 1.90) and second easy anagram (MDorm = 5.93, SDDorm = 
1.34) were rated as significantly easier than the third impossible anagram, (MImpossible = 1.39, 
SDImpossible = .82), F(2, 188) = 342.22, p < .001. On average, participants’ ratings of how good 
they were at solving anagrams (M = 5.24, SD = 1.87) and their previous experience with similar 
questions (M = 2.23, SD = .64) were similar to that in the previous studies. Theory groups were 
constructed as in previous studies.  
As shown in Figure 2.3, the pattern of choices was similar for both entity and incremental 
theorists, p = .229. Both theory groups overwhelmingly preferred switching within problem type 
(86.7% entity, 69.2% incremental) over switching between problem type (3.3% entity, 17.3% 
incremental), attempting an answer (6.7% entity, 9.6% incremental), and quitting (3.3% entity, 
3.8% incremental).  
Discussion 
These results replicate our findings in the Q-P-S conditions in Studies 1 and 2. Our 
findings offer a new interpretation of entity theorists’ quitting behaviors in light of previous 
research: entity theorists may be quicker to walk away from a particular problem when they face 
difficulty with it—but may not necessarily want to quit the type of task altogether. Instead, they 
show a certain incremental quality about their desire to continue on the same type of task despite 
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giving up on the current problem. That is, if they are given the choice to switch problems rather 
than only the restricted options to keep trying the same problem or quit. These results support 
our argument that entity theorists choose to persist as much as incremental theorists on an 
ongoing problem-solving task when offered expanded choice options. 
Study 3b: Switching Difficulty 
In choosing to switch to the same type of problem, were entity and incremental theorists 
hoping for an easier, equally difficult, or more challenging anagram? By offering participants the 
options to answer, quit, or switch to any of these anagrams upon encountering the impossible one, 
we tested whether entity and incremental theorists were motivated by different expectations in 
their choice to switch problems.  
Method 
One hundred and two adults (68.6% male, Mage = 29.4 years, age range = 18 to 57, 
Amazon Turk, geographic location: USA) participated in our online experiment. They were 
given up to an hour to complete the experiment. The procedure was the same as in Study 1, 
except on the third impossible anagram where all participants were presented with 5 choice 
options: (1) answer, (2) quit, (3) switch to an easier anagram (“Please switch me to another 
easier anagram to try.”), (4) switch an equally difficult anagram (“Please switch me to another 
anagram of equal difficulty to try.”), or (5) switch to a more difficult anagram (“Please switch me 
to another more difficult anagram to try.”). After making their choice, they were asked to give an 
open-ended reason for it. At the end, they answered demographic questions and indicated 





 We excluded 1 participant who did not complete the anagrams alone and 5 participants 
who expressed suspicion about the solvability of the impossible anagram. Results and 
significances remained the same. Difficulty ratings replicated those of Study 1, such that the first 
easy anagram (MTree = 5.71, SDTree = 1.55) and second easy anagram (MDorm = 5.59, SDDorm = 
1.49) were rated as significantly easier than the third impossible anagram, (MImpossible = 1.41, 
SDImpossible = .86), F(2, 178) = 414.01, p < .001. On average, participants’ ratings of how good 
they were at solving anagrams (M = 5.55, SD = 1.70) and their previous experience with similar 
questions (M = 2.39, SD = .62) were similar to that in the previous studies. Theory groups were 
constructed as in previous studies. Out of all the participants who clearly held one of the two 
implicit theories of intelligence, 83 (32 entity, 51 incremental) submitted a choice response on 
the impossible anagram, and gave an explanation for their choice. We present their responses 
here.  
Choice responses. As shown in Figure 2.4, the pattern of choice responses was not 
significantly different among entity and incremental theorists, p = .267. Replicating our previous 
studies, a majority of both theory group members chose one of the switching options (81.2% 
entity, 92.2% incremental) rather than to answer (6.3% entity, 5.9% incremental) or quit (12.5% 
entity, 2.0% incremental). Most tended to switch to an easier problem, regardless of implicit 
theory (65.6% entity, 76.5% incremental).  
Reasons behind choices. Those who quit (6.0%, N = 5) mostly cited the anagram as 
being too difficult (1 entity, 1 incremental, e.g., “It was way too hard”), or not worth the effort (2 
entity, e.g., “I couldn’t be bothered figuring it out.”). The few participants who attempted an 
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answer (6.0%, N = 5) thought their answer was correct (2 entity, 1 incremental, e.g., “I thought I 
knew what the anagram was.”).  
Importantly, the reasons given for switching to an easier or an equally difficult anagram 
were similar across both theory groups. Easier anagrams were chosen (72.3%, N = 60) mostly 
because they recognized their inability to solve the current one (13 entity, 28 incremental, e.g., “I 
could not find an answer for that anagram” and “Because I could not solve it.”). A few 
recognized that a long time would be required to solve the anagram and that it was not worth 
their time (3 entity, 2 incremental, e.g., “I thought it would take a very long time to solve.”), and 
others wanted more anagrams or were not ready to quit yet (2 entity, 3 incremental, e.g., “I want 
to do more anagrams but could not figure out that one.”). These reasons suggest that participants 
had rational reasons for choosing an easier anagram. 
Those requesting an equally difficult anagram (13.3%, N = 11) wanted to try another one 
(4 entity, 2 incremental, e.g., “I wanted to try another word.”), felt that they could not solve it (4 
incremental, e.g., “I couldn’t figure out the previous anagram.”), or made a reference to testing 
their intelligence (3 entity, e.g., “I feel like I’m a relatively intelligent person and feel that I could 
try another one of the same difficulty.” and “I would like to see if it was my skill level that was 
not up to par, or that one word that was tricky.”).  
Only two incremental theorists chose a more difficult anagram (2.4%) next, citing the 
desire for further challenge (e.g., “I couldn’t solve that one but I want to be challenged”). Note 
that some of their responses overlapped with more than one category or did not fall into any of 
these primary categories that emerged. We report the numbers that fell into any of the categories 




We again found that, when given the choice, the majority of entity and incremental 
theorists chose to switch to another anagram. In fact, most participants from both theory groups 
chose to switch to an easier anagram for rational reasons. Because switching problem was a 
choice that even the learning-oriented incremental theorists favored, it may not constitute a risk-
averse move that only entity theorists with low confidence in their abilities choose. Rather than 
indicate a sign of weakness, switching problem appears to be a common and rational behavioral 
response in the face of insurmountable challenge.  
In fact, choosing an easier problem to tackle after failure is an adaptive behavioral 
reaction to the recognition that the previous task was beyond one’s means – as we read in their 
responses. An easier problem allows one to practice before attempting more difficult ones and to 
recoup one’s sense of accomplishment after a failure, satisfying potentially different goals that 
entity and incremental theorists might hold. Therefore, switching problem in the face of 
experienced difficulty may prove to be not only a highly adaptive, but also very strategic 
response that is chosen by both theory groups.  
Study 4: Goals for Switching 
 On various indices of persistence, entity theorists can be as persistent as incremental 
theorists when given the option to switch problems in the face of difficulty (Studies 1 – 3). 
Furthermore, entity and incremental theorists show no differences in the types of questions or the 
difficulty level of problems they want to switch to (Study 3). A question that remains is: Does 
changing people’s response choices under difficulty affect their persistence behavior directly or 
through their goals? 
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Previous literature proposes that entity theorists primarily hold performance goals, 
whereas incremental theorists tend to hold learning goals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Believing 
that one’s intelligence is innate and fixed makes each experience of difficulty an indication that 
one is inherently unintelligent in that domain. Thus, entity theorists are primarily driven to prove 
themselves as smart through high achievement. In contrast, believing that intelligence can be 
cultivated through practice turns each experience of difficulty into a self-developmental 
opportunity. Hence, incremental theorists are primarily driven by a learning motive. In this study, 
we adapted the standard task choice paradigm (see Dweck, 2000) to test participants’ goals 
behind their switching behavior. 
While this is an open empirical question, there are two important outcomes that could 
emerge: significant differences in entity and incremental theorists’ goals consistent with prior 
literature would suggest that offering a switching option changes participants’ behavior but not 
their goals; no differences would indicate that the switching option changes participants’ 
behavior through modifying their goals. 
Method 
Ninety-four adults (54.3% male, Mage = 31.6 years, age range = 18 to 68, Amazon Turk, 
geographic location: USA) participated in our online experiment. They were given up to an hour 
to complete the experiment. Participants filled out the implicit theory of intelligence measures 
and then attempted the same impossible anagram administered in Study 1. To rule out the 
possibility that the novelty of the switching problems option on the impossible anagram drives 
participants’ choices, we immediately began this experiment with the impossible anagram and 
offered everyone all three choices: (1) answer, (2) quit, (3) switch to another anagram.  
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Participants who chose the switch option were then asked to choose what type of 
anagram they would like next – a procedure adapted from previous studies that measured goal 
orientation (Dweck, 2000; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Mueller & Dweck, 1998). They were given 
four options to choose one from, two of which reflected a performance orientation and two of 
which reflected a learning orientation, presented in alternate order. The performance-oriented 
choices included “A problem that isn’t too hard so that I won’t get it wrong.” and “A problem 
that is easy, so that I will get it right.” The learning-oriented choices included “A problem that I 
can learn from doing, even though I won’t look smart.” and “A problem that will give me more 
practice, so that I can master anagram solving.” After this, they answered the question “How 
many more anagrams would you like to try?” At the end, they filled out demographic questions 
and indicated whether they had attempted the anagrams alone or not. 
Results 
 We excluded 2 participants who did not attempt the anagrams alone and 8 who expressed 
suspicion. 85 participants’ data were used in the analysis. The pattern of results remained the 
same even when they were included. As in previous studies, a similarly large majority of both 
entity (92.3%) and incremental theorists (72.9%) chose to switch to another anagram after the 
impossible one, p = .142. Even without the two practice anagrams, most participants chose to 
switch problems. This showed that the high proportions of switching observed in previous 
studies were not necessarily driven by the novelty of the switching option. 
We combined the performance-oriented choices and learning-oriented choices into two 
separate categories. Replicating what past literature might predict, 54.2% of entity theorists 
chose to switch for performance-oriented reasons relative to 28.6% of incremental theorists, but 
71.4% of incremental theorists chose to switch for learning-oriented reasons relative to 45.8% of 
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entity theorists, χ2(1) = 3.92, p = .048. We found that after switching, both entity and incremental 
theorists wanted to try similar numbers of additional anagrams, as we had found in Study 2 (Me = 
3.77, SD = 2.39, Mi = 3.52, SD = 2.51), p = .681.  
Our findings showed that more entity than incremental theorists were driven by 
performance goals, and more incremental than entity theorists by learning goals, replicating 
previous literature. Despite their different goals, entity and incremental theorists still exhibited 
similar switching problem behaviors. Clearly this distinction in past literature is meaningful, 
although it is useful to note is that there was quite a significant proportion (about half in this 
case) of entity theorists who held learning goals. This high proportion can also be observed in 
previous studies (for example, Mueller & Dweck, 1998, Studies 1-3). In conclusion, choice 
options directly influence the effect of implicit theories on persistence behavior, without 
changing the people’s goals. 
General Discussion 
Taken together, our findings show that task persistence is a joint function of people’s 
implicit theories of intelligence and the response alternatives available to them. Prior studies that 
offer people the restricted choice between continuing an activity or quitting reliably find that, 
when faced with difficulty, entity theorists persist less and quit more than incremental theorists 
(Hong et al., 1999; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). In our studies, we replicate these well-established 
differences with the standard choice dichotomy on ongoing problem-solving tasks. However, 
merely adding the option of switching problems eliminates this motivational dichotomy: It 
significantly increases task persistence and reduces quitting in entity theorists to a level on par 
with their incremental counterparts. Our studies contribute to the implicit theories of intelligence 
literature by: (1) identifying an important contextual moderator of belief-driven differences in 
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persistence, and (2) examining behavioral persistence on ongoing, self-monitored problem 
solving tasks without explicit feedback.  
Across our studies, expanding the choices that people have under difficulty to include 
switching problems changes their levels of task persistence in important ways, especially for 
entity theorists. First, significantly more entity theorists chose to try more problems of the same 
type rather than quit when given the chance (Studies 1 – 4). Second, they dedicated more time to 
working on problems—no different, in fact, from their learning-oriented incremental 
counterparts (Study 2). Third, a greater proportion of entity theorists took the initiative to work 
on more problems of the same kind despite previous insurmountable difficulty (Study 2). Fourth, 
contrary to the characterization of entity theorists as “quitters” and “nonlearners” (Dweck, 2000), 
these people requested more problems of the same type even when given the chance to quit or 
switch to a different activity (Studies 3 & 4). Overall, these results converge on the conclusion 
that the dichotomy of “entity-quitters” versus  “incremental-persisters” is conditional on a 
specific problem-solving context, and can be attenuated by expanding problem solvers’ response 
alternatives beyond these restricted choice options. 
Just as an entity theory is not always synonymous with “quitting,” an incremental theory 
may only be superior to the extent that the context promotes it. Previous theorizing 
acknowledges the context-dependent nature of implicit theories. For example, these individual 
differences tend to manifest most under intellectual threat (Burnette, O’Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, 
& Finkel, 2013). Our studies show how a previously unrecognized albeit important contextual 
factor— response choices—can moderate these implicit theory differences in people’s 
persistence behaviors under threat. 
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By introducing this moderator of persistence, our findings may add perspective to some 
inconsistent results observed in field studies. On one hand, some field studies show that an 
incremental theory is academically advantageous (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Blackwell et 
al., 2007; Faria, 1996; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht, 2003; Henderson & Dweck, 1990). For 
example, in a study of seventh-grade students going through the challenging middle to high 
school transition, Henderson and Dweck (1990) found that those with an entity theory were more 
likely to experience decreases in grades, compared to those with an incremental theory, who 
were more likely to experience achievement gains. This pattern of results is especially evident in 
field intervention studies which induced an incremental theory of intelligence. For instance, 
teaching people that intelligence can be increased through effort bolstered them from declining 
grades in junior high school (Blackwell et al., 2007) and from stereotype threat effects on 
performance (Aronson et al., 2002; Good et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, sometimes an incremental theory does not lead to long-term 
advantages (Dupeyrat & Marine, 2005; Robins & Pals, 2002; Stipek & Gralinski, 1996). For 
example, no significant differences were found between entity and incremental students’ high 
school GPAs, college cumulative GPAs, or adult returning students’ year-end achievement 
scores (Dupeyrat & Marine, 2005; Robins & Pals, 2002). Robins and Pals (2002) observed that 
entity theorists actually had higher SAT scores when entering college. Moreover, entity-related 
beliefs but not effort beliefs significantly predicted grades and performance on standardized 
achievement tests in children grades 3 to 6 (Stipek & Gralinski, 1996). One explanation for the 
contradictory findings is that significant performance differences may only emerge after repeated 
setbacks, but may be attenuated if progress has ups and downs, producing variable reinforcement 
(Robins & Pals, 2002; Stipek & Gralinski, 1996). Our findings further suggest that the degree to 
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which people perceive choices in the environment, and how they use these choice alternatives, 
can also contribute to these inconsistent findings.  
From entity theorists’ perspective, the motivation to perform well in a domain of 
importance is generally salient (Dweck, 2000 & Study 4). When they face a problem beyond 
their current ability, they quit the task when they have to choose between that and continuing, but 
switch to another problem when they can. Thus it is not that expanding their choice options 
under challenge changes their motivation per se, but rather, the standard choice dichotomy might 
limit their capability to behave in line with their performance goal. How then can we change the 
context to increase persistence among naturally predisposed “quitters?” Our studies offer one 
possible solution: expanding problem solvers’ salient choice options (such as including the 
option to switch problems). This offers a simple way of eliminating discrepancies in persistence 
under threatening situations even without changing people’s beliefs or goal orientations. Another 
way to do this might be to change people’s construals of how restrictive their achievement 
contexts are—an idea that future research can test. 
In everyday life, we often perceive two ways of responding to problematic contexts that 
threaten our sense of self-worth. This persist-or-quit dichotomy restricts the way we respond, 
thereby accentuating individual differences in our beliefs about ability. Our studies show that 
expanding these choice options to include switching problems eliminates the negative behavioral 
consequences of these beliefs on ongoing tasks. These findings offer an easily implementable 
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Table 2.1 
Study 1: Percentages of Entity and Incremental Theorists Selecting Each Choice Option on the 
Impossible Anagram by Condition. 
 Q-P condition  Q-P-S condition 
Choice  Entity Incremental  Entity Incremental 
      
Quit 78.8 54.4  0 3.7 
Answer 21.2 45.6  6.5 5.6 





Study 2: Anagrams Available in Study 2 According to the Order in which They were Presented. 
 
Anagram Difficulty Level Possible Answers 
CREOHTRSA difficult ORCHESTRA, CARTHORSE 
LLONIECCOT difficult COLLECTION 
LLQOOUIIAMCSLA impossible - 
OHME easy HOME 
SNUCUOCISPOM impossible - 
CEDTANREENNESC impossible - 
VVIITNNOAE difficult INNOVATIVE 




Heckman Sample Selection Modeling (Full Maximum Likelihood) Results for the Total Number 
of Problems Attempted After the First Impossible One in Study 2. 
 
Selection step  
(0 = stopped at the impossible anagram;  
1 = attempted anagrams past the 
impossible one) 
Outcome step  
(total number of anagrams attempted) 
 Coefficient (SE) 95% CI Coefficient (SE) 95% CI 
Self-rated ability -.10 (.06) [-.22, .03]   
Implicit theory .08 (.14) [-.19, .35] .53 (.24)* [.06, 1.00] 
Condition 1.21 (.14)* [.94, 1.49] 1.51 (.54)** [.46, 2.57] 
Implicit Theory X Condition -.16 (.14) [-.22, .03] -.44 (.24) [-.91, .04] 
     
Full model   
Wald’s χ2(3) = 9.07, 
p = .028 
Note: SE: standard error. 95% CI: 95% Confidence Interval. Number of observations = 275. *p 
< .05. **p < .01. Heckman modeling requires an additional independent variable in the selection 
step that is not included in the outcome step reduce problems with model identification. We 




Study 2: Percentages of Entity and Incremental Theorists Attempting Each Anagram After the 




















 Q-P Condition 
Entity (%) 12.0 9.3 9.3 3.7 3.7 0.9 0 0 
Incremental (%) 22.2 20.5 17.5 11.7 11.7 9.9 8.8 7.6 
χ2(df) 4.60(1) 6.15(1) 3.70(1) 5.38(1) 5.38(1) 8.92(1) 10.01(1) 8.61(1) 
p-value 0.032 0.013 0.054 0.020 0.020 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 Q-P-S Condition 
Entity (%) 52.8 49.1 44.4 38.9 38.9 38.9 38.0 36.1 
Incremental (%) 48.0 44.4 40.0 37.4 37.4 37.4 35.7 35.1 
χ2(df) 0.62(1) 0.57(1) 0.46(1) 0.06(1) 0.06(1) 0.06(1) 0.15(1) 0.03(1) 
p-value 0.432 0.450 0.500 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.699 0.862 
Note. Anagrams are labeled by their difficulty level: EASY = Easy anagram; DIFF = Difficult 
anagram; IMP = Impossible anagram. As shown in the top panel, in the Q-P condition, there 
were generally significant differences in the percentages of entity and incremental theorists 
attempting each anagram following failure on the impossible one. As shown in the bottom panel, 
in the Q-P-S condition, the percentages of entity and incremental theorists attempting each 
anagram were similar. Overall, there were higher percentages of both entity and incremental 
theorists attempting each anagram in the Q-P-S condition than in the Q-P condition. 
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Table 2.5 
Study 2: Percentages of Entity and Incremental Theorists in Each Condition Who Accurately 
Solved Each Anagram After the First Impossible One Among Those Who Attempted Them.  
Note: Fisher’s exact test p value were reported because the assumptions of the chi-square test 



















 Q-P Condition 
Entity (%) 80.0 80.0 - 100.0 - - 61.5 - 
Incremental (%) 62.9 56.7 - 100.0 - - 61.5 - 
Exact test p value .456 .269 - N.A. - - N.A. - 
 Q-P-S Condition 
Entity (%) 87.5 100.0 - 100.0 - - 93.8 - 
Incremental (%) 95.0 93.5 - 100.0 - - 92.0 - 
Exact test p value .355 .519 - N.A. - - .666 - 
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Figure 2.1. The interaction effect of implicit theory and choice condition on log total persistence 
time (log duration that participants spent working on anagrams after the first two easy practice 




Figure 2.2. In Study 2, entity theorists in the Q-P condition attempted fewer anagrams after 
setback than incremental theorists. But when given the choice to switch in the Q-P-S condition, 
both entity and incremental theorists attempted significantly more anagrams. Error bars represent 

































Figure 2.3. Bar graph showing the percentages of entity and incremental theorists selecting each 







































Figure 2.4. Bar graph showing the percentages of entity and incremental theorists selecting each 














Beliefs about Class Flexibility Scale 
All items were administered on a 1 (Strongly Agree) – 6 (Strongly Disagree) response scale. 
1. It is unlikely that I as a student can change much of the class requirements.  
2. The fundamental structure of the course is something that can't be changed much by a student 
like me.  
3. As a student, I cannot control how the instructors grade my coursework.  
4. The instructors have their set ways of getting things done, and I as a student really can't do 









Empirical Evidence for the Motivational Implications of Situation theories 
 
Abstract 
Social systems persist to the extent that they are complied with and desist to the extent that 
people take action to change them. Yet compared to what we know about why people adapt to 
their situations (e.g., Asch, 1956; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Milgram, 1963), much less is 
known about what factors predict action directed at changing the status quo. We propose that 
people’s lay theories about whether situations are generally fixed or malleable influence how 
likely they are to act on improving unfavorable circumstances. Four studies showed that people 
who have malleable—as opposed to fixed—theories about their situations are more likely to 
speak up to improve their work conditions, protest against restrictive institutional policies, and 
even engage in collective action to change the status quo. 
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Adapting to Things You Cannot Change and Changing the Things You Can 
“God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, 
The courage to change the things I can, 
And the wisdom to know the difference.” 
- Serenity Prayer (Reinhold Niebuhr) 
 
Our social systems exist in a delicate balance—robust to the extent that people accept 
them and fragile to the extent that people are likely to react against them. Although this balance 
often entails a system that upholds the needs of the majority, it almost always comes at a cost to 
some. This compromise is often tolerated, accepted, and conformed to, even by those who stand 
to lose most from the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The psychological literature, especially in 
social psychology, has spent decades examining and explaining these human tendencies to adjust 
to our circumstances (e.g., Asch, 1956; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 
2010; Milgram, 1963). However, life is also filled with instances of people who actively change 
their social systems: People speak up to change organizational practices (Hirschman, 1970; 
LePine & Van Dyne, 1998), voice dissent against their own group’s norms (Packer, 2007; Packer, 
Fujita, & Herman, 2013), and initiate civil rights movements on a larger scale.  
While we know a lot about how people are influenced by situational forces, 
comparatively less is understood about when and why people act to change their circumstances. 
In this paper, we propose and test one psychological mechanism that leads people to take action 
to change unfavorable circumstances: their lay theories about whether situations are generally 
fixed or malleable. We hypothesize that when people believe that situations in general are 
malleable rather than immutable, they are more likely to take action to change specific 
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circumstances that are disadvantageous to them. We review the literature and describe four 
studies which tested this prediction across various domains. 
Adapting versus Changing the Situation 
Social psychology abounds with evidence that people adapt to their situations. We know 
that people have a tendency to adjust their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior to match their 
situational demands. For example, classic studies on social influence show that people often 
obey even unreasonable commands from authority figures (Milgram, 1963), conform to group 
opinions whether or not they agree with them (Asch, 1956; Sherif, 1937), and follow what they 
think is socially normative (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). Even when they stand to lose 
from their current circumstances, people justify the status quo (Jost & Banaji, 1994). We see 
instances of women who blame gender inequality in salary on biological differences, consensual 
inferiority among disadvantaged minorities, and even self-blame among victims of domestic 
violence (Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Laurin et al., 2010; Miller & Porter, 1983; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). A great deal of social psychological literature to date has emphasized the power of 
situational forces and how people’s attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are shaped by them.  
 Nonetheless, real life is also replete with examples of individuals enacting change on 
their circumstances—a perspective that has been comparatively less emphasized. From the 
employee who speaks up against unethical organizational practices to the American civil rights 
movement, we see proof that individuals are not merely passive slaves to their circumstances. 
Rather, they do take the initiative to change their social systems. For example, when members of 
lower-status groups see viable alternatives to the current status quo, they are more likely to try to 
challenge existing group boundaries (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Moreover, 
group members actively voice their dissent against ingroup opinions at times. They are especially 
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likely to do so if they strongly identify with the group and perceive existing norms as harmful to 
the collective (Packer & Chasteen, 2010). Given the important implications of such “system-
change” actions (Johnson & Fujita, 2012), what psychological mechanisms are responsible for 
motivating individuals to engage in them?  
We propose that one important factor is whether people construe external situations as 
mutable or not. In other words, people’s lay theories (or fundamental assumptions) about how 
fixed or malleable situations are influence their actions to improve circumstances. We review the 
relevant implications of people’s lay theories about personal attributes and discuss how similar 
beliefs about situations can motivate them to change their circumstances. 
Self Theories Motivate Personal Development 
A factor that plays an important role in predicting self-improvement behavior is whether 
people interpret attributes as changeable or not. People’s beliefs about the stability or 
malleability of their personal attributes, or “self theories,” powerfully predict their efforts to 
improve those attributes (Dweck, 2000). The more people perceive a certain aspect of 
themselves as changeable, the more they invest in changing it to overcome challenges. For 
example, after receiving poor performance feedback on an intelligence task, students who saw 
intelligence as malleable were more likely to sign up for a remedial tutorial than students who 
saw intelligence as fixed (Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Moreover, students who were 
taught this malleable intelligence mindset were buffered against the decrease in grades that often 
accompanies the transition to high school because they adopted healthier approaches to negative 
feedback (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007).  
Self theories also apply to a broad range of domains beyond intelligence and academics 
(e.g., Beer, 2002; Burnette, 2010; Hoyt, Burnette, & Innella, 2010; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; 
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Schumann, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014). People who construed their body weight as malleable rather 
than fixed, for instance, tried harder to self-regulate after dieting setbacks and lost more weight 
in the long run (Burnette, 2010; Burnette & Finkel, 2012). Despite feeling equally uncomfortable 
with social interactions at the outset, shy people who believed that their shyness was malleable 
used fewer avoidant social strategies when interacting with strangers than those who believed 
that their shyness was fixed (Beer, 2002). Similarly in emotion-regulation, people who believed 
that their ability to empathize was malleable exerted greater effort when faced with situations 
that challenged their empathy than those who believed it to be fixed (Schumann et al., 2014). In 
summary, when people believe that a particular aspect of themselves can be changed, they are 
more likely to work on cultivating and improving it.  
Situation Theories Galvanize System Change 
 If people’s self theories motivate personal development, do their beliefs about their 
external situations—which we broadly term “situation theories”— mobilize effort to improve 
their circumstances? We define “situation theories” as people’s general beliefs about salient 
contextual factors external to themselves. These contextual factors could be other people who 
make up the salient and meaningful interpersonal context (such as a romantic partner or work 
supervisor), organizational institutions, their responsibilities on the job, the physical environment, 
or their circumstances more generally. We propose that the lay theories framework provides a 
useful approach for understanding how likely people are to take action to improve the situations 
they are in, above and beyond how they develop themselves. Just as people’s self theories 
influence their likelihood of striving to improve personal attributes, construing situations as 
malleable rather than fixed may predict how likely they are to take action to better their 
circumstances. 
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 This theorizing is consistent with early empirical evidence on general lay theories about 
the world and the literature on when people take action to change things. Dweck, Chiu, and 
Hong (1995) first introduced the idea of lay theories of the external world, though little research 
has since expanded on the concept and its implications. In a series of studies, Chiu, Dweck, Tong, 
and Fu (1997) found that people who endorsed a malleable socio-moral order (i.e. 
simultaneously believe in a malleable world and morality) viewed the system as responsible for 
protecting individual rights and liberty, and therefore agreed that “the status quo can be changed 
when (it is) obstructive of these ends” (p. 938). On the other hand, those who believed in a stable 
socio-moral order (i.e. simultaneously believe in a fixed world and morality) emphasized duty-
based individual conformity to uphold the stable and orderly status quo. In a similar vein, Chiu 
and Hong (1999) showed that when China took over Hong Kong in 1997, the citizens of the 
newly annexed region resisted cultural assimilation when they saw the world as malleable, but 
embraced it to a greater extent when they saw the world as fixed (Chiu & Hong, 1999). These 
findings fit with the idea that seeing external situations as malleable motivate people to take 
action against unfavorable circumstances, and vice versa. 
 Research on when people actively try to change the way things are, as opposed to 
rationalizing their current circumstances (e.g., Johnson & Fujita, 2012; Jost & Banaji, 1994; 
Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 2013; Laurin, Shepherd, & Kay, 2010), is also consistent with our basic 
hypothesis. As Tajfel and Turner (1979) put it, “Where status relations are perceived as 
immutable, a part of the fixed order of things, then social identity is secure. It becomes insecure 
when the existing state of affairs begins to be questioned” (p. 45). When members of lower-
status groups see viable alternatives to the current status quo—i.e., when they recognize that 
their situation can be malleable—they mobilize social change; but when they fail to see these 
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alternatives, they accept the legitimacy of the current system (Jost et al., 2004; Tajfel, 1978; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, unchanging societal trends over time and 
environmental cues such as restrictions on geographical movement—i.e., cues that suggest the 
social system is immutable—facilitates rationalization of the current status quo rather than the 
desire to change it (e.g., Laurin et al., 2010, 2013). Finally, salient evidence that others have 
successfully changed the system—i.e., making it salient that the system is malleable—can 
motivate people to be more open to hearing about the negative aspects of the current system and 
therefore to improve it (Johnson & Fujita, 2012). These various lines of research support our 
contention that having a malleable (as opposed to a fixed) view of situations motivates people to 
take action to change unfavorable circumstances. 
Overview 
Four studies tested the hypothesis that people are more likely to take action to change 
unfavorable circumstances when they believe that situations are generally malleable rather than 
fixed. Study 1 tested whether people’s intentions to improve their situations are driven by 
situation theories or self theories. Study 2 examined whether manipulating people’s situation 
theories affects their intentions to improve an unfavorable work situation by voicing their 
dissatisfaction. Study 3 was a field study that tested whether people’s situation theories affect 
their likelihood of protesting a restrictive institutional policy. Study 4 extended our findings to 
workers’ engagement in online collective action aimed at improving their low wages.  
Study 1: Situation Theories versus Self-Theories 
First, we tested whether it is people’s lay theories about situational malleability or their 
lay theories about personal malleability that motivate them to improve unfavorable 
circumstances. On one hand, people could be proactive at changing their circumstances because 
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they think that situations are malleable and therefore that they can do something to change things. 
But on the other hand, this could be driven by their own inflexibility—they may realize that they 
cannot adjust to the current negative circumstances and therefore take action to change things. 
We tested these two alternative explanations by independently manipulating people’s 
beliefs about a salient other in context or their beliefs about themselves, and measured how they 
reacted to the same work conflict scenario. We randomly assigned participants to one of 4 
groups: A first group imagined that their supervisor was malleable, a second imagined that their 
supervisor was fixed, a third imagined that they themselves could change, and a fourth imagined 
that they themselves could not. The work conflict scenario that all participants saw was modeled 
after a dilemma that employees commonly experience when work policies change: The choice 
between accepting the new situation or proactively voicing their unhappiness in the hope of 
changing things. We predicted that we would see an effect of situation theories, but no effect of 
self-theories, on proactive voice intentions. 
Method 
Eighty-two participants (57.3% male, Mage = 27.1 years, age range = 18 – 67 years, USA, 
Mechanical Turk) were randomly assigned to one of four possible conditions: fixed situation, 
malleable situation, fixed self, or malleable self. All participants read the same work conflict 
scenario and an additional manipulation sentence based on their randomly assigned condition. 
The work conflict scenario was: 
Imagine that you have been working at a company for the past 3 years. Things have been 
going pretty well until a recent change in your department supervisor three months ago, 
as a result of a company acquisition. Over the past three months, your new supervisor has 
been expecting your whole department to work significantly longer hours for the same 
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pay. He is unfamiliar with your old company’s culture, and seems to be operating under 
the norms of your new company. Among others from your old company, you are 
unhappy with the new work demands. 
Those in the fixed situation condition additionally read that their supervisor was “not at 
all open to change;” those in the malleable situation condition read that their supervisor was 
“very open to change;” those in the fixed self condition read that they themselves were “not at all 
open to changing” in the situation; whereas those in the malleable self condition additionally 
read that they were “very open to changing” in the situation. All participants then rated how 
likely they were to change themselves to accommodate the situation or try to change the situation 
by voicing their dissatisfaction (1 = Adapt to the circumstances; 6 = Voice my dissatisfaction). 
Results & Discussion 
 We conducted two main comparisons based on our prior predictions. First, did people’s 
beliefs about the situation (i.e. how open their supervisor was in this case) affect their intentions 
to take action? Second, did their beliefs about their own selves affect these intentions? To 
address each question, we conducted planned contrasts between the fixed and changeable 
conditions for the situation and self, respectively. Our results showed that there was a significant 
effect of situation theories on participants’ likelihood of voicing their dissatisfaction, t(78) = 2.13, 
p = .04, [.21, 1.71], d = .48, but this difference was not significant for self theories, p = .60, [-
.99, .51]. People who faced a supervisor who was open to change were significantly more likely 
to voice their dissatisfaction (M = 4.76, SD = 1.22) than those who faced a fixed supervisor who 
was not at all open to change (M = 3.80, SD = 1.44). But people who saw themselves as fixed (M 
= 4.24, SD = 1.48) were just as likely to voice their dissatisfaction as those who saw themselves 
as changeable (M = 4.00, SD = 1.62). 
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These results supported our predictions that people’s beliefs about the malleability of 
their situations but not their beliefs about themselves predict how likely they are to take action to 
change unfavorable situations. This study provided a preliminary test of the causal association 
between situation beliefs and people’s effort to improve their circumstances. Having shown that 
beliefs about the situation rather than the self predict how people respond to challenge, the next 
few studies extended these findings to people’s lay theories about situations in general. 
Study 2: Taking Action in a Work Conflict 
Study 1 showed that people’s beliefs about their specific situations (their supervisors in 
this case) rather than their own flexibility predict how likely they are to take action to improve 
the circumstances. In this study, we tested if these effects generalized to people’s general lay 
theories about situation changeability. We used a biased questionnaire manipulation to encourage 
beliefs about situations as either fixed or malleable and measured people’s reactions to the same 
work conflict scenario.  
Method 
Sixty-one adults (60.7% male, Mage = 29.9 years, USA, Mechanical Turk) participated in 
our online survey. We randomly assigned them to the fixed condition or the malleable condition, 
which differed only in terms of which version participants completed of the biased questionnaire 
manipulation. The manipulation involved questions that were framed in a way to elicit general 
agreement with the stance manipulated. These biased questionnaires were adapted from previous 
research that has established the effectiveness and subtlety of biased questionnaires 
manipulations (e.g., Job, Dweck, Walton, 2010; Laurin, Kille, & Eibach, 2013).  
In the fixed condition, we asked participants to rate their agreement with three 
moderately-worded questions that favored a fixed theory (“People do not always have the 
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potential to change the situations they are in.”, “We should not assume that people’s 
circumstances can always be easily changed.”, and “The external world may sometimes be 
resistant to change.”) and with one strongly-worded question that favored a malleable theory 
(“People can always easily change the circumstances they are in.”). We expected that 
participants would agree with the moderate items and disagree with the strong item so that they 
ended up endorsing the belief that situations are generally fixed on average. 
In the malleable condition, we reversed the wording of these questions: The moderate, 
easy-to-agree-with items now favored a malleable theory (“People can sometimes find ways to 
change the situations they are in.”, “We should not assume that our circumstances are always 
unchangeable.”, and “People have the potential to change the situations they are in.”). The 
strongly worded, disagreeable item now favored a fixed theory (“The external world can never 
be changed by people.”). Here, we expected that participants to go through the questionnaire 
agreeing with the notion that situations are generally malleable and disagreeing with the notion 
of situations being fixed, so that they ended up endorsing the belief that situations are malleable 
on average. All participants rated their agreement or disagreement with these questions on 1 
(Strongly Agree) to 6 (Strongly Disagree) scales.  
They then read the same work conflict scenario as in Study 1 and responded to it by 
indicating how likely they were to accommodate the situation or try to change the situation by 
voicing their dissatisfaction (1 = Adapt to the circumstances; 6 = Voice my dissatisfaction). 
Results & Discussion 
In each condition, the single opposite stance item was negatively correlated with the 
composite of the agreeable biased questionnaire items (fixed: r = -.79, p < .001; malleable: r = -
.62, p < .001), so we reverse-scored it before averaging the items to form a scale. The biased 
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questionnaires worked as intended: On average, they were successful at getting people to agree 
with the relevance stance proposed in each condition. Those in the fixed condition significantly 
agreed, on average, that situations are generally immutable (M = 2.85, SD = .86; different from 
scale midpoint: t(29) = -4.15, p < .001, [-.97, -.33]), whereas those in the malleable condition 
significantly agreed, on average, that situations can generally be changed (M = 1.85, SD = .82; 
different from scale midpoint: t(30) = -11.25, p < .001, [-1.95, -1.35]). Note that lower numbers 
reflected greater agreement with each scale. Both scales were reliable (αfixed = .87; αmalleable = .86).  
Supporting our hypothesis, participants who were encouraged to believe that situations 
are malleable were more likely to take action to change their circumstances (M = 4.52, SD = 
1.24) than those who were encouraged to believe that situations that are fixed (M = 3.73, SD = 
1.36), t(59) = -2.35, p = .02, [-1.45, -.12], d = .61. Although the specific scenario described a 
male supervisor, the likelihood of taking action did not differ by participant gender, p = .87, [-
.77, .65], and participant gender did not interact with condition, p = .71, [-1.66, 1.14]. 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, people who believed that situations are generally 
malleable were more likely to voice their dissatisfaction to improve their work conditions, 
relative to those who believed that situations are generally fixed. These results replicated when 
we framed the salient situational factor more concretely (as in Study 1) and when we referred to 
people’s beliefs about situations more generally in this study.  
However, our evidence thus far has been based on a hypothetical scenario and a 
dependent measure which assessed proactive voice behavior and adapting to the circumstances 
as two extremes of the same continuum. Conceivably, then, our results could have indicated that 
participants in the malleable condition had less of a desire to adapt to the situation, but not 
necessarily a stronger motivation to take action. We designed the next study to address this and 
	  66	  
to provide a more realistic test of how people react towards new restrictive institutional policies. 
We tested our hypothesis in the field where students had to choose between taking action to 
change the system or adapting to the policies imposed.  
Study 3: Protesting an Institutional Policy 
 Having shown that people’s situation theories affect proactive intentions in a hypothetical 
work conflict, Study 3 replicated our findings in a field setting with policy implications and 
actual behavior. We took advantage of a recent change in University President to tell students 
about a new University policy that imposed restrictions on how and when they could change 
classes. We tested whether our manipulation of situation theories would affect how likely they 
were to join a student-led campaign protesting the disadvantageous policy. Our hypothesis was 
that students induced to endorse a malleable theory of situations would be more likely to sign a 
protest petition to change the policy than those induced to endorse a fixed theory. 
Method 
 Confederates, who presented themselves as student government representatives, recruited 
149 students (61.3% male, Mage = 20.8 years) individually in the student union of a large 
Midwestern university to participate in a survey on students’ beliefs and attitudes. Each 
participant received a survey that randomly assigned him or her to either the fixed or malleable 
condition. 
Among other filler questions, participants responded to a four-item biased questionnaire 
similar to that which we administered in Study 2. As in Study 2, three moderately-worded items 
in each condition were phrased to elicit agreement with the relevant stance and one strongly-
worded item was phrased to elicit disagreement. This was designed so that people agreed on 
average with the stance in their assigned condition. In the fixed condition, students answered 
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three agreeable questions (“People cannot always easily change the situations they are in.”, 
“Sometimes, the external world can be difficult to change.”, and “Some situations can be hard to 
alter.”) and one disagreement-eliciting question (“People can always easily change the world 
around them”). In the malleable condition, students read three parallel agreeable questions 
(“People can sometimes find ways to change the situations they are in.”, “Sometimes, the 
external world can be open to change.”, and “Some situations can be altered.”), and one 
disagreement-eliciting item (“People can never change the world around them.”). All biased 
questionnaire items were answered on 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree) scales, so that 
higher ratings indicated greater agreement. All student participants then read the following 
description of a new drop/ add college policy: 
Under the new President’s administration, the College’s drop/ add policy is being 
amended. Previously, students were able to add and drop courses through the first three 
weeks of each semester. Due the disruptive nature of having students drop in and out of 
classes, under this new policy, the drop/ add period will only last for the first two weeks 
of each semester. Along with shortening the drop/ add period from three weeks to two 
weeks, students wishing to drop a course during the two week drop/ add period will have 
to obtain their instructor’s written permission before dropping the course through 
wolverine access4. In other words, students will have less flexibility in adding and 
dropping courses each semester. However, this policy would help the College by 
providing more stability in course attendance, which facilitates instruction and group 
projects. The new drop/ add policy will affect all students. 
Students finished the survey by answering filler and demographic questions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Wolverine access is the University’s online portal for students that they use to add, drop, and 
switch classes. 
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While retrieving the survey, the confederate casually thanked them and told them that the 
student government was divided on the new policy—some members accepted the changes 
whereas some did not. Those who disagreed with the policy had put together a protest petition 
for students to sign if they were interested. The confederate passed each participant a clipboard 
with the protest petition to read on their own. To make it seem realistic, we gave each participant 
a petition that contained exactly 14 signatures out of 28 blanks. The confederate left each 
participant alone for three minutes to read and decide whether or not he or she wanted to sign the 
petition before returning to retrieve the clipboard. The experimenter then thoroughly debriefed 
each participant about the purpose of the experiment. 
Results & Discussion 
 We excluded data from 13 participants to whom the policy change did not apply, such as 
graduate students and those who had already graduated, and 5 participants who did not follow 
key parts of the experimental procedure (e.g., did not fill out the biased questionnaire or did not 
read the policy description before answering the questions). Because we did not screen 
participants beforehand as part of our inclusive participant recruitment method, we had to 
enforce these exclusion criteria before analysis to ensure the quality of our data for interpretation. 
The biased questionnaire manipulations worked as intended: Those in the fixed condition 
significantly agreed, on average, that situations are generally immutable (M = 4.17, SD = .90; 
different from scale midpoint: t(61) = 5.92, p < .001, [.45, .90]). Those in the malleable condition 
agreed, on average, that situations are generally changeable, (M = 4.90, SD = .65; different from 
scale midpoint: t(68) = 17.93, p < .001, [1.24, 1.55]). In each condition, the opposite stance item 
was negatively correlated with the aggregate of the other items (fixed: r = -.34, p = .01; 
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malleable: r = -.47, p < .001), so we reverse-coded it before averaging the items as in Study 2. 
The scales were moderately reliable (αfixed = .77; αmalleable = .66).  
Our results showed that a marginally significantly higher proportion (73.9%) of students 
primed with a changeable situation belief signed the protest petition, compared to those primed 
with a fixed situation belief (58.1%), b = .72, SE = .38, Wald(1) = 3.63, p = .06, odds ratio = 
2.05, CIExp(B) [.98, 4.28]. We speculate that the noise present in this field study may have 
partially obscured the effect, but nevertheless a difference of 15.8% is a sizeable proportion that 
could affect whether or not a new policy is instituted and whether or not its implementation 
succeeds.  
In this field study, we replicated our previous findings with a more realistic behavioral 
dependent measure. Again, we found that people’s attempts to change new organizational 
policies hinge on their general beliefs about situational changeability. When they believed that 
situations are generally malleable rather than fixed, college students showed a higher likelihood 
of joining organized group action to oppose administrative restrictions. Thus, changing these 
situation theories, even through subtle survey question wordings, can have powerful motivational 
effects on people’s reactions towards disadvantageous institutional policies. Our next study 
sought to generalize our findings to other important societal implications beyond how people 
react to newly imposed organizational restrictions. We tested whether the effects of situation 
theories also extend to how likely people are to join collective action aimed at changing an 
existing disadvantageous status quo.  
Study 4: Collective Action to Change the Status Quo 
 Do the effects of situation theories extend to real world engagement in collective action 
to change unfair systems? Study 4 addressed this question with a population of working adults 
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whose labor is being exploited for extremely low wages, benefitting others at their expense. Our 
primary aim was to test whether construing situations as malleable rather than fixed galvanizes 
individual engagement in collective action aimed at improving the status quo. 
 For this study, we recruited a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers, many of 
whom accept online work for surprisingly low pay (Kirsner, 2012; Dobson, 2013; Mills, 2007). 
We manipulated our participants’ situation theories and then gave them information drawn from 
a real article about the low wages on Mechanical Turk. Our participants got the opportunity to 
participate in a real online collective action campaign aimed at changing the low wages on 
Mechanical Turk. With the prevalence and reach of the internet today, online collective action is 
generally considered effective and is seen as “an equivalent alternative to offline action” (p. 290) 
by activists and nonactivists alike (Postmes & Brunsting, 2002). We used this design to provide 
external validity for our predictions.  
Method 
 We recruited 151 Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers (66.2% male, Mage = 34.4 years, 
location: USA) to participate in an online study about their thoughts and feelings regarding 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). As in previous studies, we randomly assigned Mechanical Turk 
Workers (or “Turkers” as they call themselves) to either the fixed or malleable condition. Based 
on their assigned condition, they filled out a survey including three agreement-eliciting biased 
questionnaire items embedded among other filler questions. We improved on the wording of the 
questions from previous studies to increase reliability of the scales. Those in the fixed condition 
received the three questions: “People are not always easily able to change the situations they are 
in.”, “Sometimes, circumstances can be difficult to change.”, and “Some situations can be hard 
to alter.”. Those in the malleable condition received the three questions: “People can sometimes 
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find ways to change the situations they are in.”, “Sometimes, circumstances can be open to 
change.”, and “Some situations can be altered.”. All questions were answered on 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 6 (Strongly Agree) scales, such that higher ratings indicated greater agreement. We 
did not use include reverse-scored questions in this study.  
All participants then read a short article about the low wages on Mechanical Turk. This 
was adapted from an actual article entitled “Amazon Mechanical Turk Workers are being paid 
pennies to do mind-numbing work” (Mieszkowski, 2006). The article excerpt can be found in the 
Appendix 3.A. This article served to remind our Mechanical Turk participants about the existing 
status quo that was benefitting others in society at their expense.  
After they had read the article, we introduced them to the Dynamo community, which 
runs an online collective action campaign. This campaign involves Turkers writing letters to 
Amazon CEO, Jeff Bezos, to improve work circumstances for them, including their pay and 
image5. We gave our participants the opportunity to support the campaign if they wished by 
writing briefly about how they felt about Mechanical Turk Workers’ pay and signing off with 
their initials. We made it clear that they could leave this blank and proceed if they did not wish to 
support the campaign, and that their choice would not have an effect on their compensation.  
To make sure that they had read and understood the gist of the article, our Mechanical 
Turk participants filled out two attention check questions about the contents of the article we 
presented earlier (“Was the article positive or negative about MTurk Workers’ pay?” and 
“Which of the following issues was the main focus of the article?”). They chose among four 
choice options for each question, both of which were easy to answer if they had read the article. 
Additionally, we measured the perceived relevance of the issue on a 9-point scale (“How 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  More information about this online campaign can be found at: http://www.wearedynamo.org 
and http://wiki.wearedynamo.org/index.php/Email_campaign_to_Jeff_Bezos. 
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relevant is the issue of Mechanical Turk Workers’ pay to you?”). Finally, participants reported 
their general Mechanical Turk usage (frequency of use, earnings per week, and time spent per 
week) and whether or not they used Mechanical Turk as a source of income (Yes/ No). We did 
not expect to find any differences on these measures between conditions. 
Results & Discussion 
We excluded nine participants who failed to correctly answer both attention check 
questions about the contents of the article. Including them in our analyses did not change our 
pattern of results. Mechanical Turk participants in both conditions did not significantly differ in 
how frequently they used Mechanical Turk, p = .50, [-.24, .12], how much they earned a week, p 
= .49, [-39.92, 19.14], or how many hours they spent on Mechanical Turk weekly, p = .79, [-6.04, 
4.60]. A logistic regression analysis showed that there were no significant differences in the 
proportions of participants in each condition who used Mechanical Turk as a source of income, p 
= .14, CIExp(B) [.45, 1.12]. Across the board, participants reported that the issue of Mechanical 
Turk wages was highly relevant to them, M = 7.17, SD = 2.07. This did not significantly differ 
by condition, p = .11, [-1.24, .13].  
As in the previous studies, our biased questionnaire manipulations were successful at 
soliciting general agreement with the stance presented. On average, people agreed with the 
specific stance they were presented: Those in the fixed condition significantly agreed, on average, 
that situations are generally immutable (M = 4.67, SD = .82; different from scale midpoint: t(74) 
= 12.29, p < .001, [.98, 1.36]). Those in the malleable condition significantly agreed, on average, 
that situations are generally changeable (M = 4.96, SD = .79; different from scale midpoint: t(66) 
= 15.02, p < .001, [1.26, 1.65]). Overall, participants’ responses to the biased questions were 
consistent (αfixed = .79; αmalleable = .94). 
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 We coded the content of participants’ responses as either supportive of the campaign or 
supportive of the current status quo (i.e. protested the low wages or supported the current wages, 
respectively). The majority of these responses supported the campaign for change, but there were 
3 responses that favored the current status quo (e.g., “I think the pay is fair given the little to no 
skills it requires”).  
Our logistic regression analysis found significant differences between conditions in the 
proportions of people who explicitly supported the campaign and those who did not (i.e. they did 
not leave a letter or responded with support for the current system). As predicted, there was a 
significantly higher proportion of Turkers who behaviorally supported the campaign in the 
malleable condition than in the fixed condition (44.8% vs. 24.0%), unstandardized b = .94, SE 
= .37, Wald(1) = 6.66, p = .01, odds ratio = 2.57, CIExp(B) [1.26, 5.25]. These results replicated 
when we repeated the analysis only comparing those who supported the campaign against those 
who did not leave a response to support it (i.e. excluding participants whose responses were 
supportive of the status quo), unstandardized b = .94, SE = .37, Wald(1) = 6.48, p = .01, odds 
ratio = 2.55, CIExp(B) [1.24, 5.23]. 
These results replicate our previous findings and support the main hypothesis: People 
who believe that situations are generally malleable are more likely to take action to change a 
disadvantageous status quo than those who believe that situations are generally fixed. They show 
that situation theory effects extend beyond contexts concerned with newly imposed institutional 
restrictions to individuals’ engagement in real collective action. Our four studies present a 
consistent picture of the motivational implications of situation theories: Believing in situational 




Life abounds with disparities between what people ideally want and what their 
circumstances afford. For example, they may be dissatisfied with their boss’ demands, restricted 
by a change in organizational policy, or they may even be contributing to a social system that 
benefits others at their expense. On one hand, these conditions can be complicated dilemmas; on 
the other hand, they offer people a choice: adapt to the circumstances or take action to change 
them. Whether people respond by proactively taking action to improve their circumstances 
depends on their beliefs about external situations.  
Across four studies, we found that whether people believe that situations are generally 
stable or malleable motivates them to change unfavorable circumstances that they face. Study 1 
showed that these situation theories, rather than self theories, explain people’s proactive system-
change behavior. Using the same work setting, Study 2 found that this causal relation extends to 
how people construe situations more generally. Study 3 replicated our findings in the field, 
showing that a malleable rather than fixed situation theory motivates people to protest against 
restrictive institutional policies. Study 4 found that these situation theory effects also generalize 
to people’s engagement in real world collective action to improve the status quo.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Given our findings, an important question that nonetheless remains is why perceiving 
situations as malleable motivates change-oriented behavior. Do these effects occur because 
people feel more efficacious about personally influencing malleable circumstances (a self-
efficacy explanation), or because they perceive a higher likelihood of anyone changing the 
circumstances (i.e. general perceived likelihood of success)? Alternatively, are people more 
motivated to take action because believing that situations can change makes them less supportive 
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of the way things are (i.e. negative attitudes towards the status quo; Chiu & Hong, 1999; Laurin, 
Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2012)? Ongoing research is attempting to assess these various plausible 
explanations of situation theory effects.  
Another avenue for future research is to test new ways of manipulating situation theories 
other than biased questionnaires. Two methods that we are currently piloting include mock 
scientific articles meant to foster agreement with each of these views and getting participants to 
self-generate reasons why situations can or cannot be changed. Identifying new ways that we can 
change people’s situation theories through simple psychological manipulations could usefully 
expand our repertoire of psychological tools.  
Furthermore, future research could look at other types of proactive situation-
improvement behavior that situation theories may play an important role in. Our lab is examining 
whether the effects of situation theories extend to circumstances where people do not have 
sufficient or adequate resources to accomplish their tasks. We are testing if it is possible to 
motivate resourceful behavior by changing people’s situation theories. 
In focusing on general lay theories about situations, our studies have been relatively silent 
on other contextual factors and individual differences that may moderate situation theory effects. 
Yet moving forward, it is important for future research to establish when we can expect situation 
theories to relate to change behavior and when these effects might be contingent upon other 
factors. Factors such as personal relevance, situational ambiguity, and conscientious group 
membership may moderate when our situation theories motivate proactive behavior. For example, 
Johnson and Fujita (2012) found that people have greater intentions to change their own 
institutional systems (when they see them as changeable) rather than others’ which have no 
implications for themselves; Packer and colleagues (2013) showed that highly conscientious 
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group members are more likely to voice their dissent to the majority’s opinion when they view 
group norms as detrimental to the group, but members low in conscientiousness are much less 
motivated to do the same. Understanding the contextual factors and individual differences that 
interact with people’s lay theories of situations could valuably qualify when situation theories 
motivate system-change behavior and when they are much less likely to.  
Finally, what roles do beliefs about stability and control play in situation theory effects? 
Do these effects occur because people see the world as inherently malleable (a stability 
argument) or because they believe that they can personally change situations (a control 
argument)? We argue that both may be plausible. Past research has not explicitly separated the 
two in measuring and manipulating self theories. In fact, self theory measures do not isolate the 
elements of stability and control. For example, “You can always substantially change how 
intelligent you are.” and “Your personality is something about you that you can’t change very 
much.” (Dweck, 2000). Early research on world theories may similarly involve both elements of 
stability and control in changing the world (e.g., “Though we can change some phenomena, it is 
unlikely that we can alter the core dispositions of our world.” and “Our world has basic or 
ingrained dispositions, and you really can’t do much to change them.”; Chiu et al., 1997). Thus, 
to the extent that lay theory research could be manipulating both of these psychological 
mechanisms at the same time, lay theory effects may confound these psychological processes. 
Alternatively, lay theory effects may very well be contingent on both as important motivational 
ingredients, rather than just one or the other. It will be fruitful for future lay theory research to 
clearly disentangle whether it is the sum of the parts or one of the two processes that primarily 




Practical implications. These findings offer practical applications for the workplace and 
systems of governance. To the extent that people believe their situations can change, they will 
display a greater tendency to speak up against unfair policies (Studies 1-2), challenge 
institutional policies that restrict their freedom (Study 3), and even engage in collective action to 
change the status quo (Study 4). Hence, organizations that want proactive employees should put 
in place policies that foster the belief in a system welcome to improvement, perhaps through 
showing that management is open to suggestions for change, giving employees greater autonomy 
in their work roles, and engaging them more in organizational decisions. On the other hand, strict 
bureaucracies, significant red tape, and harsh punishment for nonconformity may cue fixed 
situation beliefs, which contribute to better adherence to rules and more accepting citizenry. 
These and other ideas can be found in the Organizational Behavior literature, which offers a rich 
repertoire of organizational practices that psychology research can draw from to signal fixed or 
changeable systems (e.g., Detert & Burris, 2007; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Grant & Ashford, 
2008; Dutton, Ashford, O’neill, Hayes, & Wierba, 1997). Our findings highlight the importance 
of understanding what beliefs our systems and structures are cueing in their members, and how 
these beliefs lead to different degrees of active participation in systemic changes. 
 Theoretical implications. Many psychological studies have focused on people’s 
tendency to adapt to demands of the situation, whether consciously or not (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 
1998; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004; Laurin et al., 2013; Milgram, 1963; Sherif, 1937). 
Comparatively speaking, how and when people change their circumstances despite situational 
pressures to the contrary is relatively less well-understood. Yet in revisiting many classic studies, 
we observed a substantial proportion of non-conformity and behavioral reactance in participants. 
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Take Asch’s (1956) original study for instance, participants did not go along with the majority’s 
erroneous judgments in two-thirds of the trials. In Milgram’s obedience experiments, one-third 
of the participants did not go to the end of the electric shock scale and most participants voiced 
or showed signs of discomfort with complying (Milgram, 1963).  
It may be timely to remind ourselves of Asch’s (1955, p. 5) response to his original 
experiments: “Yet anyone inclined to draw too pessimistic conclusions from this report would do 
well to remind himself that the capacities for independence are not to be underestimated.” We 
hope that this research will contribute to and inspire more empirical work about when people 
take action to change their social systems despite the odds. 
Conclusion 
Social systems persist and change because of the people in them. Even though the status 
quo may appear stable, seeds of its collapse may be germinating in individuals’ minds. One 
psychological source of the impetus to change things is whether people believe that situations 
can change. Coupled with circumstances deemed unsatisfactory, malleable situation theories 
constitute a powerful force in galvanizing action to improve the status quo. 
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Abstract 
“Passion for work” has become a widespread phrase in popular discourse. Two contradictory lay 
perspectives have emerged on how passion for work is attained, which we distill into the “fit” 
and “develop” implicit theories. Fit theorists believe that passion for work is achieved through 
finding the right fit with a line of work; develop theorists believe that passion is cultivated over 
time. Four studies examined the expectations, priorities, and outcomes that characterize these 
implicit theories. Our results show that these beliefs elicit different motivational patterns, but 
both can facilitate vocational well-being and success. This research extends implicit theory 
scholarship to the work domain and provides a framework that can fruitfully inform career 
advising, life coaching, mentorship, and employment policies.  
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Finding A Fit or Developing It: Implicit Theories about Achieving Passion for Work 
“The only way to do great work is to love what you do.” This sentiment, famously 
expressed by Steven Jobs, Apple co-founder and CEO, reflects an increasing concern in 
American society with the meaning of work (e.g., Anteby & Wrzesniewski, 2014; Herzberg, 
Mausner, & Snyderman, 2011; Wrzesniewski, 2003). Since a large portion of our lives is 
dedicated to working, it is natural that we seek enjoyment and fulfillment in it. This experience 
of identifying with a line of work that one loves, looks forward to, is intrinsically motivated by, 
and derives fulfillment from has been effectively summarized by lay people in the term “passion 
for work” (Chen, Ellsworth, Schwarz, & Lim, in prep).  
The notion of having passion for one’s work is pervasive in our popular discourse (e.g., 
Coleman, Gulati, & Segovia, 2012; Kang & Albion, 2005; Newport, 2012). And understandably 
so—passion has been shown to be associated with important work outcomes, including positive 
affect, flow, entrepreneurial initiative, lower burnout, and vocational satisfaction (Cardon, 
Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009; Chen et al., in prep; Perttula & Cardon, 2011; Vallerand & 
Houlfort, 2003). Thus far, our knowledge of passion for work comes from research that has 
primarily focused on defining the experience of passion towards specific work activities, 
entrepreneurial passion, healthy versus unhealthy types of passion, and the consequences of 
having passion for work (e.g., Cardon et al., 2009; Forest, Mageau, Sarrazin, & Morin, 2011; 
Perttula & Cardon, 2011; Vallerand & Houlfort, 2003). For example, depending on how people 
identify with their work, their passion can take on more adaptive (harmonious) or maladaptive 
(obsessive) forms that facilitate or impede their work-life balance (Vallerand & Houlfort, 2003). 
Yet considering how much passion for work is touted in the popular literature, relatively 
little scholarly work has addressed how it is attained (Perttula & Cardon, 2011). In their recent 
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call for research on the topic, Perrewé and colleagues (2014) emphasize: “Although the passion 
that people demonstrate at work would appear to be a topic of considerable interest and 
importance to organizational scholars and practitioners, we know virtually nothing about it” (p. 
145). In this paper, we investigate how lay people believe that passion for work is attained. Our 
research examines lay people’s implicitly held beliefs (“implicit theories”) about how passion for 
work is achieved, along with their associated expectations, choices, and outcomes. 
Two Mindsets: Fit and Develop Theories 
The dominant mentality in America is the belief that passion is attained through finding a 
fit with the right line of work: We enjoy working in vocations compatible with our true selves. 
This is captured in the term “follow your passion,” which advocates actively seeking the right fit. 
Since 1990, this term has increased nine-fold in English books (Google Ngram 1990-2008, 
Michel et al., 2011), illustrating its rising centrality in popular culture. In the scholarly literature, 
person-environment fit researchers similarly advise matching individuals with suitable work 
environments to achieve positive outcomes, including higher job satisfaction and lower 
psychological stress (Edwards, 2008; Kristof, 1996).  
This idealistic approach, however, paints a dismal picture for those who do not find the 
perfect fit or even know what it is. Especially when the job market is tight, not everyone has the 
luxury to pick and choose the “right” vocation. Espousing what they consider a more realistic 
approach, some people suggest that passion for work can be cultivated over time in any line of 
work. They advocate developing one’s passion through mastery rather than expecting it from the 
outset (Newport, 2012; Tokumitsu, 2014). This developmental orientation resonates with 
empirical literature that focuses on how employees adjust to their companies rather than how 
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they select into them in the first place (e.g., Saks & Ashforth, 1997; Van Maanen & Schein, 
1977).  
These two different beliefs about how passion for work is attained correspond to what we 
term the “fit” and “develop” implicit theories. We define the fit theory as the belief that passion 
for work is found through a fit with the right line of work, and the develop theory as the belief 
that passion for work is developed over time in a line of work. These theories are implicit in our 
popular discourse, and furthermore, highlight fundamental assumptions that may also be implicit 
in scholarship.  
General and Domain-Specific Implicit Theories 
Prior research attests to the usefulness of implicit theory frameworks in understanding 
how people’s beliefs influence their judgments, goals, and behaviors. At a general level, there are 
two basic types of beliefs about people’s personalities—an entity theory is the belief that people 
cannot change the kind of person they are, whereas an incremental theory is the belief that 
people can change their dispositions (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Dweck, 2000). These general 
implicit theories about people’s personalities have significant implications, especially for social 
judgment. The more strongly people believe that personality is fixed, the more likely they are to 
expect consistency in people’s behaviors across situations and to draw dispositional inferences 
about others. In contrast, the more strongly people believe that personality can change, the more 
likely they are to take situational factors and psychological states into account in their social 
judgments (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). 
 Apart from these domain-general beliefs, people hold other beliefs about their abilities 
and attributes that are domain-specific (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995a). For instance, someone 
can have an incremental theory about her music ability but an entity theory about her weight. In 
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the academic domain, students’ beliefs about the malleability of intelligence affect how they 
explain and respond to academic setbacks (e.g., Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). 
Following poor performance, entity theorists who view intelligence as stable tend to construe 
their failure as indicative that they are not smart enough, and are consequently more likely to feel 
helpless and persist less in that subject area. In comparison, incremental theorists who view 
intelligence as malleable tend to attribute failure to a temporary lack of current ability that they 
can improve. These people generally respond to setbacks with greater mastery-oriented 
persistence than entity theorists (Dweck, 2000; Hong et al., 1999). Likewise, in weight 
management, believing that one’s body weight is stable tends to be associated with avoidant 
forms of coping like giving up after a dieting setback; whereas believing that one’s body weight 
can change tends to be associated with expectations of future success and persistence at weight 
regulation (Burnette, 2010).  
Researchers have richly applied this implicit theories framework to many important areas 
of life, including morality, emotions, relationships, and stress, (e.g., Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 
1997; Crum, Salovey, & Achor, 2013; Kammrath & Peetz, 2012; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & 
Gross, 2007). However, despite extensive popular discourse on passion for work, lay people’s 
implicit beliefs about how this experience is attained have yet to be examined empirically.  
Our Research 
Our work extends previous research on implicit theories and passion for work to test how 
vocational passion is achieved in the eyes of the lay person. We propose that, like beliefs about 
people’s general dispositions, there are two basic sets of beliefs that people have about what it 
takes to achieve passion in their work which motivate them in different ways. Fit theorists, who 
believe in finding their fit with the right profession, are inclined to seek a line of work that they 
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enjoy from the outset—an indication of compatibility. On the other hand, develop theorists, who 
believe in cultivating passion through mastery of the work, prioritize initial enjoyment less in 
their vocational choices, presuming that passion will grow over time. Thus we would expect that, 
if asked to make a tradeoff between initial enjoyment and another important work goal (such as 
pay), fit theorists would prioritize enjoyment from the outset but develop theorists would be 
more willing to prioritize other vocational characteristics. 
In four studies, we examined the expectations (Study 1), choices (Study 2), predictive 
value (Study 3), and real world implications (Study 4) associated with these fit and develop 
theories. Study 1 tested how fit and develop theorists’ intentions to go into different lines of 
work are influenced by their affective forecasts. Study 2 examined how they make choices 
between job offers which entail tradeoffs. Study 3 evaluated how well the fit and develop 
theories explain important work outcomes above and beyond people’s general beliefs about how 
much they can change. Study 4 surveyed a more representative sample of American working 
adults across various professions to examine how people’s fit and develop theories are associated 
with actual work outcomes. All four studies were sufficiently powered: sample sizes were 
determined based on 0.80 power and small to medium effect sizes.  
Pretest 
 We ran a pretest survey to create the implicit theory measures for the following studies. 
Participants filled out single-item measures, multi-item scales, and a dichotomous forced choice 
measure of their implicit theories of passion for work. We found consistency among these three  
measures, and therefore primarily used the single-item and dichotomous measures in our later 




 Ninety-eight adults (58.2% males; Mage = 34.8 years; age range: 19 – 61; USA; 
Mechanical Turk) completed our online survey about work attitudes. All participants filled out 
single item, multi-item and dichotomous forced choice measures of their implicit theories of 
passion for work, among other variables. These different measures were administered on 
separate pages of the online survey.  
Single-item measures. We measured participants’ endorsement of the fit theory and the 
develop theory using 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) scales. The fit theory question 
read: “I believe that there is a perfect job fit for every individual, and finding the right line of 
work will determine one’s happiness and success at work.” The develop theory question read: “I 
believe that passion is developed through a learning process within any chosen line of work. The 
better one gets at one's type of work, the more one will start to love the profession.”  
Multi-item scales. Later in the survey, participants rated their agreement with 10 
questions about their beliefs on 7-point scales: 5 about beliefs consistent with the fit theory (e.g., 
“Passion arises from a good match between people's interests and their work.”) and 5 about 
beliefs consistent with the develop theory (e.g., “People have to give themselves some time to 
truly understand a profession—only then can they appreciate and begin to love the work.”). The 
fit theory and develop theory questions were interspersed with one another on the same page and 
presented in the same order to all participants. 
Dichotomous measure. On a separate page, participants had to choose between the fit 
theory (“Passion for work is something that you find through a fit with the right line of work.”) 
and the develop theory (“Passion for work is something that develops as you gain competence in 
the line of work.”). This forced choice measure was meant to identify their dominant theory. Past 
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literature has shown that people are generally aware of many different beliefs and can even 
endorse different ones at different times. However, they tend to rely on a dominant theory at any 
one point in time to make sense of their situations (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995b). At the end of 
the survey, we measured participants’ demographics including their education levels. 
Results and Discussion 
 Using all available data, we conducted an Exploratory Factor Analysis (Maximum 
Likelihood) with Promax rotation on the ten belief questions to test if the fit and develop theory 
questions loaded onto separate constructs. The resulting scree plot and extraction results yielded 
3 fit theory items that accounted for one factor (13.44% of variance explained; factor loadings 
> .60) and 4 develop theory items that accounted for another (25.28% of variance explained; 
factor loadings > .55). We excluded the remaining 3 questions that did not load highly onto 
either of these factors (loadings < .25). The 7 retained questions are presented in Table 4.1S. 
Reliability analyses showed that the 3 fit theory items formed a reliable scale, α = .70, as did the 
4 develop theory items, α = .84. We averaged these items to form the fit and develop theory 
multi-item scales, respectively. 
Consistent with the popular “follow your passion” mindset in America, the vast majority 
(78%) chose the fit theory over the develop theory on the dichotomous measure, binomial test 
(.5), p < .001. This was consistent with higher mean endorsements of the single-item fit theory 
measure (Mfit = 3.71, SD = .91) relative to the develop theory (Mdev = 3.35, SD = .94) measure, 
paired t(97) = 2.81, p = .01, CIfit-dev [.11, .63], d = .406. It was also consistent with results from 
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  Repeated measures effect sizes were calculated using the Psychometrica online calculator 
(Lenhard & Lenhard, 2015), which uses the Cohen’s d formula recommended in Dunlap, Cortina, 
Vaslow, & Burke (1996).  
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the multi-item fit (Mfit = 5.56, SD = .81) and develop scales (Mdev = 4.97, SD = 1.06), paired t(97) 
= 4.81, p < .001, CIfit-dev [.35, .84], d = .63. 
Furthermore, participants’ choice of dominant theory corresponded to their means on the 
single-item and multi-item measures (see Table 4.2). Fit theorists on the dichotomous measure 
consistently endorsed the fit theory more than the develop theory on both continuous measures, 
and vice versa.  
Table 4.3 presented correlations among the measures and demographic variables. The fit 
and develop single-item measures did not significantly correlate with one another, nor did the 
multi-item scales, ps > .10. Unexpectedly, the fit theory multi-item scale correlated with both 
single-item measures; but it was only weakly associated with the develop theory single-item 
measure and not at all with the develop theory multi-item scale. Although we might expect 
generational or education level differences in endorsement of the two theories, the fit and 
develop measures did not significantly correlate with education level or age, all ps > .24. 
 Our findings show consistency among the three ways of measuring participants’ implicit 
theories of passion for work. This pretest provides a repertoire of measurement methods from 
which our next three studies and future studies can draw. Given the consistency and relative 
brevity of the dichotomous and single-item measures, we adopted those measures in our next few 
studies. 
Study 1: Expectations of Passion 
Many choices, especially long-term career decisions, are influenced by people’s 
expectations of what these choices entail. Study 1 examined how people’s implicit theories 
influence how passionate they expect to feel towards different types of work and their intentions 
to go into different vocations.  
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We asked participants to indicate their dominant belief about how passion for work is 
achieved. To assess their vocational tradeoffs, participants reported how likely they were to go 
into an enjoyable but low-paying line of work and a less enjoyable but high-paying line of work. 
For each line of work, participants made two affective forecasts: a near future forecast about 
how passionate they expected to feel two weeks into the line of work, and a distant future 
forecast about how they passionate they expected to feel four years into the line of work. We 
expected differences between fit and develop theorists’ forecasts of how passionate they would 
feel at both times, and that these differences would predict their intentions to go into different 
lines of work. In all our studies, we focused on people’s tradeoffs between enjoyment and pay—
the top two dominant work goals found across representative samples of workers in 7 countries, 
including the USA (Harpaz, 1990). 
Method 
 We recruited 100 adults (56.0% males; Mage = 31.9 years; age range: 18 – 59; USA; 
Mechanical Turk) to complete our online survey about work attitudes. All participants received 
three separate blocks of thematically grouped questions about (1) their dominant implicit theory, 
(2) their responses to an enjoyable, low-paying line of work, and (3) their responses to a less 
enjoyable, high-paying line of work. These blocks of questions were presented in a randomized, 
counterbalanced order.  
Participants indicated their dominant implicit theory using the dichotomous implicit 
theory measure described in the Pretest study. To assess people’s responses towards an enjoyable, 
low-paying line of work, we asked our participants to think about a line of work that they 
enjoyed very much, but which paid a low salary. They rated how likely they were to go into this 
line of work (behavioral intentions) and how passionate they expected to feel after having spent 
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2 weeks (near future) and 4 years (distant future) in it. In a separate block of questions, they 
responded to the same three questions while thinking about a line of work that paid extremely 
well, but that they did not find very enjoyable. All ratings were made on 7-point scales (0 = Not 
at all, 6 = Extremely). 
Results and Discussion 
We did not find any significant block order effects so we ruled out the possibility that 
participants were merely responding consistently after they had indicated their dominant implicit 
theory. Supporting the prevalence of the “follow your passion” mentality in America, a greater 
proportion of participants subscribed to the fit theory (68%) than the develop theory (32%), 
binomial test (.5), p < .001. We present cell means and standard deviations in Table 4.4.  
Consistent with our predictions, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
showed that there was a significant Implicit Theory x Line of Work interaction, F(1, 97) = 10.26, 
p < .01, ηp2 = .10. Simple contrasts showed that fit theorists had a marginally greater tendency to 
enter the enjoyable, low-paying line of work than the less enjoyable, high-paying line of work, 
F(1, 97) = 2.87, p = .09, ηp2 = .03, [-.88, .07], whereas develop theorists showed the opposite 
tendency, F(1, 97) = 7.41, p < .01, ηp2 = .07, [.25, 1.62].  
How participants’ expected to feel towards these lines of work in the near and distant 
futures explained their behavioral intentions. A repeated measures ANOVA showed that 
participants’ near future forecasts were predicted by a significant Implicit Theory x Line of Work 
interaction, F(1, 95) = 12.70, p < .01, ηp2 = .12. Fit theorists anticipated feeling more passionate 
towards the enjoyable, low-paying line of work than the less enjoyable, high-paying line of work, 
F(1, 95) = 74.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, [1.59, 2.53], hence their preference for the former. Develop 
theorists, on the other hand, anticipated feeling equally passionate about both lines of work, p 
	  94	  
= .14, [-.17, 1.24]. Thus it made sense for them to choose the higher paying one. Forecasts for 
the distant future showed a similar interaction pattern, F(1, 97) = 10.93, p < .01, ηp2 = .10. After 
4 years, fit theorists expected to be more passionate about the enjoyable, low-paying line of work 
than the less enjoyable, high-paying line of work, F(1, 97) = 52.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .35, [1.39, 
2.43]; however, develop theorists anticipated feeling equally passionate about both, p = .33, [-.38, 
1.13]. 
We tested whether forecasted passion mediated the influence of implicit theory on 
behavioral intentions at each time point. Bootstrapped indirect effects analyses were conducted 
with 1000 resamples, as recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004). Relative to develop 
theorists, fit theorists were more likely to enter an enjoyable, low-paying line of work partly 
because they expected to feel more passionate towards it in the near future, indirect effect = -.46, 
Z = -2.61, p < .01, [-.83, -.12] (Figure 4.1S). However, this was not driven by differences in how 
passionate they expected to feel in the distant future, indirect effect p = .53, [-.48, .20]. Relative 
to fit theorists, develop theorists were more likely to enter a less enjoyable, high-paying line of 
work because they expected to feel more passionate about it in the near future, indirect effect 
= .28, Z = 2.07, p = .04, [.04, .61], and distant future, indirect effect = .27, Z = 2.03, p = .04, 
[.03, .57] (Figures 4.2S and 4.3S). These results suggest that fit theorists’ vocational tradeoffs 
may be largely driven by short-term considerations, whereas develop theorists’ tradeoffs may be 
made with both short-term and long-term consequences in mind. 
Change scores (= distant future forecast - near future forecast) showed that develop 
theorists expected their passion to grow over time, as we might expect. They forecasted 
significantly greater increases in their passion across both lines of work, relative to the expected 
decrements by fit theorists, (enjoyable, low-paying line of work: Mfit = -.36, SD = 1.20; Mdev 
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= .29, SD = 1.22, t(96) = -2.47, p =.02, CIfit-dev [-1.17, -.13], d = .54; less enjoyable, high-paying 
line of work: Mfit = -.24, SD = 1.29; Mdev = .42, SD = 1.39, t(96) = -2.29, p =.02, CIfit-dev [-1.23, -
.09], d = .50). We found it surprising that fit theorists predicted declines in their passion for work 
over time—this was significantly different from zero in the enjoyable, low-paying line of work, 
t(66) = -2.44, p =.02, [-.65, -.06], and trending but not significant in the less enjoyable, high-
paying line of work, t(66) = -1.51, p =.14, [-.55, .08]. A possible explanation is that fit theorists 
may not expect their initially high levels of passion to be sustainable over a long period of 
time—a form of intuitive regression to the mean. Alternatively, finding a fit may emphasize 
one’s current interests, which can change over time—thus, a good fit now may not be as good a 
fit in the future. 
In a nutshell, fit theorists, who consistently expect greater passion in an enjoyable, low-
paying line of work than in a less enjoyable, high-paying line of work, gravitate towards the 
former. In contrast, develop theorists, who expect to feel equally passionate in either vocation, 
are more likely to choose the higher-paying one. Develop theorists expect their passion to grow 
over time in any line of work, as we hypothesized; however, fit theorists, perhaps realistically, 
expect decrements in their passion over time. Our next study sought to understand whether these 
group differences in behavioral intentions extended to how people make actual choices between 
job offers. 
Study 2: Vocational Choices 
 To test whether Study 1’s results extended to people’s actual choices, we asked  
participants in Study 2 to choose between two job offers. As in Study 1, these job options 
entailed tradeoffs on enjoyment and pay (Harpaz, 1990).  
Method 
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 We recruited 151 adults (61.6% males; Mage = 32.3 years; age range: 18 – 77; USA; 
Mechanical Turk). They reported their dominant implicit theory as in Study 1 and made a choice 
between two job offers in an online survey. Respondents chose between Company A, which 
“offers you a job in a line of work that pays highly. However the work does not sound very 
enjoyable to you,” and Company B, which “offers you a job in a line of work that you find very 
enjoyable. However the work does not pay well.”  
Results 
As in Study 1, more participants endorsed a fit theory (80.7%) than a develop theory 
(19.3%), binomial test (.50) p < .001. A chi-square test showed significant differences in job 
offer preferences by implicit theory, χ2(1, N = 149) = 4.44, p = .04, d = .35. Replicating Study 1, 
61.2% of fit theorists chose the enjoyable, low-paying option (Company B), as compared to 
39.3% of develop theorists. Again, we found that fit theorists tend to prioritize enjoyment from 
the outset in their vocational choices and are willing to compromise on pay for it, whereas 
develop theorists tend to make the opposite tradeoff. 
Discussion 
In sum, Studies 1 and 2 showed that implicit theories about passion for work are 
associated with how passionate people anticipate feeling towards different lines of work and how 
this impacts their vocational choices. However, our results do not differentiate these implicit 
theories about work from more general beliefs about whether people can change. Do these 
findings simply reflect people’s general theories about malleability, or do they reflect theories 
specific to work? In the next study, we examined whether people’ implicit theories of passion for 
work account for important work-relevant outcomes beyond their general implicit theories about 
personality. 
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Study 3: Differentiating from General Implicit Theories 
 In Study 3, our goal was to distinguish implicit theories about passion for work from 
general implicit theories. We examined whether these domain-specific and general beliefs were 
associated with one another. We predicted that people’s implicit theories of passion for work 
would explain variance in work-relevant outcomes beyond general implicit theories.  
Method 
 We recruited 272 adults who were working full-time in the USA (60.2% males; Mage = 
34.4 years; age range: 19 – 64; USA; Mechanical Turk) to fill an online survey on attitudes about 
work.  
Implicit theory measures. Participants reported two different types of implicit theories 
that they held: general “kind of person” implicit theories and domain-specific implicit theories of 
passion for work. Their general “kind of person” implicit theories were assessed with Dweck’s 
(1999) 4-item scale (α = .96). Examples of items include: “The kind of person someone is, is 
something very basic about them and it can’t be changed very much.” and “People can do things 
differently, but the important parts of who they are can’t be changed.” Their implicit theories of 
passion for work were measured with the dichotomous and single-item continuous measures 
described in the Pretest study. 
Vocational choice. Using our Study 2 job choice measure, participants were asked to 
make a choice between two job offers associated with different priorities. They chose whether 
they preferred to join a company in a line of work that did not sound particularly enjoyable but 
that paid highly (Company A) or a company in a line of work that was very enjoyable but that 
did not pay well (Company B). 
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Vocational well-being measures. To assess people’s actual experiences at work, we 
asked participants to rate how passionate they were towards their work (passion), how satisfied 
they felt (vocational satisfaction), and how committed they were towards their vocations 
(vocational commitment). People rated their passion on a 10-item Work Passion Scale (α = .96, 
Chen et al., in prep; Appendix 4.BS). They reported their general vocational satisfaction in 
response to the question: “How satisfied are you with your current line of work?” (-3 = Very 
Unsatisfied, 3 = Very Satisfied). Their long-term vocational commitment was assessed through 
two questions adapted from Blau (1988): “I like this vocation too well to give it up.” and “I 
definitely want a career for myself in this profession.” (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly 
agree; inter-item bivariate correlation: r = .77, p < .001). 
Results and Discussion 
Distribution of fit and develop theorists. Similar to previous studies, a majority 
(73.5%) of our American working adult participants chose the fit theory over the develop theory 
on the dichotomous implicit theory measure, binomial test (.5), p < .001. This pattern of results 
replicated on the continuous measures, where participants endorsed the fit theory more (Mfit = 
3.75, SD = .91), on average, than the develop theory (Mfit = 3.41, SD = 1.02), paired t(253) = 
4.35, p < .001, CIfit-dev [.19, .50], d = .36.  
Participants’ responses on the dichotomous and continuous measures of implicit theories 
of passion for work were consistent. On average, those who had chosen the fit theory on the 
dichotomous measure gave higher ratings on the fit theory continuous measure (Mfit = 3.88, SD 
= .83) than on the develop theory continuous measure (Mdev = 3.18, SD = 1.02), paired t(184) = 
8.15, p < .001, CIfit-dev [.53, .87], d = .75. Those who had chosen the develop theory on the 
dichotomous measure gave higher ratings on the develop theory continuous measure (Mdev = 4.04, 
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SD = .68) than the fit theory continuous measure (Mfit = 3.40, SD = 1.05), paired t(66) = -5.20, p 
< .001, CIfit-dev [-.89, -.40], d = .71. The fit and develop theory continuous measures were weakly 
correlated with one another, r = .14, p = .03. 
Differentiating implicit theories of passion for work and general implicit theories. 
Neither the fit theory (rfit = -.06) nor the develop theory (rdev = .11) measures were significantly 
correlated with the general implicit theory measure, both ps > .05. These results suggest that they 
do not measure the same construct. Although prior literature has found that some domain-
specific implicit theory measures, such as those on intelligence and morality, are positively and 
weakly associated with the general implicit theory measure (Dweck et al., 1995a), our fit and 
develop theories of passion for work seem to be tapping into separate psychological mechanisms. 
Vocational choices. First, we examined whether endorsements of the fit and develop 
theories explain people’s vocational choices above and beyond general implicit theories about 
people’s personalities. To replicate our Study 2 findings, we performed a hierarchical logistic 
regression of job offer choice on the general implicit theory measure (step 1) and the 
dichotomous implicit theory of passion for work measure (step 2). People’s general implicit 
theories were not associated with their choices between the two lines of work, B = -.04, Wald(1) 
= .11,  p = .74, Exp(B) = .96, CIExp(B) [.78, 1.20]7. Importantly, participants’ implicit theories of 
passion for work significantly explained their vocational choices, B = -.96, Wald(1) = 10.34, p < 
.01, Exp(B) = .38, CIExp(B) [.21, .69]. As we found in Study 2, those with a dominant fit theory 
(68.3%) were more likely than those with a dominant develop theory (46.3%) to choose the 
company associated with an enjoyable though poorly paying line of work, and vice versa. 
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  In reporting regression analyses, we use “B” to represent unstandardized beta coefficients 
throughout the manuscript. 
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Vocational well-being. Next, we considered whether people’s endorsements of the fit 
and develop implicit theories explained work-relevant outcomes beyond their general implicit 
theories. We regressed people’s self-reported passion, vocational satisfaction, and vocational 
commitment on their general implicit theories (step 1) and their fit and develop theories (step 2). 
Table 4.5 presents the results of our hierarchical multiple regressions.  
Passion. We expected people’s fit and develop theories to account for a significant 
amount of variance in experienced passion above and beyond their general implicit theories. First, 
people’s general implicit theories were not significantly associated with their passion for work, B 
= .04, t = .85, p = .40, CIB [-.06, .14]. Controlling for the effects of their general implicit theories, 
people’s endorsements of the fit theory, B = .19, t = 3.01, p < .01, CIB [.06, .31], and the develop 
theory, B = .27, t = 4.82, p < .001, CIB [.16, .38], were both significantly associated with how 
passionate people felt towards their work. Supporting our predictions, working adults’ implicit 
theories of passion uniquely explained 14.1% of variance in their passion for work beyond their 
general implicit theories, Fchange(2, 224) = 18.48, p < .001.  
Satisfaction. The pattern of results replicated with vocational satisfaction. People’s 
general implicit theories were not significantly associated with their reported vocational 
satisfaction, B = .11, t = 1.28, p = .20, CIB [-.06, .29]. Controlling for their general implicit 
theories, their endorsements of the fit theory, B = .23, t = 2.13, p = .03, CIB [.02, .45], and the 
develop theory, B = .54, t = 5.46, p < .001, CIB [.34, .73], were associated with how satisfied 
they were. People’s implicit theories of passion uniquely explained 13.5% of variance in their 
vocational satisfaction beyond their general implicit theories, Fchange(2, 242) = 19.04, p < .001.  
Commitment. We found similar results for working adults’ vocational commitment. 
People’s general implicit theories were not significantly associated with their vocational 
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commitment, B = .03, t = .35, p = .72, CIB [-.11, .16]. Controlling for these general beliefs, their 
endorsements of both the fit theory, B = .19, t = 2.08, p = .04, CIB [.01, .36], and the develop 
theory, B = .32, t = 4.03, p < .001, CIB [.16, .48], were significantly associated with how 
committed people felt towards their vocations. People’s implicit theories of passion for work 
uniquely explained 8.9% of variance in how committed they felt beyond their general implicit 
theories, Fchange(2, 239) = 11.69, p < .001.  
Finally, we analyzed correlations among measures of people’s fit theory endorsement, 
develop theory endorsement, education level, and age (Table 4.6). Higher endorsements of the fit 
theory were negatively and weakly correlated with education level, r = -.15, p = .02. There were 
no other significant correlations among the measures. Since these results were inconsistent with 
the lack of association among these measures in the Pretest, where we found no significant 
correlations between participants’ fit theory endorsements and their education levels, we 
attempted to replicate them in the next study. 
Discussion 
Thus far, our findings show that people’s vocation-related forecasts, choices, and even 
outcomes are associated with their implicit theories about passion for work. Working adults’ 
endorsements of the fit and develop theories significantly explain their vocational choices and 
outcomes, above and beyond their general implicit theories. In fact, people’s general implicit 
theories did not relate to any of the work outcomes that we measured. Our results highlight that 
people’s implicit beliefs about work are not just an extension of their implicit theories about 
people in general. Rather, these fit and develop theories can help us better understand how 
people make decisions about their professions that affect their well-being.  
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Having mainly focused on hypothetical scenarios in Studies 1 and 2, the next study 
sought to extend Study 3’s findings further by examining the relation between people’s implicit 
theories and vocational outcomes in their actual lines of work. We surveyed a more 
representative sample of American working adults from various professions and asked them to 
share their beliefs and actual work experiences. 
Study 4: Real World Working Adults 
We examined how implicit theories of passion for work are related to various outcomes 
on the job with a more representative sample of American working adults. Additionally, we 
wanted to examine one main difference between the two mindsets—how much they emphasize 
compatibility with their lines of work. Do fit theorists go into lines of work that they think they 
are suited for from the outset? Do develop theorists’ perceived fit with their lines of work 
increase over time, as we found with their passion forecasts in Study 1? By extension, how might 
fit and develop theorists’ perceptions of fit with their current lines of work affect their feelings 
towards their vocations? For instance, do fit theorists feel less passionate about a line of work 
that they do not think matches well with their current interests, and more passionate about a line 
of work that they think does? Compared to fit theorists, are develop theorists’ passion less 
strongly dependent on their perceptions of compatibility with their lines of work? Finally, we 
also tested whether people’s work well-being and success on the job were associated with their 
fit and develop theories.  
Method 
As part of a larger work attitudes survey, 271 USA citizens and permanent residents who 
were working full-time or part-time in the USA (48.3% male, 1.5% unreported. Mage = 40.9 
years) responded to our survey questions. We recruited them from a variety of vocations through 
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a professional survey sampling company. The targeted sample size was 300, but not all who 
participated met our criteria. Demographic descriptives and data exclusion criteria are included 
in Table 4.7S and the Appendix 4.AS, respectively. 
Implicit theory measures. Participants filled out the same dichotomous and single-item 
implicit theory measures used in previous studies.  
Vocational priorities. To assess their priorities, participants were asked to make a 
tradeoff between enjoyment and pay. They were asked to indicate where their preference fell 
along a continuum between a line of work that they found enjoyable and a line of work that paid 
well (“Suppose you had to choose between a line of work that you find very enjoyable and a line 
of work that you think pays well. On the scale below, please indicate where your preference 
falls.”; 1 = Enjoyable line of work; 6 = Line of work that pays well).  
Perceived Fit. To assess subjective compatibility, we measured participants’ perceived 
current fit with their vocations (current fit) and their perceived fit with their vocations when they 
first started (starting fit). Current fit was measured with two questions: “How good a fit do you 
think there is between you and your current line of work now?” (1 = Very poor fit; 7 = Very 
good fit) and “How well-suited do you think you are for this line of work now?” (1 = Not at all 
suited; 5 = Perfectly suited). Because these two items were highly correlated (r = .74, p < .001) 
and on different scales, we converted each scale rating into a proportion (e.g., 4/7 and 3/5) and 
summed the two proportions to create our composite measure of current fit (with a maximum 
value of 2). Starting fit involved two similar, highly correlated questions measuring perceived fit 
when they first started in their lines of work (r = .62, p < .001). We collapsed them to form our 
composite measure of starting fit. 
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Outcome measures of well-being and success. Participants’ reported their work well-
being and success through a number of measures. They reported how passionate they were 
towards their work on the Work Passion Scale used in Study 3 and how satisfied they were in 
their lines of work on a 4-item Vocational Satisfaction scale (adapted from the Satisfaction With 
Life Scale; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin, 1985). Examples of items include: “I am 
satisfied with my line of work” and “So far I have gotten the important things I value in my line 
of work.” This multi-item vocational satisfaction scale (α = .91) was used as a more 
comprehensive measure than the single vocational satisfaction question administered in Study 3. 
To measure subjective and objective success, we had participants rate how successful they 
thought they were in their work (“How successful or unsuccessful would you say you are in your 
work?”; 1 = Very unsuccessful to 7 = Very successful) and report their annual income range (12 
brackets ranging from “less than $10,000” to “$150,000 or more”).  
Results and Discussion 
Distribution of fit and develop theorists. Replicating previous studies, a majority of 
69.9% chose the fit theory over the develop theory, binomial test (0.5), p < .001. On the 
continuous measures, participants also endorsed the fit theory (M = 4.05, SD = .86) more than 
the develop theory (M = 3.81, SD = .97), paired t(270) = 3.75, p < .001, CIfit-dev [.11, .36], d = 
.26.  
On average, participants’ ratings on the dichotomous measure were consistent with their 
ratings on the continuous measures. Those who chose the fit theory on the dichotomous measure 
rated significantly greater endorsement on the continuous fit theory measure (M = 4.14, SD = 
.85) than the develop theory measure (M = 3.71, SD = 1.00), paired t(187) = 5.66, p < .001, CIfit-
dev [.28, .58], d = .47. Those who chose the develop theory on the dichotomous measure rated 
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significantly greater endorsement with the continuous develop theory measure (M = 4.05, SD = 
.85) than the fit theory measure (M = 3.84, SD = .86), paired t(80) = -2.12, p = .04, CIfit-dev [-.41, 
-.01], d = .27.  
Vocational priorities. When asked to make a trade-off between enjoyment and pay, what 
would fit and develop theorists prioritize? As in our previous studies, fit theorists preferred an 
enjoyable line of work (M = 3.37, SD = 1.59), whereas develop theorists preferred a well-paying 
line of work (M = 3.86, SD = 1.45), t(265) = -2.40, p = .02, [-.90, -.09], d = .32.  
Perceived fit. Do fit theorists self-select into lines of work that they perceive as fitting 
their interests, whereas develop theorists mature in fit over time? To test this, we ran a repeated 
measures ANOVA, which yielded a significant Implicit Theory X Change in Fit interaction, F(1, 
261) = 6.82, p = .01, ηp2 = .03 (Figure 4.4). Consistent with the argument that fit theorists self-
select into better-fitting vocations from the outset, they rated higher starting fit with their lines of 
work than develop theorists, F(1, 261) = 9.62, p < .01, ηp2 = .04, [.05, .24]. However, both fit and 
develop theorists reported similar levels of current fit, p = .75, [-.09, .12].	  This was because, over 
time, develop theorists increased in fit significantly more than fit theorists, t(261) = -2.61, p = 
.01, [-.23, -.03], d = .35. Regardless of their implicit theory, the higher people’s perceived 
starting fit (r = .60, p < .01) and current fit (r = .83, p < .01), the more passionate they felt 
towards their vocations. 
The fit theory suggests that fit theorists’ experiences of passion are very much tied to 
their perceived compatibility with their lines of work. Develop theorists, however, may not 
emphasize compatibility as much, although their experiences at work could certainly benefit 
from it. Therefore, we expected that fit theorists’ perceptions of starting fit are more strongly 
associated with how passionate they are about their work compared to that of develop theorists. 
	  106	  
Multiple regression analysis supported our prediction. There was a significant Implicit Theory x 
Starting Fit interaction on people’s work passion, controlling for each main effect, B = -.26, 
t(244) = -2.00, p < .05, CIB [-.506, -.003] (Figure 4.5). The interaction and main effects 
accounted for 36.6% of the total variance in people’s reported passion, model F(3, 244) = 46.98, 
p < .001. Fit theorists experienced very low levels of passion when starting fit was low and were 
extremely passionate at high levels of starting fit, B = 1.62, t(171) = 10.21, p < .001, CIB [1.30, 
1.93]. Develop theorists showed a similar pattern of results, but the impact of starting fit on their 
experienced passion was more modest, B = 1.11, t(73) = 5.84, p < .001, CIB [.73, 1.49]. This 
same interaction pattern emerged between implicit theory and current fit; the interaction was 
marginally significant controlling for both main effects, B = -.15, t(245) = -1.88, p = .06, CIB [-
.30, .01].  
Effects on well-being and success. Given the different motivational patterns of fit and 
develop theorists, we examined whether there were any differences in well-being and success. 
Fit and develop theorists reported similar levels of experienced passion, vocational satisfaction, 
subjective professional success, and annual income, all ps > .20.  
We further analyzed correlations between the continuous implicit theory measures and 
outcome variables (Table 4.8 presents correlations and partial correlations). Williams’ tests for 
comparing dependent correlations (Williams, 1959; Steiger, 1980) showed that there were no 
significant differences in how strongly each implicit theory was associated with passion and 
satisfaction, Williams’ test ps > .05. Hence, both implicit theories were effectively associated 
with vocational well-being although they facilitated different paths to these outcomes. 
Interestingly the develop theory was more strongly correlated with subjective professional 
success, Williams’ t(239) = -2.57, p = .01—perhaps because higher endorsements of the develop 
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theory might be associated with expecting more success from higher investments of effort. 
Neither theory was significantly correlated with income. This lack of association is not 
surprising, given that these are theories about how passion for work is achieved, rather than how 
financial success is achieved. Thus, financial success can occur regardless of how people believe 
passion is attained. 
Implicit theories and background factors. Do people’s implicit theories reflect natural 
preferences, or are these beliefs a luxury that some people but not others can afford? Framed 
differently, is the fit theory a belief that only people of higher socioeconomic status or education 
level are in a position to hold? Our results showed that these beliefs are not a function of 
socioeconomic background. Annual household income provided by the survey sampling 
company was not significantly associated with people’s endorsements of either implicit theory, 
ps > .05. Similarly, there were no significant correlations between working adults’ education 
levels and either implicit theory (Table 4.8). These results suggest that the fit and develop 
theories may be widely held beliefs among American working adults regardless of their 
socioeconomic standing. Furthermore, these beliefs about work may not be inculcated through 
the education system, but propagated more through the popular media and socio-cultural norms. 
Lastly, we suspected that endorsements of the fit theory may be a more recent 
phenomenon, and tested whether there were generational or cohort differences in implicit 
theories. We did not find a significant association between age and endorsements of either 
implicit theory (Table 4.8). These somewhat counter-intuitive results may attest to the extensive 
influence of today’s popular view about finding one’s fit with a line of work. As with household 
income and education level, it seems that age is not associated with how much people endorse 
one theory or the other about achieving passion at work. Nevertheless, our cross-sectional studies 
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should be supplemented in the future by longitudinal surveys that can more rigorously test how 
people’s backgrounds influence the implicit theories they hold. 
General Discussion 
Vocational passion has become an increasingly important topic for people ranging from 
high school and college graduates to those experiencing mid-life crises. Yet little research has 
been done on the topic of vocational passion, let alone on how it is attained (Perttula & Cardon, 
2011; Perrewé et al., 2014). To shed light on this issue, we examined lay people’s implicit beliefs 
about how passion for work is achieved. We categorized lay people’s beliefs implicit in 
American popular discourse and scholarship into the fit and develop theories, and examined the 
implications of these beliefs for people’s vocational expectations (Study 1), choices (Studies 2 & 
3), and outcomes (Studies 3 & 4). 
Although most Americans believe that passion comes from finding the right fit, our 
results suggest that this is not the only route to attain passion. Rather, people can achieve similar 
levels of well-being at work by endorsing either the fit or develop theory. The key difference lies 
in how these outcomes are attained: fit theorists tend to self-select into lines of work that fit them 
from the start, whereas develop theorists cultivate passion over time.  
When making tradeoffs, fit theorists tend to prioritize enjoyment at the expense of good 
pay, because they expect to feel consistently more passionate towards lines of work that they 
enjoy from the outset than towards higher-paying but less enjoyable lines of work. Thus, fit 
theorists tend to self-select into lines of work that they think they enjoy and fit with from the 
start. Their passion towards their work strongly relates to how compatible they think they are 
with their vocations. Because develop theorists anticipate their passion to increase over time, 
they are generally more willing to prioritize goals other than immediate enjoyment in their 
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vocational choices. Compared to fit theorists, develop theorists’ passion for work is less strongly 
related to how well they think they fit with their vocations. Moreover, develop theorists report 
growing to fit their vocations better over time. 
Importantly, people’s fit and develop theories explain important work outcomes, 
including vocational passion, satisfaction, and commitment, above and beyond their general 
implicit theories. Whether these fit and develop theories are related to beliefs about fit and 
growth in other domains, such as relationships (e.g., Knee, 1998), remains an open question that 
future research may explore. 
Our studies found that people’s endorsements of the fit and develop theories were 
positively but weakly correlated with one another (Studies 3 & 4). This suggests that they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive opposites, as many other implicit theories (for e.g., intelligence, 
willpower, and personality) have been conceptualized (see Knee, 1988, for an exception). People 
are able to agree with both fit and develop theories at the same time, but can also hold a more 
salient dominant theory that motivates their preferences and choices.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Because our findings are correlational, more research is needed to establish causality. 
Ongoing research is attempting to manipulate the fit and develop theories to provide causal 
evidence of the role of implicit theories in vocational choices and outcomes. These experiments 
could be further complemented by longitudinal studies that address how fit and develop theories 
are acquired and the functions that they play in people’s relations with their work.  
Although we focused on positive work outcomes in this paper, future research can 
examine how these implicit theories might be associated with negative outcomes. In prior 
research, downsides to an entity theory include earlier withdrawal from difficulties and vengeful 
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responses to peer conflict (e.g., Burnette, 2010; Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, & Dweck, 2011). 
Fit theorists may construe any dissatisfaction or professional setback as an indication of poor fit 
with their lines of work, and therefore more easily conclude that they should consider changing 
careers. However, an incremental theory has its drawbacks too—develop theorists may stay in 
professions that poorly match their interests and abilities for too long, which could be taxing to 
their psychological well-being (Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003).  
Our findings show that both beliefs can be adaptive. Yet it is also possible that one theory 
might be more advantageous over the other under certain circumstances. For instance, the fit 
theory might more efficiently enable passion when one can sample from multiple alternative 
options, but the develop theory might be more adaptive with few alternatives. More research 
could examine the situational variables that make one theory more effective than the other. 
Practical Implications 
From a practical standpoint, the fit-develop theory framework provides preliminary 
guidelines for advice giving and receiving. In an age of increasing awareness towards mid-life 
and even “quarter-life” crises (an early form of mid-life crises gaining prevalence among 
adolescents; Arnett, 2007; Robbins & Wilner, 2001), people are seeking successful approaches 
to inform their vocational choices. One approach has been to change people’s beliefs to 
effectively modify their strategies and outcomes (e.g., Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; 
Dweck, 2000). Our research offers a complementary approach—to tailor strategies to people’s 
existing beliefs and priorities. Especially if people’s implicit theories about a particular domain 
are difficult to change, proposing belief-congruent means by which they can achieve their 
desired ends can be helpful. For example, fit theorists may be more receptive to the use of 
personality tests in personnel selection and career guidance. However, develop theorists may 
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relate better to an emphasis on organizational socialization and training opportunities. Overall, 
interventions built on our framework could fruitfully inform career advising, life coaching, 
mentorship, and employment policies. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, people who have not found their “perfect fit” in a career can take heart— 
there is more than one way to attain passion for work. Contrary to popular wisdom, a love-at-
first-sight experience is not necessary. The good news is that we can choose to change our 
beliefs or strategies to cultivate passion gradually or seek compatibility from the outset, and be 
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Table 4.1S 
Pretest Study Fit and Develop Theory Retained Scale Questions and Their Factor Loadings 
using Exploratory Factor Analysis (Maximum Likelihood) with Promax Rotation. 
 
Question Factor loading Corrected Item-total correlation 
Fit theory scale 
Being happy at work has to follow from 
being in the line of work that is suitable to 
one's personality. 
.613 .512 
I believe that there is a line of work that is 
the right fit for each person. 
.729 .513 
Passion arises from a good match between 
people's interests and their work. 
.657 .533 
Develop theory scale 
I believe that people can become much 
more interested in a profession over time, 
even though they may not like it from the 
outset. 
.861 .735 
People can develop passion towards their 
professions as they get better at their work 
over time. 
.879 .773 
People often grow to become passionate 
about their profession even though they 
may not love it from the outset. 
.777 .709 
People have to give themselves some time 
to truly understand a profession - only 
then can they appreciate and begin to love 
the work. 
.557 .497 
Note: Factors were correlated lowly with one another, r = .12. 
 	  116	  
Table 4.2. 
Pretest Correspondence between Participants’ Dominant Theory Choice and Their Ratings on 
the Continuous Measures. 
 
 Dichotomous, force choice measures 
Single-item measures Fit theorist Develop theorist 
Fit theory 3.88(.82) 3.14(.99) 
Develop theory 3.14(.92) 4.05(.65) 
Paired t-test t(75) = 5.78, p < .001, [.48, .99] t(21) = -4.00, p < .01, [-1.38, -.44] 
Multi-item scales   
Fit theory scale 5.62(.84) 5.38(.73) 
Develop theory scale 4.73(1.01) 5.78(.81) 
Paired t-test t(75) = 6.71, p < .001, [.62, 1.15] t(21) = -2.04, p = .05, [-.82, .01] 
Note. Single-item measures were rated on 5-point response scales; multi-item measures were 
rated on 7-point response scales. 
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Table 4.3. 
Pretest Correlations among the Continuous, Single-Item, and Multi-Item Measures and 
Demographic Variables. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Fit single-item measure -      
2. Develop single-item measure .02 -     
3. Fit theory scale .58** .23* -    
4.  Develop theory scale -.13 .68** .17 -   
5. Education level .03 .07 -.04 .04 -  
6. Age .06 .11 .04 .08 .12 - 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 4.4.  
Study 1 Means and Standard Deviations for Fit and Develop Theorists’ Behavioral Intentions 
and Affective Forecasts. 










Behavioral Intention 4.50(1.26) 4.10(1.41) 4.13(1.31) 5.06(1.05) 
Near Future Forecast 5.34(1.33) 3.28(1.14) 4.48(1.53) 3.90(1.30) 
Distant Future Forecast 4.94(1.34) 3.06(1.52) 4.75(1.52) 4.38(1.64) 	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Table 4.5.  
Study 3 Hierarchical Multiple Regression of People’s General Implicit Theories, Fit Theory 
Endorsement, and Develop Theory Endorsement on Each Work Outcome: Passion, Satisfaction, 
and Commitment. 
Passion ΔR2 Fchange B SE t 95%CI 
Step 1 .00 .39     
General implicit theory   .04 .05 .85 [-.06, .14] 
Step 2 .14** 18.48     
General implicit theory   .03 .05 .68 [-.06, .12] 
Fit theory   .19** .06 3.01 [.06, .31] 
Develop theory   .27** .06 4.82 [.16, .38] 
Satisfaction ΔR2 Fchange B SE t 95%CI 
Step 1 .01 1.63     
General implicit theory   .11 .09 1.28 [-.06, .29] 
Step 2 .14** 19.04     
General implicit theory   .08 .08 .91 [-.09, .24] 
Fit theory   .23* .11 2.13 [.02, .45] 
Develop theory   .54** .10 5.46 [.34, .73] 
Commitment ΔR2 Fchange B SE t 95%CI 
Step 1 .00 .13     
General implicit theory   .03 .07 .35 [-.11, .16] 
Step 2 .09** 11.69     
General implicit theory   .01 .07 .10 [-.13, .14] 
Fit theory   .19* .09 2.08 [.01, .36] 
Develop theory   .32** .08 4.03 [.16, .48] 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. Confidence intervals are for the unstandardized B coefficients. 
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Table 4.6.  
Study 3 Correlations among the Fit and Develop Theories and Demographic Variables. 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Fit theory scale -    
2.  Develop theory scale .14* -   
3. Education level -.15* .11 -  
4. Age 0 -.10 .17** - 
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Table 4.7S. 
Study 4 Survey Respondents Demographics. 
Demographic N Percentage  
(%) 
Mean (SD) Range 
Age   40.9(12.7) 18 - 64 
Gender     
     Male 146 48.2   
     Female 148 48.8   
     Unreported 9 3.0   
Race     
     White 190 62.7   
     African American 29 9.6   
     Asian 34 11.2   
     American Indian or Alaska Native 2 0.7   
     Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific  
     Islander 
4 1.3   
     Other 9 3.0   
Work Status     
     Full-time 277 91.4   
     Part-time 11 3.6   
Gross Yearly Household Income     
     < $20,000 15 5.0   
     $20,000 - $29,999 25 8.3   
     $30,000 - $39,999 35 11.6   
     $40,000 - $49,999 27 8.9   
     $50,000 - $59,999 44 14.5   
     $60,000 - $74,999 53 17.5   
     $75,000 - $99,999 54 17.8   
     $100,000 - $149,999 30 9.9   
     $150,000 + 19 6.3   
     Unreported 1 0.3   
Highest Education Level     
     Completed some high school 6 2.0   
     High school graduate 29 9.6   
     Completed some college 84 27.7   
     College degree 117 38.6   
     Completed some postgraduate 13 4.3   
     Master’s degree 43 14.2   
     Doctorate, law, or professional degree 11 3.6   
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Table 4.8.  
Study 4 Correlations between Continuous Implicit Theory Measures and Work Outcomes using 
All Available Data. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Fit -        
2. Develop .36** -       
3. Passion .33** .36** -      
4. Vocational 
satisfaction 
.32** .40** .84** -     
5. Subjective success .08 .27** .40** .39** -    
6. Income .02 .12 .08 .12 .06 -   
7. Education level -.12 .00 .10 .12 .09 .35** -  
8. Age -.07 .03 .05 .01 .05 .08 -.08 - 
Partial correlations controlling for develop theory endorsement 
1. Fit -        
2. Passion .23** -       
3. Vocational 
satisfaction 
.21** .82** -      
4. Subjective success -.02 .34** .32** -     
5. Income -.03 .04 .08 .03 -    
6. Education level -.12 .11 .13* .09 .35** -   
7. Age .08 .04 .00 .05 .08 -.08 -  
Partial correlations controlling for fit theory endorsement 
1. Develop -        
2. Passion .28** -       
3. Vocational 
satisfaction 
.32** .82** -      
4. Subjective success .26** .40** .39** -     
5. Income .12 .08 .12 .06 -    
6. Education level .05 .15* .17** .10 .36** -   
7. Age .05 .08 .04 .06 .08 -.09 -  
Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. 	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Passion in the Near Future 
Implicit Theory Intentions 
-.86** .54** 














Figure 4.1S. Mediation of the effect of implicit theory (0 = fit theory, 1 = develop theory) on 
behavioral intention to enter an enjoyable, low-paying line of work by passion forecasted in the 
near future. Unstandardized coefficients reported. **p < .001. 	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Passion in the Near Future 
Intentions 
.63* .44** 














Figure 4.2S. Mediation of the effect of implicit theory (0 = fit theory, 1 = develop theory) on 
behavioral intention to enter a less enjoyable, high-paying line of work by passion forecasted in 
the near future. Unstandardized coefficients reported. * p < .05. **p < .001. 
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Passion in the Distant Future 
1.31** .20* 
.97**   (.70*) 














Figure 4.3S. Mediation of the effect of implicit theory (0 = fit theory, 1 = develop theory) on 
behavioral intention to enter a less enjoyable, high-paying line of work by passion forecasted in 
the distant future. Unstandardized coefficients reported. * p < .05. **p < .001.

















Figure 4.4. Study 4 Implicit Theory X Change in Fit interaction showing how fit theorists report 
greater perceived fit with their lines of work at the start, but develop theorists catch up with them 
over time. 	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Figure 4.5. Study 4 Implicit Theory x Perceived Starting Fit interaction on experienced passion. 
Fit theorists’ perceptions of starting fit with their lines of work were more strongly associated 
with their experienced passion than develop theorists’ perceptions of starting fit. Mean work 
passion ranged from 1 to 5; perceived starting fit ratings ranged from 0 to 2. 	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Appendix 4.AS 
Study 4 Exclusion Criteria 
Because our measures were part of a larger work attitudes survey, we followed the 
exclusion criteria used in the larger survey to ensure the quality of the data and accuracy of any 
conclusions drawn. An original 303 participants from the USA started the survey, although not 
all were technically eligible by the recruitment criteria and some gave responses that made their 
data quality suspect. Our exclusion criteria were designed to identify and filter out those 
responses. We excluded 6 participants who indicated that they were not working at all (e.g. full-
time students), 1 who did not list a line of work, 20 participants who gave nonsensical answers 
(e.g. “jhbjhbjb”) to more than one open-ended question in the larger survey, and 5 who were 
suspected of not taking the survey seriously (e.g. answering “NA” to almost all the open-ended 
questions). Using these criteria, we ensured – as much as possible – that anyone included took 
the survey seriously, was working at least part-time, and responded to the Work Passion Scale 
items with their line of work in mind. This ensured the quality of our results, interpretations, and 
conclusions.
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Appendix 4.BS 
Work Passion Scale 
(Chen, Ellsworth, Schwarz, & Lim, in preparation) 
 
Items Scale Options 
1. How much would you say you love doing your work?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
2. How often do you feel positively about your work?  1 (Never) - 5 (All of the Time) 
3. How important would you say your work is to you?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
4. How often would you say that you wake up in the morning looking forward 
to working?  
1 (Never) - 5 (All of the Time) 
5. How much would you say you enjoy doing your work?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
6. How central is your work to who you are?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
7. How much time do you spend thinking about your work because you enjoy 
it, not because you have to?  
1 (Never) - 5 (Most of the Time) 
8. How fast does time seem to pass when you are fully engaged in your 
work? *We are interested in your subjective feeling of how fast time passes.  
1 (Slows to a Crawl) - 5 (Flies by 
Quickly) 
9. To what extent is the work fulfilling to you?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
10. How motivated are you to do a good job at work?  1 (Not At All) - 5 (Extremely) 
 
 
Note: The scale should best be preceded by instructions that focus people on their current line of 
work. The following question and instructions were used in our survey: 
 
“What is your current line of work? By line of work, we mean the profession that you are 
in or the type of industry that you associate yourself with. For example, you could be in 
academia, carpentry, journalism, etc. Please write down your current line of work.” 
 
 
“Now, we will ask you about your attitudes towards your line of work. Thinking about 
your line of work...” 	  
 
 






Integrating Lay Theories of Personal and Situational Changeability: 
The Self by Situational Change Model of Lay Theories 
 
Abstract 
The lay theories literature has thus far focused on people’s beliefs about the stability or 
malleability of their personal attributes, or “self theories.” Comparatively less research has 
examined and discussed the implications of people’s fundamental assumptions about their 
external contexts, or “situation theories.” This paper highlights the motivational implications of 
both types of lay theories, proposes that they play complementary roles in motivating change, 
and introduces a new Self by Situation Change (SSC) framework which describes how they can 
combine in context to produce different response orientations. The SSC framework offers 
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The Self by Situational Change Model of Lay Theories:  
Integrating lay theories of personal and situational changeability. 
Consider two students: Tom and Sue both receive news that they did not do well on a 
recent class test. Both are equally disappointed and know that they cannot do anything about 
their grades at this point. Tom, who believes that his ability is stable and innate, perceives the 
low test score as a sign that he may not be cut out for the subject, and decides to subsequently 
invest less time in it relative to his other school subjects. Sue, who believes that she can cultivate 
her ability through effort, attributes her current grades to insufficient investment on her part. 
Thus, she reacts to the news by resolving to develop her ability by doubling her efforts and time 
in the subject. These two students embody a key distinction in the research literature, which 
contrasts a fixed, innate conception of personal attributes (“entity theory”) and its malleable, 
dynamic counterpart (“incremental theory;” Dweck, 2000; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988; Ross, 1989). The distinction between entity and incremental beliefs has been 
well-established in psychological literature (Burnette, O'Boyle, VanEpps, Pollack, & Finkel, 
2013; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Molden & Dweck, 2006). 
Relatively less discussed in prior theorizing, however, is a key factor that predicts how 
Tom and Sue react to the disappointing news—their belief that they cannot do anything about 
their class. In other words, Tom and Sue believe that their situations are unchangeable. Consider 
two other students who seem to have the opposite mentality: Patrick and May similarly receive 
disappointing news about their poor performance on a recent class test. Both of them, however, 
do not view their class structure as rigid, but instead believe in its possible flexibility to 
accommodate their needs as students. Patrick firmly believes that his ability on multiple-choice 
questions, which dominated the last class test, is not particularly good, but knows that he 
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performs well on group projects. He is motivated to persuade his teacher to add more graded 
group assignments to the class. Therefore, he reacts to the disappointing news by trying to 
convince his teacher that the class should be structured to accommodate various kinds of students 
with different strengths (like himself). In contrast, May believes that she can work on her current 
knowledge of the class content, but also recognizes that her teacher may be open to changing the 
structure of the class. Believing that her current abilities and the class structure are both flexible 
to change, May resolves to negotiate the multiple possibilities with her teacher to find a good 
compromise. 
These four different responses represent four general orientations that people can 
possibly assume across multiple life domains. People can adopt an emphasis on the fit between 
them and their context (like Tom), an emphasis on personal development within the immutable 
context (like Sue), an emphasis on how they can shape the context to suit themselves (like 
Patrick), and an emphasis on finding a flexible arrangement that recognizes the malleability of 
both self and context (like May). Although the scenarios above describe how people react to 
adversity, the orientations they illustrate are by no means restricted to these types of contexts, as 
I will discuss later.  
Most important, these scenarios emphasize that how people react to their social worlds is 
often a function of an interaction between their beliefs about how much they can change and 
their beliefs about how much their external situation can be changed. I first review the literature 
on these beliefs about whether people can change themselves and their situations. Following 
which, I introduce a new framework—the Self by Situation Change (SSC) model—that describes 
how they predict the aforementioned behavioral orientations. 
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Lay Theories of Stability and Change 
There is general consensus that people have beliefs about how stable or unstable various 
attributes are, including personality traits, abilities, attitudes, and even physical sensations. These 
beliefs inform their judgments and reactions (Ross, 1989). In his seminal review, Michael Ross 
(1989) defined these beliefs, or lay theories of change, as “schemalike knowledge structures that 
include specific beliefs regarding the inherent stability of an attribute, as well as a set of general 
principles concerning the conditions likely to promote personal change or stability” (p. 342). 
Today, they are used interchangeably with the terms “implicit theories,” “naïve theories,” and 
“mindsets.” These fundamental beliefs about stability play a central role in satisfying people’s 
innate need for control and predictability by considering what they can and cannot change 
(Furnham, 1988). People use these fundamental assumptions, often shaped by their socio-cultural 
backgrounds, to offer explanations for events, and thereby impose structure on an otherwise 
unpredictable reality (Furnham, 1988).  
To date, the literature on lay theories of change has primarily focused on research on the 
malleability of people’s attributes (“self theories”), whereas much less literature has examined 
how malleable we perceive our external circumstances to be (“situation theories”). Nonetheless, 
both offer complementary perspectives that can significantly enrich our theorizing about how 
people behave in context. I review in brief the existing literature on self theories, highlight the 
dearth of literature on situation theories, and propose a framework that focuses on their 
interaction to predict how people react to their social worlds. 
Self Theories  
Theorizing and empirical research on lay theories have, to date, been dominated by self 
theories, which are concerned with how stable or changeable people believe their characteristics 
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are. As we observed in our introductory examples of Tom and Sue, fixed and malleable theories 
of intelligence incline people towards validating their innate ability or towards cultivating it 
within what is generally perceived to be a fixed context, respectively. In Tom’s case, academic 
failures suggest a lack of natural ability in that subject because he believes that intelligence is 
stable and innate. In Sue’s case, the same failures are considered indicative of a lack of effort or 
current (but not permanent) ability because she sees intelligence as malleable. Thus, people with 
Sue’s belief system tend to put in more effort to cultivate their abilities in reaction to academic 
setbacks than people who share Tom’s belief system.  
To date, the most comprehensively researched domain of lay theories is probably that of 
intelligence. Carol Dweck and her colleagues (1988, 1995) proposed the distinction between an 
entity theory of intelligence, which involves believing that intelligence is inborn and stable, and 
an incremental theory of intelligence, which involves believing that intelligence can be 
developed through effort. Research has repeatedly shown that these two lay theories yield 
important differences in outcomes: incremental theorists, relative to entity theorists, tend to show 
more adaptive responses in the face of setbacks and even attain higher levels of academic 
achievement in the long run (e.g., Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1997).   
In a study on first year college students in Hong Kong, Hong and colleagues (1999, Study 
2) found that students with low college entrance English proficiency scores were more likely to 
take an English proficiency remedial course if they held an incremental theory of intelligence 
rather than an entity theory of intelligence. The researchers replicated these results in a 
laboratory study, in which they manipulated college students’ lay theories of intelligence through 
scientifically written articles (Hong et al., 1999, Study 3). Again, they found that students who 
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received low performance feedback on a nonverbal ability test were more likely to choose a 
tutorial to improve themselves after reading the incremental theory article (73.3%) as compared 
to the entity theory article (13.3%). No differences emerged among those who performed well in 
both studies. Other researchers also found these effects in longitudinal field studies on American 
seventh-grade students who were going through the critical junior high school transition 
(Blackwell et al., 2007). Students randomly assigned to receive an eight-week incremental theory 
of intelligence workshop (intervention group) at the beginning of their seventh grade were less 
susceptible to a decline in grades commonly associated with the junior high school transition, 
compared to those assigned to a control group. 
To date, multiple laboratory and field studies have replicated these findings, showing that 
incremental theorists tend to show greater persistence and more adaptive responses in the face of 
academic setbacks, compared to entity theorists (e.g., Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2001; Kamins & 
Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; O’Rourke, Haimovitz, Ballwebber, Dweck, & Popovic, 
2014). These motivational differences are driven by a greater learning orientation (which 
emphasizes the gradual mastery of relevant competencies) among incremental theorists, in 
contrast to the performance orientation (which focuses on achievement) that entity theorists tend 
to hold (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Their learning and performance goals powerfully influence 
the attributions and responses that students have towards their academic setbacks. Over time, 
motivational differences among entity and incremental theorists tend to accumulate into 
disparities in academic achievement, especially over crucial school transition years that are often 
fraught with increasing difficulty (Blackwell et al., 2007; Yeager et al., 2014). A recent meta-
analysis shows that there is an overall positive albeit small relation between an incremental 
theory of intelligence and academic achievement (r = .095, rc = .141; Burnette et al., 2013).  
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 Self theories about many other attributes, including but not limited to social skills, 
emotions, weight management, negotiation skills, and leadership ability, orient people in an 
analogous manner (e.g., Beer, 2002; Burnette, 2010; Burnette & Finkel, 2012; Hoyt, Burnette, & 
Innella, 2010; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007): the more 
people view an aspect of themselves as changeable, the more likely they are to focus on 
developing that part of themselves (rather than validating its innate levels). For example, in her 
study of shy entity and incremental theorists, Beer (2002) found that shy incremental theorists 
adopted fewer avoidant strategies than shy entity theorists in their social interactions with 
strangers even though both felt equally uncomfortable with the interactions. Moreover, they felt 
less shy and nervous in their subsequent social interactions than shy entity theorists, and 
independent observers rated them as appearing more sociable too (Beer, 2002, Study 3). Thus, 
although shy people tend to feel uncomfortable with social interactions with a stranger, whether 
they conceive their shyness as malleable or not determines how hard they try to overcome their 
shyness in social interactions.  
Beyond domain-specific lay theories, people also have lay theories about their own 
personalities more generally (Dweck, 2000)8. Entity personality theorists believe that they cannot 
change their basic nature, and tend to endorse statements like: “Your personality is something 
about you that you can’t change very much.” In contrast, incremental theorists tend to disagree 
with these statements, believing that their personality can change over time. When presented 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Note that although semantically similar to “implicit personality theory,” person theories refer to 
the mutability of various characteristics rather than how associated traits are with one another, 
which the former emphasizes (e.g. Schneider, 1973). 	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with challenging social situations, fourth to sixth graders who endorsed an incremental theory 
had fewer intentions to use low-risk strategies (for instance, only inviting people who would say 
yes to attending their party) to navigate their social interactions, relative to those who held an 
entity theory (Erdley, Cain, Loomis, Dumas-Hines, & Dweck, 1997). Furthermore, incremental 
theorists were less concerned about how socially skilled they appeared to be in front of others 
compared to entity theorists.  
To date, self theories have been studied very thoroughly. The general pattern of findings 
is that the more changeable people believe an attribute to be, the more they focus on developing 
it when it is deemed lacking. Nevertheless, these self theories have generally been looked at 
independent of the beliefs that people may concurrently hold about their situations, which I 
discuss next. 
Situation Theories 
Relative to the plethora of research on self theories, comparatively less research has 
examined what lay theories people have about their external situations. In reviewing the 
literature, I adopt an extensive definition of people’s lay theories about how changeable any 
situational aspects external to themselves are. Thus, the broad label “situation theories” refers to 
beliefs about the changeability of salient and relevant aspects of the situation that are external to 
the self. Depending on the context, this could be another person in a relationship, such as a 
romantic partner, mentor, or group members; it could also be features of one’s circumstances, 
like social systems, job responsibilities, living conditions, and financial circumstances, or take 
the form of the external physical world, such as the organization of one’s work environment. 
Using more concrete examples, in the context of a romantic relationship, one’s partner 
constitutes the salient and relevant situational aspect; on the job, the salient situation could be the 
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tasks involved in the individual’s specific role; within the home, it could be the physical 
arrangement of the furniture. Thus, by this broad definition, people’s situation theories refer to 
beliefs about the changeability of what is deemed salient and relevant in the external context, 
which can be specific aspects of one’s social or physical environment.  
 Why do we need to consider situation theories if we already know what self theories 
affect? To appreciate the implications of situation theories, compare our introductory examples 
Tom and Sue with Patrick and May. Tom and Sue assume that their grades are absolute and 
irreversible, whereas Patrick and May believe that they can be changed. Tom and Sue represent 
people who believe that their situations (in this case, the way their teachers have structured their 
classes) are fixed and that they cannot do anything about them. Patrick and May believe the 
opposite—that they can change their teachers’ minds about the class structure, or in other words, 
that their situations are changeable. As in these illustrative examples, we observe that different 
situation theories can breed dissimilar reactions to the same event. Tom and Sue, who have fixed 
situation theories, choose among the options they have to respond to a fixed and restrictive 
context (which generally amount to quitting or persisting); whereas Patrick and May, who have 
malleable situation theories, attempt to alter their circumstances by persuading the teacher to 
modify their class requirements, albeit with different motives (change the teacher’s mind versus 
negotiate flexibly). These examples illustrate that situation theories can influence how likely 
people are to change aspects of their situations rather than merely adapting themselves to fixed 
situations. This argument is consistent with what was first suggested by Dweck and Leggett 
(1988), who proposed that people’s lay theories about external attributes, including of other 
people and the world, can lead to “low initiation of and persistence towards change” under an 
entity theory or to “mastery-oriented goal pursuit” under an incremental theory. 
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Lay Theories about Other People’s Personalities 
Perhaps the most studied aspect of the external social context within the lay theories 
literature has been other people’s personalities. Prior research has implicated people’s lay 
theories about others’ personalities in people’s social judgments and reactions to others’ 
behaviors. For example, these lay theories powerfully influence how people react to ambiguous 
and perceived acts of aggression. Yeager and colleagues (2011) found that, in the context of peer 
victimization and exclusion, an incremental person theory was associated with lower attributions 
of hostile intent to the aggressor, lower feelings of shame and self-blame in the victims, and 
fewer intentions to take revenge on their aggressors. They replicated these main effects in a 
longitudinal field study where high school students were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups: control (no treatment) group, socio-emotional coping skills group, or an incremental 
theory group. After a 6-week-long workshop, students who had been taught about an incremental 
theory of personality were significantly more prosocial and less likely to show aggressive 
retaliation after a social exclusion experience (they allocated 40% less hot sauce to their 
aggressors), relative to those in the other two groups. Additionally, these students in the 
incremental theory group were more likely to have been nominated by their teachers for having 
reduced their conduct problems three months after the intervention (Yeager, Trzesniewski, & 
Dweck, 2013).  
Lay theories about others’ personalities also carry significant implications for people’s 
judgments of individuals and groups. Chiu, Hong, & Dweck (1997) found that people who held 
an incremental theory were less likely to exhibit lay dispositionism than those who held an entity 
theory. Relative to entity theorists, participants who were induced to believe in an incremental 
theory were less likely to make trait judgments and were less confident about using current 
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information about a person to predict that person’s behaviors in the future (Chiu et al., 1997, 
Study 5). Furthermore, incremental theorists had a lower tendency to endorse group (racial and 
occupational) stereotypes than entity theorists (Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998). 
Situation Theories about Other Contextual Factors 
To date, almost all the work on what I define as situation theories has focused on other 
people’s dispositions. Comparatively, little empirical research has tested how people construe 
other important aspects of their social contexts, such as their circumstances, physical 
environments, and the world in general. Nonetheless, these situation theories also carry 
important and unique implications of their own. First, Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) showed 
that people’s general theories about the world were independent of their lay theories about other 
people’s personalities and their personal attributes. Second, Chen and colleagues (in prep) found 
that situation theory effects do not overlap with those of self theories. To highlight the 
importance of these situation theories, I summarize the findings of each individual paper that 
examines their effects on judgment, intentions, and action, of which there are only a few to date9. 
 Lay Theories about Situations. People’s lay theories about how changeable their 
situations in general are predict how likely they are to take action on unfavorable circumstances. 
Chen, Laurin, McBrairty, and Lin (in prep) found that when people believe that situations are 
generally malleable, they are more likely to try to change them rather than passively adapt to 
them. In a field experiment, college students’ situation theories were first manipulated using 
biased questionnaires before they were presented with a hypothetical college policy that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Note that in this paper, I specifically focus on lay theories about stability and changeability of 
external situations. This is distinct from other literature on different types of lay theories, such as 
cultural theories (e.g. Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1998), attribution theories (Weiner, 1972, 
1985), or cognitive biases like the fundamental attribution error (e.g. Ross, 1977; Ross, Greene, 
& House, 1977).  
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university intended to implement. A higher proportion of the students who were induced to 
believe that situations can be changed signed the protest petition (73.9%), relative to those 
induced to believe that situations cannot be changed (58.1%). In a second study, survey panel 
workers who believed that situations are generally changeable were almost twice more likely 
(44.8%) to join a collective action campaign aimed at increasing their low wages, compared to 
those who believed that situations are fixed (24.0%). In sum, people’s lay theories about the 
malleability of situations can influence how likely they are to change disadvantageous situations 
rather than adapt to them. 
World and Morality Theories. Chiu and Hong (1999) examined the implications that 
Hong Kong citizens’ lay theories had on their attitudes towards the 1997 handover of Hong 
Kong to China. They found that Hong Kong citizens who viewed the world as fixed showed 
greater intentions to assimilate to mainland Chinese culture, but Hong Kong citizens who viewed 
the world as malleable showed more divergent attitudes. Relative to the former, those who 
believed in a changeable world reported that Hong Kong children should learn the mainland 
Chinese language at an older age (Study 2) and were more punitive towards a hypothetical 
mainland Chinese person relative to a Hong Kong person who committed the same infraction 
(Study 1). 
Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu (1997) established a similar pattern of results in the domain of 
morality. They found that participants who believe in a fixed socio-moral reality (simultaneously 
believing that the world and people’s moral values are fixed) tend to subscribe to a duty-based 
morality. These people generally prioritize the expectations and roles that each person is 
expected to fulfill in society. On the other hand, those who believe in a changeable socio-moral 
reality (simultaneously believing that the world and people’s moral values are changeable) tend 
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to subscribe to a rights-based morality. These people tend to prioritize the higher-order principles 
and human rights that societal regulations should adhere to. 
 Organizational Theories. Situation theories also have implications for how people 
present themselves to organizations they want to be a part of. Murphy and colleagues (2009, 
2015) found that the dominant lay theory that an organization portrays can influence applicants’ 
self-presentational styles, stereotype threat concerns, and even intentions to apply for a job at the 
organization. Murphy and Dweck (2009) randomly assigned students to either read about an 
organization that espoused a fixed theory of intelligence or one that espoused a malleable theory 
of intelligence by manipulating the organization’s description and meeting minutes that students 
were given to read about the organization. Students who were exposed to the fixed theory 
manipulation were more likely to select intelligence-related qualities of theirs to describe in their 
applications, whereas those who were exposed to the malleable theory manipulation were more 
likely to select motivation-related qualities such as their enthusiasm for learning. Other research 
extends these findings to show that the lay theories apparent in companies’ mission statements 
can affect how much stereotype threat they pose to female applicants, how much women trust the 
companies, and how likely they are to apply for the jobs offered by the companies (Emerson & 
Murphy, 2015). 
Summary 
 As described above, these represent the handful of empirical papers that have specifically 
examined the implications of situation theories other than people’s personalities. Compared to 
the plethora of research on self theories and personality theories, empirical work on these 
situation theories has accumulated at a comparatively slow rate despite their consequential 
implications. Importantly, understanding the different types of situation theories, how they are 
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associated with different goals and what consequences they have for behavior pose rich avenues 
that future empirical research should explicate. 
Motivating Complementary Types of Changes 
At a big-picture level, self theories motivate the degree to which people effortfully 
change their own attributes, be it their intelligence, emotions, or personality (Dweck, 2000). 
Situation theories, on the other hand, motivate how likely people are to judge others, react 
attitudinally against unsatisfactory circumstances, and enact changes on their environments 
(Chen et al., in prep; Chiu & Hong, 1997; Yeager et al., 2011). To date, the literature has 
generally studied the effects of self and situation theories separately. Nonetheless, these lay 
theories can serve complementary functions in motivating change—self theories motivate how 
likely people are to change aspects of themselves (“self change”) whereas situation theories 
motivate how likely people are to change their external environments (“situation change”).  
Self Theories Motivate Self Change within Fixed Situations 
The dominant existing self theory framework proposed by Dweck and Leggett (1988, 
Figure 5.1) accounts well for the motivational consequences of people’s beliefs about their 
attributes. The model proposes that an entity theory focuses people on showcasing their existing 
levels of the relevant attribute to gain positive judgments. An incremental theory, in contrast, 
focuses people on developing their attributes, such that they seek challenge and show persistence 
in the face of temporary setback.  
Let us, however, consider the contexts in which self theories have mainly been studied. 
Recent findings suggest that the conventional difference between entity and incremental 
theorists’ responses to difficulty may be contingent upon contexts that are assumed to be fixed 
and restrictive (Chapter 2; Chen, Schwarz, & Ellsworth, under review). As we saw with Tom and 
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Sue, the effects of self theories are especially pronounced in contexts such as school classes, 
which students generally do not consider within their power to change. Construing the situation 
as immutable focuses the actor on two plausible ways of responding: changing the self to suit the 
situation or disengaging with the situation. Thus, beliefs that incline one towards personal 
development would facilitate the former, and beliefs that incline one towards self-validation 
rather than improvement would make the latter more likely. 
Situation Theories Motivate Situation-Directed Change 
To juxtapose, situation theories predict how likely people are to change their situations 
rather than merely adapt themselves to them. We observe this by contrasting Patrick and May’s 
reactions against Tom and Sue’s reactions to their poor exam grades—Patrick and May see 
approaching their teacher as a plausible response because they believe that there is the possibility 
of changing her mind; Tom and Sue accept their grades as absolute and adjust themselves 
accordingly.  
Empirical research shows that people are more likely to take action to change 
problematic situations the more they believe that circumstances are changeable rather than fixed 
(Chapter 3; Chen et al., in prep). Importantly, these studies ruled out the effect of self theories on 
these outcomes. For example, participants’ likelihood of proactively voicing their dissatisfaction 
to their supervisor in a work conflict (rather than passively adapting to the situation) was 
influenced by how much they perceived their supervisor to be open to change, but not by how 
much they themselves were resistant to change (Chen et al., in prep; Study 1).  
Complementary Motivating Forces 
Considering the findings altogether, the evidence suggests that self theories and situation 
theories offer different, complementary predictions for behavior. Self theories are implicated in 
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how well people develop personal attributes within seemingly fixed and restrictive 
circumstances, whereas situation theories influence how likely people are to change their 
circumstances—an outcome that self theories do not account for. In a nutshell, malleable self 
theories direct change inwards at one’s personal attributes (“self change”) when the situation is 
immutable, whereas malleable situation theories direct change outwards at one’s situation 
(“situation change”). Thus, these two kinds of lay theories offer complementary predictions for 
human motivation.  
Next, I illustrate how understanding their interaction, above and beyond these separate 
motivational patterns, is important and discuss a new framework that extends previous theorizing 
to include the possible ways that they may interact with one another. 
Self Theories and Situation Theories Interact to Predict Behavior in Context 
To date, the self theory and situation theory literatures have mostly examined these 
beliefs independently of the other. As aforementioned, self theories primarily motivate self-
directed changes within situations that seem restrictive and fixed, whereas situation theories 
primarily motivate situation-directed changes. Still, it is important to consider the simultaneous 
interactions of these beliefs. The dynamicism that emerges from simultaneously understanding 
how changeable the self is in relation to the external environment could significantly add to our 
predictions of human behavior. This self-by-situation interactionist perspective is not new, given 
that psychology has long recognized the importance of understanding their interplay (Kelly, 
1991; Lewin, 1943; Ross & Nisbett, 2011). I discuss how this insight can be applied to inform 
the study of lay theories, which has generally considered them separately, and to highlight the 
generative predictions that we could make from understanding their interaction.  
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 Given that much less research has looked at situation theories relative to self theories, it is 
not surprising that their interaction has yet to be well-examined. Examined independently, self 
theories do not sufficiently account for reactions like proactive behavior aimed at changing the 
situation; situation theories do not distinguish between staying with the status quo and actively 
adjusting oneself to it. Nor can each approach alone differentiate between cases like Sue and 
Patrick, who have opposite beliefs about personal and situational malleability—Sue’s reactions 
characterize people who believe that their attribute is malleable but the situation is fixed; 
Patrick’s reactions characterize people who believe that they can change the situation but they 
cannot change themselves. 
Thus far, the dominant lay theories framework by Dweck and Leggett (1988) has 
effectively explained differences between people who believe that certain attributes are fixed or 
malleable, especially within a stable context. Nevertheless, it does not fully account for the 
various types of reactions that may emerge from different combinations of self and situation 
theories, such as proactive behavior aimed at changing the situation. To increase the explanatory 
power of the past framework, I propose an extended “Self by Situation Change” (SSC) Model 
(Figure 5.2) that integrates self and situation lay theories of change. I discuss how this 
framework builds on previous classic findings and highlight testable empirical predictions that 
emerge from this framework.  
Self by Situation Change (SSC) Model 
The Self by Situation Change (SSC) model extends Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) 
theoretical framework to account for more variation in people’s motivational patterns. It attempts 
to show how different combinations of self theories and situation theories motivate various types 
of response orientations.  
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As portrayed in the opening examples, beliefs about changeability can lead to multiple 
different reactions to the same event, or “response orientations”: Tom represents people who 
believe that their personal attributes and their situation are relatively immutable; Sue represents 
those who consider their personal attributes as more malleable but their situations as more fixed; 
Patrick represents those who construe their personal attributes as more stable but see their 
situations as more changeable; May represents those who consider both their personal attributes 
and their situations as flexible. These examples exemplify different combinations of self and 
situation theories that motivate orientations focused on finding one’s fit, developing oneself, 
shaping the situation, and navigating multiple options, respectively (see Figure 2). For simplicity, 
I discuss these self and situation theories as dichotomous, although these beliefs exist to various 
degrees along continua in real life. In this section, I describe each of these combinations of self 
and situation theories and the orientations they are associated with. Although I will frame self 
and situation malleability in general terms for illustrative parsimony, predictions made by the 
SSC framework involve construals about the salient and relevant aspects of the self and situation 
in context. 
Find My Fit: Fixed Self, Fixed Situation 
When characteristics of the self and situation are both believed to be pretty stable, people 
focus on the fit between the self and the situation. This mentality orients people to attend to 
features of the Person-Situation relationship that connote compatibility or a lack thereof. Thus, 
the “find my fit” orientation is characterized by two important responses: first, self-selection into 
situations that are compatible with the individual’s fixed attributes (in ways that validate the 
latter), and second, construing experiences of difficulty and failure as indicative of 
incompatibility with the situation. Take Tom for instance, who believes that his intelligence and 
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his grades are both unchangeable. With this combination of beliefs, he focuses on judging 
whether there is a good fit (or not) between his abilities and the class that he is in. Thus, failure 
and difficulty are interpreted as signs that he should disengage from what he considers a poor fit. 
People with this orientation believe that if a good match is found, positive outcomes will ensue; 
if a good match is not found, outcomes will be suboptimal—in which case a better match should 
be sought. If leaving the situation is not an option, however, helplessness may result. 
We observe evidence of this find-my-fit orientation in various domains. Importantly, this 
response orientation is consistent with theorizing about entity theorists within fixed situations, 
who are described as generally more concerned with proving their existing, supposedly stable 
levels of an attribute. Driven primarily by the goal to do well, entity theorists gravitate towards 
arenas that afford favorable judgments of their abilities over others (Dweck, 2000, p. 24). When 
faced with setback, however, they tend to be similar to depressed, helpless people “in their desire 
to simply quit or escape from the arena in which failure took place” (Dweck, 2000, p. 46). 
Therefore, when we consider that students generally see their academic contexts as fixed and set, 
the behaviors exhibited by an entity intelligence theorist as proposed in Dweck and Leggett’s 
(1988) framework are consistent with what the find-my-fit orientation might predict. 
Although one might readily assume that this find-my-fit orientation is no different from 
an entity theory, there is a main distinction to take note of. The entity theory is concerned with 
the belief that a personal attribute or ability is fixed (or many attributes for that matter are fixed), 
whereas the find-my-fit orientation emerges from the combination of the belief in a stable 
personal attribute and simultaneous belief that the salient situational factor is also fixed. Thus, an 
entity theory focuses on assessing one’s existing attribute or ability within a given situation, but 
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the find-my-fit orientation emphasizes achieving compatibility between personal and situational 
attributes. 
In the domain of work, some people tend to self-select into lines of work that correspond 
to their personal interests (Chapter 4; Chen, Ellsworth, & Schwarz, in press). These people, 
termed “fit theorists,” believe that what they consider enjoyable at the outset will generally 
remain more enjoyable than alternatives over time—indicative of a stable conception of their 
own interests. Additionally, their perceptions of fit with their lines of work do not change 
substantially over time, suggesting a similarly stable conception of their work circumstances. For 
fit theorists, these perceptions of vocational fit strongly predict how much passion they feel 
towards their work. When they perceive a poor fit with their lines of work, however, they report 
lower levels of vocational passion and satisfaction. 
The self-fixed and situation-fixed pattern of beliefs is also implicit in people’s views of 
their close relationships. In the context of close relationships, the salient situation often refers to 
one’s partner. Knee and colleagues’ (2001, p. 809) define a destiny belief as the belief that 
“potential relationship partners are either meant for each other or they are not.” Survey items 
include: “Potential relationship partners are either compatible or they are not,” “To last, a 
relationship must seem right from the start,” and “Potential relationship partners are either 
destined to get along or they are not” (Knee, Patrick, & Lonsbary, 2003). These questions 
suggest that implicit in this destiny belief are the assumptions that both partners have fixed 
attributes and they cannot change over time. Consequently, the relationship as a whole is viewed 
as static and “diagnosable with little opportunity for improvement” (Knee, Patrick, et al., 2003, p. 
46). Thus, compatibility from the outset is prioritized and relationship conflicts are construed as 
signs of a mismatch between the partners. 
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Across these domains, people who concurrently believe that their attributes and their 
salient situational factors are fixed tend to adopt a find-my-fit orientation. At its core, the 
orientation focuses people on achieving a good match between their personal and situational 
characteristics. Thus, those with a find-my-fit orientation are attentive towards cues that indicate 
compatibility or incompatibility, and tend to self-select into situations that validate their fixed 
attributes (such as their abilities, attitudes, interests, and values). When faced with negative 
experiences, people with this orientation tend to attribute their setbacks to incompatibility with 
their current situation, making them more likely to withdraw from these situations when success 
does not come smoothly, or to feel helpless if they are unable to leave the situation. 
Develop Myself: Malleable Self, Fixed Situation 
At its core, the “develop myself” orientation emerges when people believe that their 
personal attribute can be cultivated within what they assume to be a fixed situation. When people 
see their attributes as changeable but their situation as fixed, they tend to focus on how they can 
develop their attribute to match the situational demands. Take Sue for example, who views her 
exam grades as fixed but believes that she can cultivate her Mathematics abilities. This inclines 
her to focus on personal development, especially when outcomes turn out short of her 
expectations. This orientation is characterized by a focus on opportunities for personal 
improvement to suit the demands of the situation, either by construing events as such 
opportunities or by recognizing personal attributes that need to be worked on. Like Sue, people 
with this orientation generally construe experiences of challenge and setback as opportunities for 
personal growth. We expect a focus on personal growth within this develop-myself orientation to 
manifest most under conditions that signal a need for change. Thus, their implications are 
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sometimes obscured during positive experiences, which do not indicate that a change in the self 
or the situation needs to be made. 
Research on an incremental theory of intelligence, which has generally been studied in 
academic contexts that students perceive as unchangeable, exemplifies this orientation. Driven 
by mastery goals, incremental theorists tend to attribute failure to a lack of personal effort. Yet, 
because they recognize that ability can grow, doing poorly now suggests that there is room for 
improvement and better future performance. Thus, they often respond to difficulty and setback 
with perseverance and resilience (e.g. Hong et al., 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1997). Because of 
these adaptive psychological and behavioral reactions to setback, incremental theorists tend to 
reap short-term and long-term academic achievements often superior to those of entity theorists, 
who tend to be less persistent and resilient in the face of setback (Blackwell et al., 2007; Dweck, 
2000).  
Beyond the academic context, working adults can similarly hold beliefs about their 
attributes as malleable but their work characteristics as set and unchangeable. Those with a 
“develop theory” believe that passion for their work can grow over time as they gain competence 
in their line of work (Chapter 4; Chen et al., in press). Rather than expect their work roles or 
vocational demands to change, these people endorse developing competence on the job to better 
fulfill what is expected of them. Moreover, they also tend to have a malleable conception of their 
feelings of passion, forecasting that it will increase over time within the same line of work. 
Consistent with this, research on a representative sample of American working adults showed 
that “develop theorists” tend to report significant increases in their perceived fit with their 
vocations over time, which is positively related to their self-reported passion at work (Study 4). 
An important context in which many people tend to hold this self-malleable, situation-
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fixed pattern of beliefs is weight management. In America and many other developed countries, 
healthy and unhealthy foods alike are often extremely accessible—in quantities that are 
appropriate to a daily caloric intake and in quantities far beyond this acceptable range. In the 
popular media, we often see quotes that illustrate the prevalent assumption that people cannot do 
anything to change their consumption environment. Take for instance how the obesity epidemic 
in America is portrayed in our media. In a summary of the book Food Politics: How the Food 
Industry Influences Nutrition and Health, R. Morgan Griffin writes that:  
recommendations about healthy eating are overwhelmed by hundreds of billions of 
dollars worth of advertising for junk foods that we’re subjected to at home and even in 
public schools. And as fast food companies and chains compete with one another by 
increasing portion sizes, our waists are increasing proportionately (quote from WebMD, 
April 5, 2015). 
Similarly, NPR (May 14, 2012) reported that “sedentary lifestyles and changes in eating habits 
have contributed to weight gain, as more Americans work at desk jobs, use electronic devices 
and get served increasingly larger portions at restaurants.” 
 As these quotes illustrate, many people tend to assume that people are the passive 
victims of their consumption environments. In other words, weight management is about the 
difficult exercise of willpower in a consumption environment dictated by the food companies and 
unchangeable by the consumer. This assumption is reflected in much of the research on weight 
management, which generally study dieting and exercise—two willpower-oriented strategies—as 
the main means through which weight is managed (e.g., McFerran & Mukhopadhyay, 2013; 
Miller, Koceja, & Hamilton, 1997; Ross et al., 2000). 
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In these seemingly fixed consumption environments, Burnette and her colleagues (2010, 
2012) have shown that people who believe that body weight is changeable rather than stable tend 
to be more successful self-regulators after dieting setbacks. In response to a hypothetical dieting 
setback, those who had been primed with a malleable lay theory of body weight were reported a 
greater likelihood of engaging in adaptive self-regulatory efforts than those with a fixed theory of 
body weight (Burnette, 2010). In a longitudinal study, people who had taken a malleable body 
weight theory intervention were buffered against severe weight management setbacks, compared 
to control condition participants whose setbacks led to weight gain. Those with the malleable 
theory also successfully lost more weight over a 12-week period compared to control participants 
(Burnette & Finkel, 2012).  
Taken together, we observe evidence of a develop-myself orientation across many 
domains in which people see their attributes as more malleable and their situations as more fixed. 
Central to this orientation is a prioritization of personal development in the area where there is 
room for improvement. This is consistent with Carol Dweck and colleagues’ (1988, 2000) 
argument that incremental theorists are primarily motivated by learning (as opposed to 
performance goals). Consequently, this orientation inclines people to appraise events in terms of 
what they can learn from them. They therefore tend to respond to events, especially negative 
outcomes or challenging experiences, with developmentally-focused persistence. 
Shape the Situation: Fixed Self, Malleable Situation 
A shape-the-situation orientation involves believing that the situation can be changed to 
suit oneself. Central to it is the combination of beliefs that the relevant personal attribute (for 
instance, one’s position in an argument) is fixed and the commensurate situational factor (such as 
the other person’s position) is malleable. This combination of beliefs motivates the intention to 
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change the situational factor—and under the appropriate conditions, actual behavior directed at 
changing the situation (see Ajzen, 1985, for when intentions lead to action). People with this 
orientation construe situational cues that suggest contextual malleability as opportunities to be 
acted on.  
For example, many of us are familiar with the experience of arguing with someone more 
stubborn than ourselves (unless of course we tend to be the most stubborn of all). Often in these 
interactions, the person who more stubbornly holds his or her point of view keeps trying to 
change the mind of the other, while being adamantly resistant to any form of reciprocal 
persuasion. This more stubborn person behaves like one who has a shape-the-situation 
orientation. Although I use a negative example of a stubborn person here, note that having a 
shape-the-situation orientation is not necessarily bad. In fact, proactive situation-change 
behaviors associated with this orientation can involve challenging a disadvantageous status quo 
and generating new ways to revolutionize previously inefficient methods. These actions can 
promote job performance and garner leadership responsibility for the individual, and even have 
the potential to improve social circumstances for many (Crant, 2000; Grant & Ashford, 2008).  
Although it has been less studied from a lay theories approach, we observe manifestations 
of this shape-the-situation orientation in everyday life—from students who contest their grades 
and employees who speak up against unethical organizational practices to large social 
movements like the civil rights protests. In the opening example, Patrick represents students who, 
upon seeing a poor grade, react by taking action to change the system. Rather than considering 
the situation a fixed reality that they must cope with, or even construing their grades as an 
indication of low ability, these students focus on changing the situational factor instead. 
Representations of this orientation have yet to emerge in the lay theory of intelligence literature, 
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which has been dominated by the comparison between entity and incremental self theories. In the 
academic domain, the equivalent of this shape-the-situation orientation would be what we 
observe in Patrick’s case—students who react by changing their circumstances. 
At work, employees exhibit behavior that involves changing others, their role 
responsibilities, their organizational norms and many other aspects of their work contexts to suit 
personal wants and needs. For example, they voice issues with which they are dissatisfied 
(LePine & Van Dyne, 2001; Van Dyne & LePine, 1998), sell issues of personal relevance to 
their supervisors (Detert & Burris, 2007; Dutton & Ashford, 1993), change the tasks and 
responsibilities involved in their roles (Nicholson, 1984; Parker, Wall, & Jackson, 1997; 
Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001), and take charge in driving organizational changes that they want 
to see (Morrison & Phelps, 1999). The circumstances that promote these situation-change 
behaviors involve factors that arguably contribute to seeing the self as more fixed and the 
situation as more malleable.  
For example, the organizational behavior (OB) literature shows that workers are more 
likely to engage in behaviors aimed at changing the organizational context when the 
organizational leadership is open and supportive of change, management is willing to listen to 
employees, there are ongoing change initiatives in the organization, and there is ambiguity in the 
organizational context (Detert & Burris, 2007; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Rank, Nelson, Allen, & 
Xu, 2009; Morrison & Phelps, 1999; Grant & Ashford, 2008; Dutton, Ashford, O’neill, Hayes, & 
Wierba, 1997)—situational factors suggestive of a more changeable context. At the same time, 
the likelihood of proactive behaviors is also affected by workers’ dispositional need for control, 
desire for personal consistency, accountability to a particular group of stakeholders (which 
necessitates behavioral and attitudinal consistency), and their perceived influence in the 
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organization (including a position of importance and access to powerful networks; Black & 
Ashford, 1995; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Grant & Ashford, 2008; Lind & Tyler, 1988). These 
constitute personal factors suggestive of stability in personal attributes or fixedness in one’s 
position that the individual can afford (or has to prioritize). Although there is little empirical 
evidence testing the simultaneous interaction of these personal factors of fixedness and 
situational malleability, existing evidence suggests that situation-directed proactivity can be 
maximally facilitated when people construe the situation as malleable and the self as fixed on 
relevant characteristics. 
In the context of weight management, we observe a shape-the-situation orientation 
emerge when people recognize (somewhat counter-intuitively) that their willpower is difficult to 
change but their consumption situations can. Proponents of this view argue that “it’s easier to 
change your eating environment than to change your mind” (Wansink, 2014, p. 6). In contrast to 
the develop-myself orientation, Wansink (2014) proposes that people should take the initiative to 
change their kitchen contents and proactively ask businesses to structure their systems so as to 
facilitate consumers’ healthy eating goals. For example, he recommends that people should make 
unhealthy foods inconvenient and less accessible in their kitchens, minimize leisurely material 
around the kitchen to decrease non-cooking time spent there, and use smaller serving dishes to 
decrease portion sizes. Rather than passively going along with what is on the menu, he also 
suggests that people should consider asking their servers at restaurants to bag a portion of their 
meal beforehand or request for a half portion to order before they eat. In these and many more of 
Wansink’s (2014) recommendations, we can infer a pattern of beliefs that reflect a shape-the-
situation orientation—beliefs that the external environment (specifically the physical 
environment in many of these instances) is more changeable than one’s own dietary habits. 
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To summarize, a shape-the-situation orientation emerges from construing the relevant 
characteristic of the situation as more malleable and the one’s personal attribute as more fixed. 
Central to this orientation is a focus on changing the external situation to suit oneself. People 
with this orientation tend to look out for opportunities to change the situation to suit their 
preferences and needs, and take action to change suboptimal circumstances. Whether these 
actions and intentions lead to successful change or not is another issue that depends on various 
other factors that moderate the outcomes (which I discuss later). 
Navigating Multiple Possibilities: Malleable Self, Malleable Situation 
An interesting combination occurs when people believe that they themselves and their 
situations are both malleable. Like the example of May, this produces a state in which the self is 
flexible within a changeable situation. Recognizing the simultaneous changeability of both puts 
one in a state in which multiple options are possible, ranging from mutual compromise to one 
side completely accommodates the other’s demands. This mentality allows the individual to 
consider what he or she wants out of the specific situation. It orients people towards being more 
strategic in recognizing possibilities within the context and navigating them to achieve mutual 
compromise.  
One possibility is that people with this orientation strategically navigate the flexibility in 
themselves and situations to effectively attain their goals. This assumes that they are aware of the 
multiple possibilities that can emerge within the context. For example, May herself is willing to 
accept her poor grades and develop her own knowledge, but at the same time, she also believes 
that her teacher is willing to be persuaded to improve the class. Thus, May might try to 
understand what she herself needs to learn and also try to justify her reasons to change her 
teacher’s mind. Under these circumstances, both, either, or neither could change.  
 	  158	  
An obvious upside of this orientation is that one perceives a greater number of 
possibilities within the context, which expands one’s response repertoire. Additionally, it 
motivates people towards achieving mutual compromise. We observe this orientation manifest in 
the mutually beneficial co-development of partners in close relationships. In the close 
relationship literature, Knee’s (1998) growth belief of relationships best illustrates this self-and-
situation-malleable pattern of beliefs. The growth theory proposes that “successful relationships 
are constructed and developed by conquering obstacles and growing closer” (p. 361). This 
involves endorsing statements such as: “A successful relationship is mostly as matter of learning 
to resolve conflicts with a partner,” “Relationships often fail because people do not try hard 
enough,” and “With enough effort, almost any relationship can work” (Knee et al., 2003). 
Although framed at the level of the “relationship” as a unit, implicit in these statements is the 
assumption that each relationship partner (i.e. the self and the situational other) can change over 
time. Therefore, relationship obstacles and conflict can be overcome with mutual willingness and 
effort. Note that this orientation differs from the develop-myself orientation because it involves 
believing that both the self and the salient other can change, rather than believing that only the 
self is more malleable and the other is much less so (as in the develop-myself orientation). 
On the other hand, a potential downside to seeing multiple possibilities is decision-
making paralysis (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz & Kliban, 2004). Presented with so many 
plausible strategies and outcomes, one might find it difficult to commit to a single path of action. 
Another disadvantage can be seen in decision-making inefficiency when there are overly 
accommodating parties on both sides, neither of whom want to assert their preferences on the 
other. We observe this among friends who are highly accommodating towards one another, on 
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food preferences for instance, to the point that a mutual decision is significantly delayed and 
ironically difficult to reach. 
It is also possible that this cell in the SSC model may only exist as a transient state. With 
further interaction and more information, the two entities at hand would settle into one of the 
other three SSC orientations that actually predict directed action and intention. This phenomenon 
is relatively common in negotiations, where both parties are flexible in reacting to the changing 
offers on the table. Negotiators who are strangers may enter the negotiation admitting that both 
sides’ positions can change. Yet soon after the interaction begins, a hierarchy of stability forms 
as the two negotiators develop a better understanding of whose position is more malleable 
relative to the other’s. Following this, one of the other three SSC orientations dominates, 
depending on the relative malleability judged. Take May for instance. In her case, she might 
enter the meeting with her teacher understanding that both sides’ positions can change. During 
the meeting, her teacher might very well convince her that the class system cannot be changed to 
accommodate any specific student. As she learns more about her teacher’s rationale, May’s 
position might become more and more flexible to change, thereby shifting her to a develop-
myself orientation. However, if during the meeting May realized that she could persuade her 
teacher to reconsider the current class grading system (i.e. her teacher’s position is more 
malleable than her own), then she would have shifted to a more shape-the-situation orientation. 
Some theorists have said that when both possibilities of changing the self and situation are 
available, people start by trying to alter the situation and resort to self-change only after the 
former proves difficult or impossible (Lazarus, 1993; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). 
However, I do not think that situation-change and self-change have to occur in sequence that way 
all the time. If multiple options are available, then some people might just identify one strategy 
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that they prefer, some may be naturally inclined to trying to conform to what the situation 
demands first, yet others may consider the options in order of ranked preferences, and so on.  
In summary, the core psychology that is a product of believing that both oneself and the 
situation are malleable produces an orientation that motivates the strategic recognition and 
navigation of multiple possibilities towards mutual compromise. Whether or not this cell in the 
SSC model exists as a stable state, or if it is merely transitory until more information is gathered, 
remains an open question. Consider these issues: Can person and situation entities in any context 
exist at exactly equal levels of malleability? If two people in an interaction are equally rigid in 
their positions or equally flexible, then what direction can they settle on to take action? Future 
research might fruitfully examine what happens when self and situation components are both 
construed as highly and similarly malleable to inform this component of the model.   
Summary  
 In summary, existing literature has predominantly focused on people’s lay theories about 
how malleable their attributes are and less so on their beliefs about situational aspects. Taken 
alone, neither self theories nor situation theories can explain the diversity and complexity of 
people’s responses to situations—self theories do not sufficiently explain when people take 
action to alter their circumstances; situation theories do not distinguish between passive and 
active ways of adapting to the status quo. However, there has yet to be empirical research that 
examines how self and situation theories interact with one another in context to affect people’s 
responses to their environments.  
 To build upon Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) previous model, the SSC model integrates 
theorizing about self and situation theories into a unified framework. It furthermore illustrates 
different response orientations that their interactions are associated with. These four broad 
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orientations include: finding my fit, developing myself, shaping the situation, and navigating 
multiple possibilities. Each of these orientations directs people’s focus on certain possibilities in 
context, their interpretation of events, and their behavioral reactions. As previously mentioned, 
the self and situation theories (and their combinations) have been presented here dichotomously 
for illustrative parsimony. However, they can exist in real life to varying degrees along continua. 
The SSC model therefore offers an integrated framework with which to interpret previous 
findings and suggests testable predictions that could fruitfully inform future empiricism. 
Implications 
One of the aims of the SSC framework is to offer a new perspective on familiar 
psychological phenomena. Understanding people’s self and situation theories, along with the 
mindsets that emerge when these two types of beliefs interact, can help us fruitfully explain the 
types of strategies that people use to react to events. I discuss how this framework may be 
potentially useful in informing how we think about topics including self-regulation, social 
influence, and work-relevant decisions. 
Self-regulation 
 Previous models of self-regulation, especially those of emotion self-regulation, have 
generally focused on comparing the effectiveness of different regulatory strategies (e.g., Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003; Kross, Ayduk, & 
Mischel, 2005). This has produced an array of tactics that are now scientifically recognized as 
more or less beneficial ways of dealing with emotional experiences, including but not limited to: 
cognitive reappraisal, rumination, distancing techniques, emotion suppression, situation selection, 
and situation modification. These emotion regulation techniques reflect two general means by 
which people regulate their emotions: trying to directly control the way they feel and using the 
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contexts that they are in to regulate their emotions. This distinction resonates with similar 
theories in the literature, such as Folkman and Lazarus’ (1988) emotion-focused versus problem-
focused coping and Gross’ (2001) process model of emotion regulation. Nonetheless, earlier 
models have been more concerned with the different regulatory strategies in and of themselves, 
and have recognized but not emphasized self-directed and situation-directed changes as two 
broad means of regulation. Note that although self-change sounds similar to emotion-focused 
coping and situation-change to problem-focused coping, they are not equivalent. For example, 
problem-focused coping can include both types of change—as Lazarus (1993, p. 238) put it, “the 
function of problem-focused coping is to change the troubled person-environment relationship 
by acting on the environment or oneself.” In contrast, the SSC model focuses on explaining how 
people’s fundamental beliefs about change influence how their regulation is directed. It does not 
speak to the comparative effectiveness of each specific type of regulation.  
 Beyond emotion regulation, this approach offers implications that extend to other forms 
of regulation. For example, many people nowadays have weight management goals for 
themselves; yet their regulatory strategies vary significantly in how they go about achieving 
these goals. This is not surprising, given that the advice offered regarding weight regulation 
comes in various forms—some advocate the exercise of pure willpower to avoid one’s favorite 
unhealthy foods, others espouse exercising off the calories, and yet others recommend modifying 
the consumption context (e.g., McFerran & Mukhopadhyay, 2013; Wansink, 2014). Riding on 
the old adage that people selectively attend to and comply with what they intrinsically believe in 
(Festinger, 1957; Frey, 1986), I propose that people’s lay theories offer a parsimonious way to 
predict when people gravitate towards one form of regulation over the other. People’s 
fundamental assumptions about the malleability of their weight and that of their consumption 
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contexts interact to motivate different weight management strategies. Another important insight 
is that we could potentially target the specific beliefs that people have in order to change their 
weight management strategies (e.g., Burnette & Finkel, 2010). 
In essence, self-regulation can be construed as the exercise of willpower against 
situational forces of temptation. Whether we choose to work on one or the other can be explained 
by the beliefs we have about their malleability. Moreover, changing our self or situation theories 
could potentially influence which strategies we expect to be effective. 
Social Influence 
 Social influence theories have long concerned how people affect one another, whether in 
groups or as individuals, purposefully or nonconsciously (Gilovich, Keltner, Chen, & Nisbett, 
2013). Given the gravity of the implications, a great deal of research has been dedicated towards 
identifying important factors that explain when people are more or less likely to be influenced 
(e.g., Asch, 1956; Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Milgram, 1963; Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). I offer 
another plausible, empirically testable factor—people’s lay theories of interpersonal malleability. 
Applied to interpersonal settings, such as negotiations or relationships with power differentials, 
the person whose position is believed to be less changeable (i.e. more fixed) holds greater 
capacity to persuade the other. Conversely, the person whose position is believed to be more 
malleable has greater potential to become the target of influence. Perceived malleability could be 
cued by personality traits such as openness to change and an easy-going nature, resources that 
confer status and power, the success or failure of previous change attempts, or even in-the-
moment behavioral cues such as body language and communication style. Thus characteristics of 
the person and the situation provide cues that are used to form judgments of potential 
malleability which direct social influence.  
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 At present, little empirical research has examined how the interaction between people’s 
self and situation theories can affect their social influence strategies and how effective these 
strategies are. Existing studies have shown that people are more likely to voice their 
dissatisfaction to try to change their work situations and relationships when they endorse an 
incremental rather than entity theory of their social contexts (Chen et al., in prep; Kammrath & 
Dweck, 2006). In attitude change research, there are to my knowledge only two papers that have 
examined people’s lay theories about attitude stability. One by Petrocelli and colleagues (2010) 
found that individuals’ lay theories about attitude stability affects how much they think their own 
attitudes towards specific issues have changed over time, and consequently, how certain they are 
about their attitudes. More relevant to the SSC model, Akhtar and Wheeler (under review) 
showed that entity theories about one’s own attitudes fosters greater advocacy of one’s opinions, 
whereas entity theories about others’ attitudes inhibits people’s intentions to advocate. The SSC 
framework offers similar predictions, and urges researchers to further consider the relative 
malleability of persuaders’ and targets’ positions, beyond that of each side. In addition, it 
encourages a holistic consideration of the two-way interaction comprising the social influence 
context—who changes when depends on which side is construed as more changeable. 
Organizational Decisions and Behavior 
One of the most obvious domains that the SSC model resonates with is Organizational 
Behavior. First, the OB literature has accumulated decades of research on work behaviors related 
to each of the four SSC cells. Examples of relevant phenomena include: personnel selection to 
facilitate fit (Werbel & Johnson, 2001), organizational socialization tactics to promote new 
employee development (Black & Ashford, 1995; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), job crafting by 
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employees (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001), and middle management’s negotiation between 
personal and role changes (Nicholson, 1984).  
Second, OB theories have long identified self-change and situation-change as two 
important ways that people can respond to their work contexts. In his theory of work role 
transitions, Nicholson (1984) introduced the insight that people can adopt various combinations 
of personal development and role development during work transitions. Additionally, he 
identified specific characteristics of the person and work role that he thought were primarily 
responsible for these different types of adjustment, including desire for control, desire for 
feedback, novelty of role demands, discretion allowed in the role, and discretionary shift from a 
previous work role. Later empirical research, however, only found mixed results for these 
proposed antecedents. For example, Black and Ashford (1995) found that workers’ need for 
control and feedback predicted personal development, but job novelty and job discretion were 
unrelated to the changes people enacted in their work roles. Testing Nicholson’s (1984) model 
with MBA graduates, Ashforth and Saks (1995) found that only perceived job discretion was 
related to role development behaviors over time on the job, workers’ desire for feedback was 
positively related to personal development after four months on the job but not after, and there 
were no interactions between the factors as Nicholson had predicted on personal and role 
development.  
Despite the lack of empirical support for Nicholson’s (1984) proposed antecedents, the 
SSC model resonates with his insight about two important types of change—personal and 
situational—and the notion that they can interact with one another. Moreover, this framework 
expands on Nicholson’s in proposing that it is people’s contextualized construals about the 
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stability or malleability of attributes which produces different motivational orientations—more 
so than the specific attributes themselves. 
As proposed earlier, factors such as organizational leadership’s openness to change (e.g. 
Detert & Burris, 2007; Dutton & Ashford, 1993) and ongoing change initiatives within the 
company (e.g., Crant, 2000; Dutton et al., 1997) can signal how rigid or changeable the work 
environment is; factors such as individuals’ desire for consistency and accountability (e.g., 
Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Grant & Ashford, 2008) could play a role in fostering beliefs 
about personal stability or changeability. Furthermore, roles with power or status may afford 
greater perceived flexibility in some areas (such as the autonomy and resources to make changes; 
Dutton & Ashford, 1993) and less so in others (for instance, responsibility for upholding 
traditions). While these factors have previously been examined as antecedents of adjustment 
more from the perspective of individual differences among workers and characteristics of their 
roles and organizations (e.g., Black & Ashford, 1995; Nicholson, 1984; Saks & Ashforth, 1997; 
Saks, Uggerslev, & Fassina, 2007), I propose to study them vis-à-vis possible underlying lay 
theories of changeability. In essence, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any predictor 
depends primarily on how it alters people’s construals of whether their relevant personal and 
situational attributes are changeable or not. Furthermore, it is the interaction between these 
different self and situation construals that orient how people behave in relation to their work 
environments. Future research on people at work may benefit from testing this theoretical 
approach. Understanding how different combinations of these self and situation theories predict 
different work behaviors, from self-selection into certain jobs to proactivity on the job, could 
fruitfully complement and extend current OB theorizing. 
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Other Areas 
This lay theory approach could also be applied to other areas, such as culture and close 
relationships to explain who changes when. To the degree that relationships between people and 
their social systems and relationships between romantic partners reflect social interactions in 
which mutual influence processes are at play, we might make similar predictions to those 
previously described. These areas described provide rich avenues for empirical research to 
theoretically integrate the SSC framework approach with existing literatures within psychology 
and neighboring fields. 
Further Questions 
It is worthwhile for us to consider some questions that are directly relevant to this 
theoretical framework and some which pertain to lay theory research more broadly. I first 
address some questions that potentially arise in the current framework. Following which, I 
discuss some important issues germane to the lay theory literature as a whole. 
Main Effects or Interaction?  
In this paper, I have described both the main effects of self and situation theories and how 
they possibly interact with one another to influence motivation. Is our motivation always a 
product of equally salient self and situational malleability judgments? Not necessarily. At times, 
one or the other may be more salient, and therefore constitute the primary motivational force. 
This shows up especially in domains where one or more of the combinations of lay theories do 
not practically exist. For instance, there may hardly be anyone who believes that physical 
appearance never changes over time. And when fall progresses into a harsh winter, it is what 
helps people adjust themselves to the unchangeable reality of the seasons that matter most. At 
other times, however, it is people’s simultaneous judgments of both personal and situational 
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aspects that matter. Take the couple arguing over how to educate their child for example. In that 
case, each partner’s assessment of how flexible the other person is to changing views matters as 
much as how flexible he or she is willing to be on the matter. Thus, whether self theories, 
situation theories, or their combination predominantly motivate action depends to a large extent 
on the context they are being applied to. 
Lay Theories and Reality 
Lay theories, being subjective beliefs, are not always consistent with objective reality 
(Furnham, 1988). In any context, there are realistic limits to how much people can actually 
change themselves and their circumstances. A short child born to two diminutive parents, for 
instance, may never naturally achieve the height of a runway model, no matter how much she 
jumps, stretches, or modifies her diet. Likewise, no matter how changeable the average prison 
inmate thinks his circumstances are, the reality is more likely that he will not be able to change 
the prison system to what suits him. Additionally, certain types of drugs or psychopathologies 
distort people’s perception of reality, sometimes to the extent that they imagine being able to 
accomplish the impossible. As in these cases, there is not always a match between what can 
actually be done and what people consider themselves capable of. Certain strategies, therefore, 
may prove unproductive in certain contexts. 
 In other cases, people sometimes do not see what is possible. Many often make the 
mistake of assuming that they cannot change their circumstances at all. We generally observe 
this in highly structured or hierarchical organizations, such as schools and government 
institutions. Tom and Sue in the opening paragraph, who view their class systems as set and their 
teachers’ minds as irreversible, are examples of students who do not consider their circumstances 
 	  169	  
as changeable. In cases like these, people often pass up opportunities to improve their 
circumstances, even though the latter might actually be amendable to change. 
When lay theories and reality are incongruent, what happens? On one hand, lay theories 
shape our subjective reality, and on the other hand, they are also held in check by reality. When 
these incongruencies occur, it is possible that people may change their lay theories or they may 
leave to look for other contexts that match their lay theories instead. Future research can examine 
the degree to which lay theories and objective reality overlap, and how this overlap (or lack 
thereof) influences people’s responses and outcomes.	  
Goals 
At present, the SSC framework does not discuss how different combinations of self and 
situation theories and their motivational orientations relate to people’s goals. Whereas Dweck 
and Leggett’s (1988) model centrally features people’s performance and mastery goals, this 
framework leaves this relation as an open empirical question that more research is needed to 
address. Although there are obvious parallels between people’s efforts to improve themselves 
and their efforts to improve their circumstances (i.e. mastery goals and situation-change goals), 
the situational equivalent to a performance-orientation is less evident. One possibility is that 
situation theories may influence system justification goals (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and system 
change goals (Johnson & Fujita, 2012)—fixed situation beliefs may foster an orientation towards 
justifying and validating the current status quo whereas malleable situation beliefs may motivate 
intentions to improve the system. Empirical research is needed to test this proposition. 
Broader Questions for Lay Theory Research 
 While the above issues are most directly relevant to the SSC framework, there also 
remain big picture questions for the broader lay theories literature to address. I discuss three 
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which are of particular importance: First, are lay theories domain-general or domain-specific? 
Second, are “other people” part of the self or the situation? Third, how do lay theories come 
about? 
Domain-General or Domain-Specific? 
A common question that arises is: Are lay theories domain-specific or do people’s beliefs 
about stability and malleability generalize across multiple domains? On one hand, there are 
people who believe that street savvy can be learned but that athletic ability is inborn; on the other 
hand, there are also those who believe that gaining competence at any skill is all about practice 
and experience. Thus far, Carol Dweck and her colleagues (1995) have argued that lay theories 
are generally domain-specific, although people also hold theories about personality in general. 
These “kind of person” lay theories (Dweck, 2000) implicate many attributes and can therefore 
affect motivation across multiple domains, like people’s responses to relationship conflict and 
school bullying (Kammrath & Dweck, 2006; Yeager et al., 2011). Nonetheless, more can be 
done to discuss how domain-specific lay theories relate to one another and how far the effects of 
general lay theories extend across domains. 
Measurement-wise, Dweck advises (2000), “the domain-specific measures are preferable 
when the study focuses on one particular domain… The domain-general measure is used when 
the study focuses on judgments and behavior that cut across the social and intellectual domains 
(such as certain stereotypes)” (p. 175-176). This heuristic allows us to explain why some studies 
find that domain-general lay theories about personality affect motivation in many specific areas 
(Kammrath & Dweck, 2006; Yeager et al., 2011), whereas others find that certain attributes like 
shyness and passion for work are explained by domain-specific lay theories but not by general 
“kind of person” lay theories (e.g., Beer, 2002; Chen et al., in press).  
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The SSC framework similarly adheres to these rules of thumb. For parsimony of 
illustration, self and situation theories have been discussed in their general terms in this paper. 
However, it is crucial to note that whether we make predictions that are general or domain-
specific, we should match our construct to the judgment at hand. Future lay theories research 
could expand on what we know by studying how different domain-specific lay theories are 
related to one another, why they might be more strongly associated in some individuals than 
others, and the boundaries of motivational phenomena that general “kind of person” lay theories 
account for.   
“Other People” as the Self or Situation?  
 A common question that emerges in response to the self-situation distinction is: where do 
“other people” fall? Although “other people” have been discussed earlier under the category of 
the external situation (given how previous research has operationalized them), I would like to 
clarify that the answer to this question is more nuanced and contextually bound.  
On one hand, people’s judgments of others can sometimes be projections of their 
judgments of themselves, especially when they make evaluations of ingroup members whom 
they associate with. For instance, a person who concludes that people in general do not change 
their moral values may be drawing that conclusion based on an assessment of how much his or 
her own personal values have remained stable over time. On other occasions, people may 
construe others as external to them, such as when differences are made salient in times of 
interpersonal conflict. Take for example the couple fighting over how their child should be 
educated. In this case, the husband and wife are likely to make judgments of one another’s 
flexibility that are distinct from their judgments of themselves (in fact, the fundamental 
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attribution error would suggest that each party would generally accuse the other of being less 
flexible about a specific issue than they think they themselves are). 
Prior literature has tended to measure people’s lay theories about others’ personalities 
with very generally worded items, which does not allow a clear distinction between beliefs about 
people in general including the self and beliefs about other people excluding the self. The 
traditional “kind of person” (“others” form) includes questions like the following: “The kind of 
person someone is, is something very basic about them and it can’t be changed much.”, “People 
can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.”, and 
“Everyone is a certain kind of person, and there is not much that can be done to really change 
that.”  
 Again, it is important to consider that whether other people are seen as part of the self or 
the situation boils down to the judgment context. Contexts that signal inclusivity or emphasize 
similarity among people facilitate processing of others as part of the self (such as evaluations of 
one’s ingroup); contexts that highlight the self as a unique entity or make differences between 
the self and others salient facilitate construal of others as part of the external situation (such as 
evaluating one’s partner during a relationship conflict). Furthermore, people’s reports about their 
global beliefs could be interpreted one way or the other depending on the judgment that they are 
brought to bear upon (Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Sudman, 1992). This is consistent with 
previous literature, which finds that lay theories of people’s personality can affect both 
judgments of the self and others even within the same context (for e.g., Yeager et al., 2011, 
2013). Future research should test when people tend to construe others as part of the self versus 
part of the situation, and the implications that these two types of beliefs have for our social lives. 
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Origins and Development of Lay Theories 
One important question for lay theory research in general is: what determines the kind of 
lay theories we hold? Previous research has highlighted some factors that contribute to the 
development of certain lay theories, including the kind of praise children receive and teachers’ 
classroom climates (Kamins & Dweck, 1999; Mueller & Dweck, 1998; Rattan, Savani, Naidu, & 
Dweck, 2012). Apart from these, there may be many other factors (including contextual factors) 
that influence how stable or changeable people judge a particular aspect of themselves or their 
situation to be. These could include how important and personally relevant an issue is, whether it 
is considered a moral value to the individual, and repeated experiences of success or failure in a 
particular domain. If a person holds a particular value as important to their identity and moral 
value system, then he or she may very well be less willing to compromise on it. Moreover, Leith 
and colleagues (2014) have shown that people are often driven by egoistical goals in the lay 
theories they endorse—when these egoistical goals are salient during one’s experience of success, 
people tend to like thinking that they are naturally talented at a task; but if these goals are salient 
during failure, people often prefer to agree that their performance is only temporary and that they 
can get better at the task over time.  
Factors that may influence how fixed or malleable people consider their situations to be 
may include: how welcome the organizational culture is to feedback and change, communication 
and enforcement of institutional rules, and larger societal norms. Although many of these factors 
have previously been studied within the Organizational Behavior literature, as described earlier, 
their underlying psychology can be better understood. I propose that these factors constitute 
organizational and societal aspects that can signal how changeable external contexts are, which 
influence the lay theories people hold about their situations. These beliefs could become more 
 	  174	  
chronic in nature if reinforced over time. In sum, although this question of how lay theories 
develop and perpetuate is beyond this paper, it is certainly a ripe avenue for empirical research to 
explore. 
Conclusion 
 The SSC model builds upon prior theorizing by integrating self and situation theories to 
predict motivational orientations that have not previously been accounted for. First, it argues that 
self theories and situation theories serve complementary motivational functions. Second, it 
generates testable predictions about how people are inclined to react given their concurrent 
beliefs about their personal attributes and relevant situational aspects. When people see 
themselves and the external situation as fixed, they tend to seek out a good fit; when people see 
themselves as malleable and the relevant situation as fixed, they tend to focus on developing 
themselves to suit the situational demands; when people see their external situation malleable but 
themselves a fixed, they are motivated to shape the situation to their own needs and wants; and 
when people see themselves and their external situations as highly malleable, they adopt a 
mentality of strategically navigating multiple possibilities. Thus, this model moves us closer to a 
more comprehensive predictive framework of how people’s lay theories of change motivate what 
people attempt to change when.  
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Figure 5.1. Dweck and Leggett’s (1988) model showing how lay theories of intelligence are 
associated with different goal orientations and behavior patterns, dependent on their perceived 































Figure 5.2. Self and Situation Change (SSC) Model of Lay Theories shows how lay theories of 
how changeable people and their situations are interact with one another. Each of the four white 
cells describe the orientations that people who have each combination of lay theories would 
hold—find my fit, develop myself, shape the situation, and navigate multiple possibilities. This 
model captures context-specific lay theory interactions, but can also be used to describe more 
chronic response orientations using an individual differences approach. 
 






Future Directions and Concluding Thoughts 
 The previous chapters build on one another incrementally in an effort to extend our 
understanding of how lay theories of change work. Self theories exemplify the transformational 
force of human beliefs—merely believing that attributes can change inspires effort towards self-
improvement. But influential as they are, self theory effects are conditional on their context. For 
example, changing people’s response options to difficulty can facilitate or attenuate lay theory 
differences in motivation. Complementing self theory effects, situation theories motivate action 
towards improving the circumstances. These effects manifest across a range of domains and 
behaviors, including people’s intentions to voice problems at work, their willingness to sign 
protest petitions against restrictive institutional policies, and their engagement in collective 
action to change the status quo. Taken together, self and situation theories explain when people 
adjust themselves to their situational demands and when they act to change their circumstances, 
respectively. Nonetheless human psychology does not comprise of isolated beliefs about the self 
and the situation. Understanding how they combine, as the Self by Situation Change model 
illustrates, can give us a more comprehensive picture of human motivation.  
 The empirical studies in this dissertation provide preliminary evidence for parts of the 
Self by Situation Change framework. Yet, they merely scratch the surface. The SSC framework 
provides an array of new testable predictions that we have yet to fully investigate. A set of 
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studies can test whether changing an entity theorist’s construals of the situation from fixed to 
malleable can motivate situation-change action from helplessness (i.e. going from Tom’s to 
Patrick’s reactions). Another set of studies can manipulate people’s self and situation theories to 
test whether their combinations map onto the response orientations proposed in the four SSC 
cells. A third set of longitudinal studies can measure people’s self and situation theories as they 
go through critical life transitions to understand how their responses are associated with their 
beliefs and also how their beliefs are shaped by these experiences. Furthermore, empirical 
research should explicate the role that goals and attributions play in this framework. In short, 
there are many exciting studies and questions just waiting to be tested. 
Concluding Thoughts 
A common criticism of psychological findings is that they are all “common sense” 
(Furnham, 1988). Many social psychological studies have tried to challenge this perception by 
showing that what many people consider general knowledge can often be inaccurate (e.g., 
Gilovich, Green, & Kahneman, 2002). In contrast, lay theory research concerns itself with the 
very questions of what this “common sense” entails, who has is and who does not, and what its 
implications are (Furnham, 1988). Because the lay theories of change literature originates from 
this tradition, I return to it in closing.  
 While we as scientists shirk the thought of denigrating our findings, there may be more to 
the perception that psychology is all about common sense. Our findings suggest that people 
change things that they think can be changed, and do not otherwise—an effective, adaptive, and 
seemingly obvious conclusion. Nevertheless, much of our reality is also shaped by these very 
behaviors. People are motivated to fulfill their fundamental assumptions about themselves and 
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the world, thus they often cause changes in the things they actively alter and do not in the things 
they deem fixed. In other words, people infer stability or changeability from the world, but their 
beliefs and actions also cause these very qualities. Insofar as psychology articulates common 
sense when people’s beliefs converge with reality, we should take it as a compliment that our 
findings reflect a good sense of the world, common or otherwise. 
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